

*Chaillot Paper*

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January 2007

n° 96

Monitoring a region in  
crisis: the European Union  
in West Africa

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Marie V. Gibert



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*Marie V. Gibert*

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*This Chaillot Paper only covers events in West Africa up to the end of December 2006.*

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	Préface Nicole Gnesotto	5
	Introduction	7
<b>1</b>	<b>Politics and security in West Africa</b>	9
	• <i>West Africa's conflicts: politics by other means?</i>	9
	• <i>West Africa's answers to insecurity</i>	14
<b>2</b>	<b>Peace-building: the evolution of a concept</b>	19
	• <i>The fragile balance between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing</i>	20
	• <i>Achieving peace and security in the immediate post-conflict phase</i>	21
	• <i>Long-term peace measures: reforms, democratisation and decentralisation</i>	24
	• <i>Dealing with borders and trade</i>	28
<b>3</b>	<b>The European Union's planned responses</b>	29
	• <i>The potential for military interventions</i>	30
	• <i>Early warning and action: still an objective?</i>	31
	• <i>Structural stability</i>	34
	• <i>Local ownership</i>	36
	• <i>Mainstreaming conflict prevention</i>	38
<b>4</b>	<b>An ongoing learning process</b>	41
	• <i>Dilemmas in the field</i>	41
	• <i>The institutional gap</i>	45
	Conclusion	51

# Contents

 <b>Annexes</b>	55
• <i>European Commission Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict</i>	55
• <i>The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership</i>	61
• <i>Action brought on 21 February 2005 by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union</i>	68
• <i>Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2004/85/CFSP</i>	69
• <i>Abbreviations</i>	80

*L*e continent africain figure, depuis 2003, à l'agenda quasi quotidien de la politique étrangère et de sécurité de l'Union. C'est par le biais de l'opération Artemis, en République démocratique du Congo (RDC), que les crises africaines sont en effet devenues l'un des domaines d'action privilégiés de la PESC. La RDC est restée depuis au centre de la politique africaine de l'Union : trois autres opérations ont été menées dans cet Etat, qu'il s'agisse de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité, de la formation de la police, ou, plus récemment, du soutien apporté par l'Union à la force des Nations unies lors de la première élection présidentielle démocratique qu'a connue ce pays. Simultanément à cet engagement physique dans la sécurité de la RDC, les pays membres de l'Union soutiennent également les efforts de l'Union africaine au Soudan, notamment la force de l'Union africaine au Darfour, par un ensemble de moyens financiers, personnels, politiques et logistiques.

Bien que marquée par de violentes crises locales ou nationales, l'Afrique de l'Ouest ne connaît pas la même priorité sur l'agenda de la PESC. Non que les Etats membres y soient absents : les cas de la Côte d'Ivoire ou de la Sierra Leone, par exemple, sont révélateurs des engagements politiques et militaires récents de la France et du Royaume-Uni, dans le cadre des Nations unies. De même, à travers toute une série d'instruments propres, la Commission joue un rôle de premier plan dans la prévention des conflits, l'aide et les perspectives de développement de ces pays. Mais ces différents engagements nationaux et européens en faveur des pays de la région de la Mano River ne permettent pas de déceler une stratégie globale et cohérente de l'Union à l'égard de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. La question récurrente de la cohérence des instruments européens, de leur efficacité donc pour la prévention des conflits, trouve une illustration particulière dans le cas de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

C'est ce que montre, avec concision, expertise, et conviction, ce Cahier de Chaillot, écrit par Marie Gibert, jeune universitaire française diplômée du King's College de Londres, qui séjourna à l'Institut au printemps 2006. Cet ouvrage offrira au lecteur une analyse précise des conflits ouverts ou

*latents en Afrique de l'Ouest, ainsi que des efforts déployés par les Nations unies ou les organisations régionales africaines pour réduire les sources d'instabilité et stabiliser les différents pays. Mais il rend également très visible la déperdition d'efficacité qui accompagne les différents niveaux d'engagements européens dans la région, faute de cohérence institutionnelle et de vision politique commune. Al'heure où le débat sur la réforme de l'Union connaît un regain d'actualité, ce Cahier de Chaillot est un argument de plus pour que soit conservé et surtout mis en œuvre l'ensemble des innovations que le projet de Traité apportait à la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union.*

*Paris, janvier 2007*



Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire ... For many, these names conjure up political crises and violent conflicts. The five West African countries that constitute the Mano River Basin have attracted significant international and regional attention and preoccupation over the last fifteen years.

Due to its history of colonial involvement in Africa, Europe shares a common past with these countries and has maintained a close partnership with them ever since their independence. This was done through the Yaoundé (1964-1969) and Lomé (1975-2000) agreements, which established a preferential trade and development aid partnership between European member states and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states. An increasing emphasis on political stability and on security was then progressively introduced into the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000. This peace and security dimension is also fully acknowledged in the EU's strategic partnership for Africa, which sets out the steps the EU will take by 2015 to support African efforts to build a peaceful future.<sup>1</sup>

The Mano River conflicts justified and gave a new urgency to these new efforts and the region remains the focus of considerable European political analysis and attention. Much has been written and said about the root causes of the Mano River conflicts. These analyses have informed the post-conflict solutions and the conflict-prevention policies advocated by the international community and the European Union (EU). This discussion about the origins of the region's conflicts is considered in the first chapter of this paper.

The second chapter focuses on the recent evolution towards a holistic understanding of development. Security, political stability and democracy are now considered essential elements in the recipe for economic development. Specific attention is therefore given to the range of technical and political programmes that are

1. 'Without peace, there can be no lasting development' (article 4). Council of the European Union, *The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership*, 19 December 2005, see Annex 2, p.61.

derived from this vision and the way they are advocated and supported.

The EU is slowly appropriating this holistic understanding of security and development and developing new programmes and concepts. A range of specific EU instruments has emerged over the past fifteen years, since the 1996 Commission communication on the issue of conflicts in Africa.<sup>2</sup> These instruments are described and analysed in chapter three.

The gap between these instruments and the planned policies, on the one hand, and on-field realities and effective institutional capacities in the EU, on the other hand, can at times be considerable. This gap is studied in detail in chapter four, which suggests some approaches for the improvement of the EU's responses to West Africa's fragile stability.

2. European Commission, 'The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond', Communication from the Commission to the Council, SEC (96)332 final, 6 March 1996.

# Politics and security in West Africa

Monitoring a region in crisis: the European Union in West Africa

1

Although the wars that plagued Sierra Leone and Liberia throughout the 1990s finally came to an end, stability and peace in the Mano River Basin remain fragile and vulnerable to any new crisis. The region's leadership, however, is increasingly taking control of matters. This is done with the assistance and support of the international community, which currently favours a holistic approach that underlines links between security, political stability and economic development. Taking a look at West Africa's security and politics is therefore an interesting opportunity to study the scope and extent of peace-building solutions that are currently being explored. It is also a means of measuring the gaps between these solutions and the effective needs on the field. Let us here consider the situation in West Africa, and the attempts at explaining the region's recent conflicts and at determining their root causes.

## West Africa's conflicts: politics by other means?

The Mano River region has been plagued with conflicts over the last decade and a half. Just as the long-lasting Liberian (1989-1996 and 1999-2003) and Sierra Leonean (1991-2000) wars were about to end, Guinea's Eastern province – *Guinée forestière* – was attacked by Sierra Leonean and Liberian rebel troops in 2000-2001. The declining health of Guinea's President Conté and the void and political struggle for scraps that it has entailed has led many to predict a future crisis in Guinea. The resolution of Côte d'Ivoire's conflict, which erupted in 2002 after several years of uncertainty, remains uncertain in spite of multiple national, regional and international mediation efforts. Guinea-Bissau has also come to attract the attention of the international contact group on the region.<sup>3</sup> After the coups that occurred in 1998 and 2003,<sup>4</sup> the international community feared a new destabilisation of the sub-region.

3. The International Contact Group on Liberia was formed in September 2002 and held its first working session on 19 December 2002 in Dakar, Senegal. It comprises representatives of the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. It is coordinated by ECOWAS. Recognising the need to take regional dynamics fully into account, the Group decided to extend its remit to the Mano River Basin (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau) in September 2004.

4. The first *coup*, in 1998, was led by General Mané, head of the army. President Vieira had dismissed Mané on the charge that he had provided Casamance rebels with weapons. General Mané challenged the accusation and was followed by a major part of the army. Following international and regional mediation efforts, a parliamentary investigation eventually showed that President Vieira himself was involved in the weapons trafficking. A new resurgence of violence forced him to resign in May 1999. In 2003 again, the army deposed President Yala, who had been elected in 2000. President Yala had dissolved the Parliament in November 2002 and regularly postponed new elections, thus triggering new tensions in the country.

5. This trend is best represented by Robert D. Kaplan's article 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet', *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2, February 1994, pp. 44-76, in which the author insists on the increasing scarcity of resources and urban overpopulation, and the weakness of many African states unable to face these challenges. As a result of this gloomy depiction, the author foresees the unavoidable rise of 'environmentally driven praetorian regimes'. This article performed a useful function in triggering a debate, although its main arguments were soon dismissed as lacking consistency.

6. United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000.

7. Paul Collier, *Economic Causes of Civil Conflicts and the Implications for Policy*, World Bank, Working Paper, June 2000. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.htm> (accessed on 15 May 2006).

8. Ian Smillie, 'Diamonds, Timber and West African Wars', *Securing Sustainable Development: Trade, Aid and Security – A Case Study*, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2002. Available at: [http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec\\_diamonds\\_timber.pdf](http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/envsec_diamonds_timber.pdf) (accessed on 16 May 2006).

9. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

10. For a detailed and carefully argued analysis of the economic causes of contemporary armed conflicts – and one that dismisses 'greed and grievance' as the principal cause of these conflicts –, see Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, 'Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflicts', International Peace Academy Policy Report, October 2003.

11. David Keen, 'Greedy Elites,

Attempts at determining the root causes of the region's conflicts are numerous and run between both ends of the spectrum, from deeply afro-pessimistic assessments<sup>5</sup> to more nuanced analyses. A consensus is slowly emerging, however, over bad economic and political governance. This mode of governance is derived from the mixture of pre-colonial and colonial governing habits that has never been abandoned.

'Natural resources' – essentially diamonds, gold and timber – features among the key terms that have made the reputation of the Mano River region. Especially since the December 2000 UN expert report to the Security Council, the role played by these natural resources in the conflicts is at the heart of a passionate debate.<sup>6</sup> Some consider that wars in countries rich in natural resources are necessarily triggered and driven by greed and predation.<sup>7</sup> The economic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and order would provide a convincing explanation for both the level of violence and the length of Sierra Leone's and Liberia's wars.<sup>8</sup> According to this thesis, economic factors, much more than social or political ones, are therefore at the very heart of the Mano River conflicts, while development programmes, as they were then implemented and supported by Western donors, failed to reverse this evolution towards 'warlord economies'.<sup>9</sup>

This single, economic explanation for a complex chain of conflicts is obviously weak: other countries similarly endowed in natural resources never experienced conflicts similar to those of the Mano River region. Trafficking in natural resources constantly fuelled the war and certainly partly explain its duration and possibly its level of violence, but they are not its sole, or main, cause.<sup>10</sup> Numerous surveys and survivors' testimonies have shown that enrichment through the extraction and traffic of natural resources were not at the origin of the political crises and violence that characterised the Mano River conflicts. According to the same testimonies, grievances against traditional economies and corrupt governments are much more convincing explanations for the war and the greed and violence that accompanied it.<sup>11</sup>

This first point underlines the need for a more complex understanding of the Mano River conflicts. The 'crisis of youth' may be one of the most apparent features in the Mano River conflicts, since young people constituted the majority of rebel recruits. The popularity of violent rebellion among young people should however be considered much more as a symptom of a deeply

entrenched political crisis than as one of the root causes of the region's conflicts. The so-called 'lumpen'<sup>12</sup> youth grew up under the rule of violent and corrupt elites.<sup>13</sup> The origins of the crisis could be traced as far back as the colonial era and the chieftaincy and slavery systems – supported by British and American settlers – that persisted in implementing matrimonial rules to the disadvantage of young people. These systems were never questioned by Sierra Leone's and Liberia's successive governments, which used them to their own advantage, thus maintaining a strong feeling of injustice and hopelessness among young people.<sup>14</sup> The same crisis is observable in Côte d'Ivoire, where groups of young patriots propagate xenophobic violence.

This first symptom of a crisis among the youth provides a stepping stone to the understanding of a wider 'crisis of identity' – beyond the youth factor alone – and to the idea that war in the Mano River basin could be interpreted as the continuation of political and economic struggles by other means.<sup>15</sup> More recent observations of the Ivorian conflict echo this argument. This conflict, in what was thought to be one of the most stable and prosperous states of West Africa, was analysed as a complex identity crisis: a crisis in intercommunity relations, a questioning of the relationship between the people and the national territory, a crisis of the nation's youth, going so far even as to lead to demands for a 'second independence' from the former colonial power, as was illustrated by the highly manipulated, but nonetheless numerous, anti-French demonstrations.<sup>16</sup>

Analyses, sometimes relayed in the media, referring to antagonism between Côte d'Ivoire's Muslim North and Christian South or to ethnic tensions in Sierra Leone, also tend to oversimplify matters. Grievances expressed by one ethnic group against the other constitute part of a wider set of grievances against a paralysed and unfair system, both at the national and at the local levels. At the national, overcentralised level, rulers often maintained ethnically-based inequalities in order to reward their supporters. Meanwhile, at the local level, an outdated chieftaincy system has often blocked social advancement.<sup>17</sup>

These arguments all point to the failure of West-Africa's post-independence states to break with old habits and provide their populations with the hoped-for economic prosperity. The now popular concept of 'failed states' acknowledges that many developing states' incapacity to ensure a stable economic and security

Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youth: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone', *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, no. 2, February 2003), pp. 67-94.

12. 'A largely unemployed and unemployable youth, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy': in Ibrahim Abdullah, 'Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2, 1998, p. 207.

13. Ibrahim Abdullah, op. cit.; see also Jimmy D. Kandeh, 'Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone', in Tunde Zack-Williams, Diane Frost and Alex Thomson (eds.), *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp. 179-95.

14. Paul Richards, 'To Fight or To Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone)', *African Affairs*, vol. 104, no. 417, October 2005, pp. 571-90.

15. Stephen Ellis, 'Les guerres en Afrique de l'Ouest : le poids de l'histoire', *Afrique contemporaine*, no. 198, avril-juin 2001, pp. 51-6.

16. Richard Banégas and Ruth Marshall-Fratani, 'Côte d'Ivoire, un conflit régional?' in *Politique Africaine*, no. 89, mars 2003, pp. 5-11.

17. Paul Richards, op. cit.

situation was due to weak and ill-adapted institutions and an unbalanced relationship between state and society. William Reno, with specific reference to Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1980s and 1990s, analysed these states' systems in detail and preferred the concept of 'shadow state' to the idea of 'failed state'. While a semblance of state bureaucracy continues to operate, the state leader benefits from the privileges of an internationally recognised sovereignty. In an attempt to defend himself against rivals and strongmen inherited from a previous regime, he personally leads a parallel, informal business network of internal and external clients.<sup>18</sup> Short-term, personal strategies therefore prevail over other, long-term objectives and alienate the majority of the population. The state structure is progressively dismantled and eventually loses its connection to society.

Democratisation and good governance reforms, as advocated and supported by Western donors and international institutions, failed to offer an alternative to 'shadow state' arrangements. They may have in fact hastened the crisis. The very quick democratisation processes of the beginning of the 1990s seriously undermined the fragile ethnic and political balances maintained in the Bissau-Guinean and Ivorian state apparatuses. They led some newly founded political parties to use community identity politics in the hope of winning the elections.<sup>19</sup> An obvious example here is the emergence of the concept of 'Ivoirité' on Côte d'Ivoire's political scene in the mid 1990s, in a context of economic and political crisis. The violent debate on the notion of Ivorian identity led to electoral and land reforms, which excluded foreigners from political leadership positions and ownership of landed property. The destabilising potential of a rapid democratisation process, essentially based on electoral – i.e. on numbers rather than on ideas – politics, had been deeply underestimated by international donors and state leaders alike.

Beyond these explicit political strategies, the porosity of West Africa's borders – a legacy of pre-colonial times exacerbated by modern regional integration – is also questioned. Rebel groups, small arms and light weapons as well as mineral resources easily cross the border, as was obvious during the attacks in Eastern

18. William Reno, *op. cit.*

19. On the destabilisation effects of democratisation programmes in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, see Thomas J. Bassett, '« Nord musulman et Sud chrétien » : les moules médiatiques de la crise ivoirienne', *Afrique contemporaine*, no. 205, Spring 2003, pp. 13-27; Richard C. Crook, 'Winning Coalitions and Ethno-regional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d'Ivoire', *African Affairs*, no. 96, 1997, pp. 215-42; and Joshua B. Forrest, 'Guinea Bissau', in Patrick Chabal et al., *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), pp. 235-63.

Guinea in 2000-2001 or in Western Côte d'Ivoire at the end of 2002. This apparent lack of control should however be qualified: Cross-border rebellions and arms trafficking are often the results of high-level political strategies. Interconnections between the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have already been widely documented: Charles Taylor, Liberia's warlord and subsequent President, was a main protagonist in Sierra Leone's war, in which he supported the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Beyond Taylor's Liberia, the responsibility of Burkina Faso, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire in both conflicts was also pointed out. These interferences explain the tolerated presence of Liberian and Sierra Leonean rebels in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, and the spreading of the war to both countries.<sup>20</sup> Guinea-Bissau was the object of similar neighbouring concerns. Links between the conflict in Senegalese Casamance and the *coups* in Guinea-Bissau are numerous.<sup>21</sup> The Senegalese and Guinean interventions in Bissau in 1998 underline how eager neighbouring countries are to prevent an emerging conflict from spreading and leading to regional instability, as well as the way personal connections and animosities can influence conflicts and external interventions.<sup>22</sup>

These alliances and struggles between West Africa's leaders, which are also fuelled by and which in turn themselves fuel provincial and local struggles at the borders,<sup>23</sup> are reminiscent of the European pre-first World War alliances, when all states claimed not to want to engage in war but rushed into political alliances which were bound to plunge them into the conflict. Meanwhile, other political strategies may also be at play here, when state leaders such as President Compaoré of Burkina Faso or President Conté of Guinea use the rhetoric of aggression to evoke a long-forgotten or non-existent national unity.<sup>24</sup>

20. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); Gerry Cleaver, 'Sierra Leone: A Victim of Intervention', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), *African Interventionist States* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 211-27.

21. Norrie MacQueen, 'A Community of Illusions? Portugal, the CPLP and Peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003, pp. 1-26.

22. Senegal's intervention in Guinea-Bissau in June 1999, in particular, was clearly marked by the long dispute between the two countries over the border region of Casamance, while Guinea, the other intervening and neighbouring country, shares a history of antagonism with Guinea-Bissau since the assassination of Amílcar Cabral – Guinea-Bissau's independence hero – in Conakry. See Simon Massey, 'Intervention in Guinea-Bissau', in Oliver Furley and Roy May (eds.), *African Interventionist States*, op. cit., pp. 229-64.

23. Amos Sawyer, 'Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2004, pp. 437-63.

24. The atrocities committed against natives from Burkina Faso in Côte d'Ivoire triggered a 'sacred union' around President Compaoré. Meanwhile, in 2001 in Guinea, President Lansana Conté showed the extent of his military and political skills when he called the Guinean population to unite and resist external aggressions in Eastern Guinea, using the very same xenophobic rhetoric as his predecessor Sékou Touré. See Mike McGovern, 'Conflit régional et rhétorique de la contre-insurrection : Guinéens et réfugiés en septembre 2000', *Politique Africaine*, no. 88, 2002, pp. 84-102.

## West Africa's answers to insecurity

### Current political situations in the Mano River Basin (as of December 2006)

**Sierra Leone** has resolutely taken the path towards reform and held its first parliamentary and presidential elections in 2002 and local elections (for the first time since 1972) in 2004. The United Nations (UN) mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, left the country in December 2005, leaving behind a UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) in charge of helping the government consolidate peace, while the United Kingdom (UK) and international NGOs actively contribute to state and security sector reforms and remain very present in the country. Sierra Leone's new state is now preparing for its second general elections due to take place in July 2007. The international community has however expressed its concern that the parties' unwillingness to articulate a clear political platform may jeopardise the electoral process.

**Liberia** attracted much international attention last year, electing Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as Africa's first female president. Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf asserted her resolution to implement state capacity-building reforms and to lead her country onto the path to peace, democracy and economic prosperity. She is already conducting a dynamic anti-corruption campaign and has also shown her determination to boost the timber business, one of Liberia's most promising economic sectors. The international community supports her efforts and the Governance Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) adopted in September 2005. The IMF also decided to revise and relax the recovery measures applied to Liberia. Reform of the justice and security sectors is also underway, although the UN Secretary General's report cited some serious flaws in police deployment and criminal justice. Responding to international pressure, Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf asked for Charles Taylor's extradition from Nigeria, where he has lived in exile since 2003, to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has indicted the former president of Liberia on 11 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In order to avoid any further destabilisation in the sub-region, the trial will take place



in The Hague, on the premises of the International Criminal Court. Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission should also start its formal hearings at the beginning of 2007.

The international community praised **Guinea-Bissau's** peaceful transition after the 2003 *coup*. Parliamentary elections took place in 2004 and brought the independence party, the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC), back to power, while former president Nino Vieira was elected to the presidency in 2005. His relations with his former party, the PAIGC, are however complicated and President Vieira, against the international community's advice, dismissed the government in November 2005 and appointed a new Prime Minister, himself suspended from the PAIGC for having openly expressed his support for Vieira. The new government's programme was finally adopted by parliament in March 2006, but the awkward relations between legislative and executive representatives slow down the transition process and hamper the revival of the country's economy. Another worrying sign was the heavy fighting that opposed the Bissau-Guinean army and the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC) rebels at the border with Senegal in March-April 2006,<sup>25</sup> thus underlining that Casamance would remain a destabilising factor. Guinea-Bissau is also said to be a new passing point for illegal immigration and drug trafficking.

**Côte d'Ivoire's** transition is even more uncertain, although there have been more positive signs over the last year, since the nomination of Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny in November 2005, than during the four years since the 2002 *coup*. A heavy debate over the proposed simultaneity of the disarmament and voter identification process – the *Forces Nouvelles* (Northern rebel movement) supporting it and President Gbagbo arguing that voters could not be identified in the current climate of insecurity – has considerably slowed down the organisation of the presidential and parliamentary elections, which were postponed once more. Upon the recommendation of the African Union, the United Nations Security Council prolonged the transition and President Gbagbo's mandate by twelve months on 1 November 2006. President Gbagbo seized this new opportunity to propose

25. Nino Vieira has an old enmity with MFDC leader Salif Sadio who played an instrumental role in the 1998-1999 *coup* against Vieira. Vieira may also have wanted to give a positive sign to his counterpart and Senegalese neighbour President Wade and to make clear that Casamance rebels could not use Guinea-Bissau as a military base.

his own peace plan in December 2006, a plan which the *Forces Nouvelles* rejected in favour of the UN plan. The United Nations reiterated its support to Prime Minister Banny on 21 December.

As for **Guinea**, its resistance to the 2000-2001 attacks and its stability throughout the Mano River conflicts has surprised and still puzzles more than one observer. Guinea's leadership indeed at times actively supported some rebel movements – such as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), opposed to Charles Taylor and based in Eastern Guinea, while the population was asked to take in numerous refugees from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. President Lansana Conté, who experienced several – real or fake – *coups* over the last fifteen years, is however seriously ill. The Guinean state is therefore characterised by an absence of clear leadership – there being currently no Prime Minister – and a struggle for power among Conté's *protégés*. The worsening living conditions for the majority of the country's population and the regular, widely followed general strikes lead many to predict a future crisis in Guinea and to wonder about the nature of the post-Conté transition. The government and the opposition have, however, been taking part in a 'national dialogue' meant to prepare the parliamentary elections due to take place in June 2007. They recently reached a consensus over four draft laws on the legal status of opposition political parties, the creation and role of the independent electoral commission, the public funding of political parties, and changes to the electoral code, which will be presented for adoption by the parliament.

26. A recently published Occasional Paper is devoted specifically to ECOWAS and its relations with the EU. See Bastien Nivet, 'Security by Proxy? The EU and (Sub-)Regional Organisations: The Case of ECOWAS,' *Occasional Paper* no. 63 (Paris: EUISS, March 2006).

27. This is true for both the states that were intervened in and the intervening states: Sierra Leone and Liberia were further pillaged by corrupt ECOMOG troops, while the Gambian troops that came back from the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia were the ones who supported Yahya Jammeh's *coup* in 1994.

28. Nigeria refused to intervene militarily in Guinea-Bissau after the demanding interventions it conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone. See Norrie MacQueen, *op. cit.*

As the above description of the current situation in the Mano River Basin shows, and in spite of the great uncertainty of the countries' political futures, the sub-region is slowly moving towards more peace, if not complete stability. Further attention will be given to the prevention and post-conflict reforms carried out by each state with the support of the international community in the following chapter. Let us first briefly consider efforts implemented at the regional and sub-regional levels.<sup>26</sup>

The regional aspect of West Africa's crises soon led the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the path to peacekeeping missions through its Monitoring Group ECOMOG. In spite of some controversial results<sup>27</sup> and ECOWAS's still limited capacities and heavy dependency on Nigeria,<sup>28</sup> the trans-

formation of the economic regional organisation into a more political organisation turned towards conflict resolution underlines a concern for regional peace and the willingness of West African leaders to take matters into their hands. The same concerns are present at the continental level. The reborn African Union (AU) aims at playing a growing role in conflict resolution and prevention through its Peace and Security Council and regional standby forces, a project already approved by and supported by ECOWAS and its member states. ECOWAS has further equipped itself with a Mediation and Security Council meant to implement the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted in 1999.

Critics are quick to point out the lack of concrete measures on the ground, but the series of summits, declarations and documents referring to conflict prevention and resolution strategies certainly revived the political dialogue and improved the region's international image. Moreover, the brutal ending of Côte d'Ivoire's success story necessitated a regional response, which was backed by the international community and helped break down the Anglophone-Francophone divide. Some feel it is not a dominant issue anymore, although the division of labour between ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) still needs to be clearly defined. There are also signs that the Mano River Union<sup>29</sup> (MRU) could be revived, now that recent elections have brought new leaders to power in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In spite of its impressive record of passivity, the sub-regional organisation may indeed be better equipped to implement long-term solutions and handle issues specific to the three countries.

29. The Mano River Union (MRU) is a society established in 1973 between Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1980, Guinea joined the union. The goal of the Union was to foster economic cooperation between the countries. Due to conflicts between the countries, the objectives of the Union could not be achieved. However, on 20 May 2004, it was reactivated by a summit of the three leaders of the Mano River Union states.



# Peace-building: the evolution of a concept

Several policy shifts, over the last twenty years, have occurred in donor programmes in Africa and explain and support the current international focus on conflict prevention. During the second half of the 1980s, democracy and good governance slowly came to the fore, based on the assumption that economic development for all could only be achieved in a democratic and stable environment.<sup>30</sup> Security, democratisation and economic development came to be automatically associated. This triangle gave way to holistic programmes that are best illustrated in the Washington consensus and in ambitious democratisation programmes. Former ‘fragile states’ would, through these reforms, recover their authority and eventually be able to both prevent new crises and deliver the long-expected economic prosperity.

The third wave of democratisation, however, was not as widespread and sustainable in Africa as had been initially expected, while the link between democratisation and stability, which had seemed obvious at first, came to be increasingly called into question by emerging crises. The end of the Cold War, and therefore of superpower strategies in Africa, did not provide the promised peace either: the conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone were marked by high levels of violence and the international community’s unwillingness and unpreparedness to intervene quickly and proportionally. Accordingly, donors resolved to focus their efforts on peace-building<sup>31</sup> measures meant to prevent new conflicts and shifted their policies from limited efforts towards simple mediation to a broader engagement with the processes that created the conflicts. The 1990s thus saw the emergence of a number of pre- and post-conflict reform packages, which are expected to be both broad (all root causes of a crisis should be addressed) and technical (reforms must remain manageable and ethically acceptable). Peace-building programmes range from Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) to state and security sector reform (SSR), while good governance and democratisa-

30. See, for example, article 5 of the Agreement amending the fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomé signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995 (Lomé IV bis), OJ L156.

31. The term ‘peace-building’ refers to the ‘national and international efforts at economic development and institution building to make states viable and peaceful including pre- and post-conflict aspects.’ See International Crisis Group, *EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited*, Europe Report no. 160, 17 January 2005, Brussels.

tion remain among the conditions and objectives of all development programmes. This set of options and the hypotheses underlying them will be considered in this second chapter. Let us however first take a quick look at the peace-keeping interventions that recently took place in the region under study.

### **The fragile balance between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing**

As a consequence of the number of conflicts that have taken place in West Africa over the last fifteen years, the region has been the scene of numerous international and regional peace-keeping efforts. ECOWAS showed its determination to take matters into its own hands as early as 1990, when it first sent its monitoring group ECOMOG to Liberia. As has been previously mentioned, this first intervention came up against some serious hurdles and ECOMOG found itself caught up in unexpected violence, transforming its mandate from peace-keeping to peace-enforcing.<sup>32</sup> ECOWAS however maintained its efforts and subsequently conducted new interventions in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, thus making its mark as a major security actor in the region.<sup>33</sup>

The UN, of course, is another major player in West Africa's security complex. There again, the renaming and reshaping of its interventions shows that it has had to adapt its missions to local realities in a way very similar to that of ECOWAS. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) left the country in 1997, when Charles Taylor's election to the presidency triggered some hopes of political stability. The UN was not away for long, however: a new United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) intervened at the outbreak of war, in 2003, and is still in place,<sup>34</sup> ensuring the state's and the people's security and assisting in national security reform during the transition period.<sup>35</sup> In a similar fashion, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) had to be upgraded, in 1999, to a United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was authorised to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and was expanded several times in 2000 and 2001. UNAMSIL left the country at the end of 2005, however, and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), meant to coordinate effectively with the UN system in Sierra

32. This was effectively the case for the first ECOMOG intervention, when the monitoring group's mandate was changed from 'peacekeeping' to 'peace enforcement' at the ECOWAS extraordinary summit in Bamako, Mali, 27-28 November 1990.

33. For more information on the four ECOWAS interventions and the regional organisation's contribution to security in West Africa, see Bastien Nivet, *op. cit.*

34. As of 30 November 2006, UNMIL included: 15,638 total military personnel, 1,097 police, 521 international civilian. See UNMIL website, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unmil/> (accessed on 12 January 2007).

35. UNMIL is currently authorised until 31 March 2007.

Leone to help the country consolidate peace and assist the government of Sierra Leone in strengthening the capacities of state institutions. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI),<sup>36</sup> finally, is, like UNMIL, still in place, controlling a 'zone of confidence' across the centre of the country.<sup>37</sup>

These UN missions were at times preceded or complemented by European bilateral interventions. British forces were deployed to Freetown in 2000 to evacuate UK citizens and secure the airport to allow the arrival of UN reinforcements. They subsequently took part in the training of Sierra Leone's armed forces and assisted and advised the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme. More recently, and in spite of its tendency to reduce its military presence in Africa, France agreed to send a military mission of more than 4,000 troops to Côte d'Ivoire in September 2002, in support of the ECOMICI mission of the ECOWAS. This double intervention succeeded in ensuring a fragile peace in Côte d'Ivoire, but the subsequent efforts led by France, the UN, the AU and ECOWAS failed to bring a long-lasting solution to the country's political and military crisis. Like previous ECOMOG interventions, the current international force in Côte d'Ivoire seems caught up in the dilemma of keeping a peace that does not exist. The conflicting parties remain unwilling to abide by the rules set out in the Marcoussis agreement, signed in 2003, which provide *inter alia* for the disarmament of non-state combatants and the organisation of elections.

### **Achieving peace and security in the immediate post-conflict phase**

The above-mentioned peace-keeping missions were often preceded and/or gave way to ceasefire and peace negotiations. These negotiations, to which all belligerent parties are invited, most often lead to power-sharing agreements. All parties – rebels and incumbents – are given a share of power in the post-conflict state and granted blanket amnesties. The new state should be as representative as possible of the population's opinions and interests and the material and social privileges linked to the position are meant to wean former combatants away from renewed violence. This strategy may seem sensible in the short term: inviting all parties to the negotiating table has proved to be an effective ceasefire strategy.

36. UNOCI was established in April 2004. The mandate of the small political mission, the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) established in May 2003, ended on that same date. In accordance with the Council's request, the Secretary-General transferred authority from MINUCI and ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date.

37. As of 30 November 2006, UNOCI included: 9,036 total uniformed personnel, 992 police, 369 international civilian personnel. See UNOCI website, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unoci/facts.html> (accessed on 12 January 2007).

Middle and long-term results are much more debatable. First, there is no reason to believe that those rebels who have spread violence and political disorder in the territories under their control are interested in achieving a conclusive agreement or that they will become democratic state leaders. Second, the quasi-systematic implementation of power-sharing agreements runs the risk of generating an even greater number of insurgent groups whose sole aim is to get their share of privileges, while the amnesties that often accompany power-sharing compromises may create a feeling of impunity and unfairness, both among the rebels and the population.<sup>38</sup> In Liberia and Sierra Leone, power-sharing agreements (respectively Abuja in 1996 and Lomé in 1998) resulted in a disastrous 'warlord's peace' and renewed violence by insurgents.<sup>39</sup> The current transitional government in Côte d'Ivoire, which has also brought together incumbents and rebels, has shown no sign that it might be more successful at reaching a compromise over the disarmament process and the preparations for coming elections.<sup>40</sup>

Following a similar logic of finding quick disincentives to violence and responding, partly at least, to the notion of a 'youth crisis', external actors have resolved to carefully manage, through their DDR programmes, the reintegration of young fighters into newly created military or police forces or into civil society. Aid agencies, NGOs and international organisations have now acquired enough experience in disarmament and demobilisation to achieve most of the technical and short-term objectives of the D and D part of the DDR.

The main difficulty, however, lies in the gap that can arise between the ex-combatants' expectations and the effective support they are eventually given. The complicated start of the DDR programme in Liberia in late 2003 and 2004 came up against this very problem. Ex-combatants expected to receive their demobilisation allowance at once whereas it was paid progressively. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which was in charge of the DDR programme, was not, either, ready to lead the DDR process at its official start. The additional troops had not arrived yet, and the demobilisation camps meant to host the process were not ready. The ex-combatants' reaction, in December 2003, was extremely violent – 12 were killed in demonstrations in Monrovia.

38. Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, 'The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa', *African Affairs*, vol. 104, no. 416, 2005, pp. 375-98. The reverse is however also true: once amnesty has been granted, the international community's credibility is at stake. This question may have been treated a little lightly concerning Charles Taylor: what African leader will now accept an 'amnesty and exile' solution, as did Taylor, if it does not exclude a future judiciary transfer? See Andreas Mehler and Judy Smith-Höhn, 'Liberia: Ellen in Wonderland?', *GIGA-Focus*, no. 5, May 2006.

39. Amos Sawyer, *op. cit.*

40. On the current situation in Côte d'Ivoire, see the box on page 15.



This episode underlined how difficult and important it is to find the right balance between positive incentives that will lead ex-combatants to engage in the DDR programme, and the effective means and capacities of the institutions in charge of the programme. Beginning a DDR too rapidly and promising too much can only trigger frustration, which can itself turn into violence so soon after the end of a conflict.

The longer-term objectives comprised in the reintegration part of the programme, moreover, are generally not taken into account during disarmament and demobilisation, rendering it more complicated. Clear figures on combatants are often lacking both before and after demobilisation, which makes its evaluation and the continuation of the reintegration process difficult. The perceived urgency of DDR also means that it is often undertaken by external actors at a time when the new – transition – government is busy settling in and does not get involved enough to subsequently take over the reintegration phase. The two latter problems could be observed, in particular, in Guinea-Bissau where there is no planned follow-up for the Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Former Combatants (PDRRI), led by the International Organisation for Migration until December 2005.

Reintegration is also less technical and demands a more comprehensive approach: Economic recovery is essential if new perspectives are to be offered to former combatants. In the absence of road and market infrastructures, staff involved in DDR in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau have avowedly found it difficult to convince young people to go back to land farming, the first provider of employment in the region.<sup>41</sup> DDR is, finally, caught up in a moral dilemma since it amnesties and provides former combatants with material advantages of which most of the population and many victims are deprived. It may thus send an ambiguous or even dangerous message, as is the case with power-sharing agreements. The DDR process has been the object of much criticism in Sierra Leone, for example, where this ambiguity was reinforced by the non-inclusion of combatants who had used non-firearms or of women – volunteers and slaves – combatants.<sup>42</sup>

41. David Keen, *op. cit.* An interview with an international NGO worker in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, March 2006.

42. Interview with an international NGO worker in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in December 2005.

## Long-term peace measures: reforms, democratisation and decentralisation

The now widespread observation that the conflicts of the Mano River Basin were above all caused by the failure of the states where they took place led the international community to 'bring the state back in', i.e. to try to re-establish its authority through reforms. The idea driving this new trend is that by addressing, through institutional reforms, the issue of state weakness, future crises – whatever the triggering factor – may be prevented. This has led the international community to get involved in a sector which it had until then avoided, essentially for ethical and international law reasons: the security sector.

Security sector reform is in its early stages and its contents therefore remain rather vague and ill-defined. The novelty of the approach is in its broadened understanding of the 'security sector' that integrates both traditional security forces (including intelligence), but also the institutions in charge of controlling them (ministries and Parliament) or necessary for their good working order (judiciary system).<sup>43</sup> As some civil society organisations underline, the merging of development and security programmes forces some donor-countries to reconsider the contents of their development programmes and adopt a more military and security-based approach. The way military and security assistance expenditures are included into donor countries' budgets has also been the object of much debate and scrutiny, there being the growing risk that traditional military assistance be included in development budgets.<sup>44</sup>

A close look at reforms in the Mano River region shows that the broadest definition was used in Sierra Leone and the most limited in Guinea where military assistance in training and equipment remains the rule.<sup>45</sup> Wide differences in the levels of violence and post-war international presence in both countries, as well as in the definitions given to 'conflict prevention' by their tutelary powers, explain these different degrees of security sector reform. Sierra Leone, where a broad security sector reform strategy is progressively implemented, provides an interesting case study. Following the DDR programme, the army and police underwent new training programmes essentially conducted by the UK and other Commonwealth nations who were also careful to improve the equipment and living conditions of the security staff and their families.

43. Aline Lebœuf, 'La réforme britannique du secteur de la sécurité en Sierra Leone : vers un nouveau paradigme ?', *Politique africaine*, no. 98, June 2005.

44. Jean-Marc Châtaigner, 'Aide publique au développement et réformes des systèmes de sécurité : l'improbable rencontre du Dr Jekyll et de Mr Hyde', *Afrique Contemporaine*, no. 209, 2004, pp. 23-49.

45. Training sessions also provide space for raising awareness, among the military, of the importance of peaceful and respectful relations between the Guinean army and the country's civil institutions and society.

The behaviour and ethics of the two bodies improved considerably and security was restored in the country, allowing for the departure of UNAMSIL in December 2005. A long history of military coups and ‘sobel’<sup>46</sup> mischief, however, means that long-term efforts will be necessary before trust can be fully restored between the army and the state’s civil institutions. Reforms in other parts of the security sector further underline the importance of this human factor: the country’s justice system has considerably improved thanks to the high-quality work of the Chief Justice who managed to attract able people from the diaspora and set new standards of justice with the help of other judges from the Commonwealth.

The results and utility of the Special Court and the Anti-Corruption Commission are much more disputed, however. Many Sierra Leoneans expressed their incomprehension at the considerable funds spent by these institutions and at the establishment of a Special Court when the normal justice system could have sufficed.<sup>47</sup> It is now obvious that the Special Court will judge only two of the chief figures of the conflict – Sam Hinga Norman and Charles Taylor. Taylor’s much awaited and acclaimed transfer from Nigeria cannot silence these critics and poses serious security questions for the whole region. As for the Anti-Corruption Commission, many in both the Sierra Leonean and international communities resent its obsession with corruption and the very bad image it gives of Sierra Leone’s leadership. This raises the question, in West Africa as elsewhere, of an increasing ‘juridicisation’ of post-conflict reconstruction, to the probable detriment of local and international balances of power.<sup>48</sup> Sweeping it aside in the name of morality and justice is not acceptable and the automatic inclusion of international *ad-hoc* justice in immediate post-conflict programmes deserves a serious debate, when time, simply, may be necessary to heal crimes and societal rifts and establish a capable local judiciary.

Democratisation measures are another aspect of conflict-prevention programmes, and generally encompass transparent and peaceful elections and democratic liberties, in particular for the political opposition, media and civil society. Following a post-conflict transition period, elections are generally considered a first step towards normalisation since they necessitate the end of the disarmament and demobilisation process and the identification of all voters. In all situations, they are considered as a means of

46. The term ‘sobel’ designates the rogue and often unpaid combatants – soldiers by day, rebels at night – who turned to looting, illegal mining and attacks on civilians during the war.

47. Chandra L. Sriram, ‘Wrong-Sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone’, *Fordham International Law Journal*, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 472-506, February 2006.

48. Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Order and Justice in Iraq’, *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 4, 2003, pp. 135-52.

popular expression and diffusion of tensions, therefore as conflict prevention. Liberia's 1997 presidential elections, however, which gave Charles Taylor a democratic and indisputable legitimacy, underlined the limits of electoral democracy: surveys showed that Liberian voters had given their votes to Taylor out of violence fatigue more than out of conviction that he could lead the country towards a better future.

These results point to an overestimation of the transformation potential carried in democratic elections: The wave of democratisation in Africa in the 1990s saw the emergence of a number of 'electoral autocracies', which had only the appearance of multi-party democracies and triggered immense frustration among opposition leaders. The destabilisation potential of a rushed-in democratisation, almost solely based on elections, was equally underestimated,<sup>49</sup> as was illustrated by the Ivorian and Bissau-Guinean crises of the 1990s. Electoral processes in both countries led to inter-community violence. In the absence of long-prepared political programmes, some party leaders turned towards the easiest type of argument, i.e. community and national identity. These four examples underline the limits of 'democratisation by numbers'. When democracy is in its early stages, a sound system of checks and balances is absolutely necessary to counter-balance the possible pitfalls of a solely electoral democracy.

Responding to critics pointing out the artificiality of Africa's wave of democratisation, donors and NGOs have been keen on reinforcing the civil liberties' section of their democratisation programmes. NGOs therefore support media capacity-building projects, essentially intended for national and local community radio projects in the Mano River region. The aim is to both revive West Africa's oral traditions and create new communication channels between the local and national, popular and institutional levels. Donor institutions, on the other hand, now accompany their programmes with media liberalisation and civil liberties conditions. The Guinean state, for instance, was invited not only to organise transparent elections in 2005, but also to liberalise Guinean radio and guarantee freedom of movement in the country for opposition leaders. Guinean civil society organisations, however, underline that these civil liberties amount to nothing in the absence of financial, material and intellectual capacities that would allow political opponents to travel around the country and have equal

49. Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, *op. cit.*

access to campaigning resources, and enable civil society to offer independent radio programmes.

Decentralisation has more recently become an integral part of state reform packages and is increasingly considered an efficient means for the expression of local concerns and the improvement of governance. Decentralisation in Africa is also meant to effectively block the tendencies towards over-centralisation that were apparent in many African states during the post-independence era, and re-establish a balance between provinces and local communities. In spite of the injustices perpetuated by chieftaincies before and during the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, many West Africans still feel a strong bond to their local chieftaincy system and trust it as their best representative at the national level. Decentralisation was a major element in Sierra Leone's peace agreement and many felt it should be implemented as soon as possible. In effect, many Sierra Leoneans interpreted the 2004 local elections as a very strong sign of change. Their hope still is that decentralisation – and the new link it establishes between local and national politics – will introduce more transparency and democracy in the chieftaincy system. Many rural inhabitants also think decentralisation will enable the local level to effectively check and balance the national level, which is renowned for its abuses and failure to redistribute wealth and benefits to the entire territory.

More critical voices note, however, that this reform is premature when the central state is still very fragile and that the reform has, like many others, been undertaken too hastily, with the destabilising effects this can entail in a country with a long history of warlords and state fragility.<sup>50</sup> It remains to be seen whether the Sierra Leonean government, supported by the international community, can successfully guarantee good governance and accountability at the local level and maintain the link between the local and national spheres. There is a high risk that the national government favours a local district system that runs parallel to traditional chieftaincies. The latter are indeed accused by many external donors and parts of the national media of being at the very source of the injustices that triggered the war. Creating a parallel system – even elected – would however only isolate further the rural poor who still feel very strong bonds with their customary chiefs.<sup>51</sup>

50. Richard Fanthorpe, 'On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone', *African Affairs*, vol. 105, no. 418, 2006, pp. 27-49. And interviews with NGO staff in Freetown, Sierra Leone, December 2005. A member of the EC delegation in Freetown also implicitly acknowledged that the decentralisation programme in Sierra Leone, in part funded by the EU, may come a bit early in the post-conflict process. But decentralisation was part of the post-conflict agreement and donors insist Sierra Leoneans awaited its implementation with some impatience.

51. Richard Fanthorpe, op. cit.

## Dealing with borders and trade

Whereas the above-mentioned reform efforts were conducted at the national state level, other reforms necessitated common efforts at the regional and international levels. The idea that uncontrolled borders and unethical trade may fuel conflicts, and that both neighbouring and Western countries may therefore have had their share of responsibilities in the Mano River conflicts, has slowly come to the fore. International law and UN Security Council Resolutions now closely regulate arms sales, but the proliferation of light weapons remains a crucial issue in West Africa. It is a source of serious concern in fragile post-conflict states such as Liberia where the disarmament of former combatants cannot constitute a satisfying long-term solution in the absence of an effective sub-regional control of the borders. Common border management, in the form of joint patrol and community programmes, was one option favoured by the Mano River Union heads of state at their last summit,<sup>52</sup> while the new Liberian government, in the absence of a stable Ivorian partner, is naturally eager to secure its border with Côte d'Ivoire and concerned by its lack of capacity in this respect.<sup>53</sup>

A similar concern, based on the role played by trafficking in natural resources before and during the Mano River conflicts, triggered both European and West African support for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which aims at preventing the illegal trade of so-called 'blood diamonds'. Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea and the European Community are among the 45 participants, while Liberia has proved its determination to satisfy the criteria for its acceptance in the scheme and to fully participate in the international diamond trade. Similar strategies for other products, such as gold and timber, which were at the centre of West African conflicts, are currently under consideration.

52. Government of Sierra Leone, *Communiqué of the Special Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mano River Union*, 28 July 2005. Available at: <http://www.state-house-sl.org/pressreleases/mrucom-july28-05.html> (accessed on 17.05.2006).

53 *The Inquirer* (Monrovia), 'Take Border Issue Seriously', 22 May 2006.

# The European Union's planned responses

In line with the current holistic approach to conflict prevention and peace-building policies, the EU asserts its determination to 'enhance the capacity to deal with tensions and insecurity as early as possible to prevent the outbreak of violence and address structural causes of conflict as well as ensuring that violent conflicts do not re-emerge in the post-conflict phase'.<sup>54</sup> The European Commission classifies the EU's conflict prevention and peace-building efforts into two categories: direct and indirect initiatives.

Direct initiatives range from military interventions to early-warning and action mechanisms to support for conflict-resolution initiatives and institutional reforms and will be the subject of the first four sections of this chapter. Indirect initiatives refer to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes, from development to trade or agriculture. The implementation and efficiency of these indirect initiatives is naturally more difficult to determine. The European Union at times seems to suggest, in its policy documents, that any development programme can contribute to conflict prevention.<sup>55</sup> This approach, based on the idea that any measure of economic improvement will lead to increased security for all, is certainly too optimistic and avoids considering the political and social impact of development programmes on the different strata of a society. While the EU begins to engage in a reflection on the indirect consequences of its development and trade policies, specific policies are implemented in order to avoid the trade in particular goods fuelling violent conflicts. These efforts will be examined in the fifth section of this chapter.

54. European Commission website, Conflict Prevention: Overview; available online at: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp.htm) (accessed on 20 May 2006).

55. European Commission (no date), IQSG Programming Fiche on Conflict Prevention (Conflict Prevention Guidelines), [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/doc/cp\\_guide.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/doc/cp_guide.pdf) (accessed on 1 June 2006).

### The potential for military interventions

The EU has achieved significant steps in the field of military and civilian crisis management in Africa over the last two years and led five ESDP missions on the continent since 2003.<sup>56</sup> Operation Artemis, in 2003 in Bunia, in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was an interim emergency multinational force meant to provide the UN mission in DRC (MONUC) with some additional time to adjust to the situation. Observers agree that it successfully fulfilled its mission, paving the ground for new ESDP missions in the DRC. Among these is another military mission, EUFOR, the deployment over a period of four months of an EU force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in DR Congo.<sup>57</sup> EUFOR was concluded on 30 November 2006. Although it is still early to draw definitive conclusions on the longer-term effects of the mission and the success of the political transition it monitored, EUFOR proved able to maintain peace in the capital city when the two presidential candidates' militia provoked serious skirmishes between the two election ballots. Both operations also underline the EU's capacity to conduct short-term, well-targeted interventions. This demonstration of capacity certainly contributes to strengthening the EU's political leverage and may act as a powerful conflict-prevention tool in other parts of Africa.

These operations also show that ESDP operations can act as a necessary and appropriate complement to other organisations' operations. Another example of this is provided by the EU civilian-military support given to the AU's operation AMIS II in Darfur, Sudan. The EU action is meant to support the AU's efforts, while respecting its counterpart's ownership. The African Peace Facility completes this multilateral strategy by providing funds from an EDF budget of €250 million in support of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU and other regional organisations. The ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire thus received €12.5 million from the facility funds. Such cases of 'multilateral subsidiarity' are certainly more conceivable than direct ESDP military operations in West Africa. As mentioned earlier, ECOWAS has indeed given strong signals that it wishes to develop its capacities to respond to regional crises and the EU in turn supports this policy.<sup>58</sup>

56. A review of the main types of ESDP mission is provided in Pedro Serrano, 'A Strategic Approach to the European Security and Defence Policy', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way', *Chaillot Paper* no. 90 (Paris: EUISS), June 2006, pp. 39-47. The two ESDP missions conducted in the DRC and not mentioned here, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo, are considered in this current volume, p. 37.

57. EUFOR included 1,200 troops in Kinshasa and as many in neighbouring Gabon, ready to be deployed in the event of a crisis. The mission was terminated four months after the first round of the elections, i.e. at the end of November 2006.

58. Bastien Nivet, *op. cit.*



## Early warning and action: still an objective?

The notion of early warning derives from the idea that a conflict does not erupt suddenly, and that early warning signs can be detected sufficiently in advance for an early, preventive action to be launched. The Commission, its various desks around the world and in-country delegations, are thus asked to closely monitor the political situation in all countries with the help of a list of root causes of conflict.<sup>59</sup> These assessments are then used, by the EU Secretary General and High Representative and the Commission, to prepare a watch-list of crisis-prone countries at the start of each Presidency. In addition, risk factors are to be closely considered during the elaboration of the Commission's Country Strategy Papers so as to ensure a coordinated approach to conflict prevention.

The term 'early warning' appears much less often in more recent policy documents. This is possibly an implicit way of acknowledging that 'early warning and action' is an ambitious objective whose results are often hard to prove. Council and Commission staff themselves agree that the EU, like all other international actors, tends to react to crises more than it prevents them.<sup>60</sup> The complexity and extent of the international scene and the exigencies of democracy and multilateralism mean that preventive measures and interventions are often delayed, while military interventions and reactions to emergencies are more prone to attract media attention and public visibility.

The Council has nonetheless adopted a series of conflict-prevention instruments, which range from diplomatic, financial and economic sanctions to preventive diplomacy and a reserve of funds that can be quickly mobilised for initiatives in peace-building, reconstruction and development. Sanctions, adopted by the Council in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), are now a regularly used policy instrument, either in the form of autonomous EU sanctions or as sanctions implementing certain resolutions of the UN Security Council. They comprise such measures as arms embargoes, other specific or general trade restrictions, financial restrictions and restrictions on admissions against certain non-state entities and individuals of non-EU countries. These sanctions, under one form or another, were applied against Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone

59. European Commission, Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict, see Annex I, p. 55. Root causes are listed under eight headings: legitimacy of the state; rule of law; respect for fundamental rights; civil society and media; relations between communities and dispute-solving mechanisms; sound economic management; social and regional inequalities; geopolitical situation.

60. Interviews with Commission staff members in Brussels in September 2005 and June 2006.

and/or some of their political leaders. Their drafting, over the years, has been characterised by a greater precision: the goal is to target specific commercial exchanges or specific persons whose activities are detrimental to the country's peace, while trying to avoid a situation where these sanctions affect the country's population.

Post-conflict reconstruction programmes and security sector reforms, moreover, necessitate the resurgence of economic development and foresee the rebuilding of effective police and army forces. A fragile balance must then be found between the necessary resumption of trade in natural resources and arms, while the political situation often remains too fragile for a complete lifting of the embargos. Sanctions are therefore partly lifted and re-worded, while the definitions of the newly authorised trade and necessary controls need to be made tighter.

Sanctions are not, however, the panacea for the EU, which privileges preventive diplomacy and political dialogue. Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, the partnership agreement that links the EU and the ACP states, plans for a 'political dialogue' between the EU and its ACP partners. The aim of this dialogue is to 'cover all the aims and objectives laid down in [the] Agreement' and to 'contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment'. Policies aimed at preventing, managing and resolving violent conflicts should also feature prominently in this 'political dialogue'.

The first five years of implementation of the Cotonou Agreement gave rise to comments and critiques. Observers noted, in particular, that in the absence of a systematic political dialogue, the EU's position tended to be more reactive than effectively preventive. Relations with Guinea-Bissau and Togo, whose governments were accused of not respecting all the conditions of the partnership, also demonstrated that the ACP Group and friends of the country could contribute positively to the dialogue.<sup>61</sup> The Council and its ACP partners, often the instigators of the critiques, partly responded to them through the mid-term revision of the Cotonou Agreement, in 2005.

Initially conceived as a flexible tool, the 'political dialogue' provided by Article 8 was reformed. The revised Cotonou Agreement makes provision for a more systematic, formal and structured dialogue with each country. The dialogue should now be held before the consultation procedure provided by Article 96<sup>62</sup> of the same

61. James Mackie and Julia Zinke, 'When Agreement Breaks Down, What Next? The Cotonou Agreement's Article 96 Consultation Procedure', *Discussion Paper* no. 64A, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht, 2005.

62. An Article 96 procedure can be launched if a party to the agreement – the European Community and the member states of the European Union or an ACP state – considers that the other party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. This consultation procedure can lead to the adoption of 'appropriate measures' and, as a last resort, to a suspension of the agreement. Please refer to the following section of this chapter for more information on the implementation of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.

agreement can be launched. In addition, under the revised Cotonou Agreement, representatives of the ACP Group and of the Joint EU-ACP Parliamentary Assembly may take part in the political dialogue. It remains to be seen whether these reforms can effectively increase the EU's capacity for preventive diplomacy. The amendments, in any case, strengthen the political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement and provide for a systematic dialogue with each partner country, which in effect complements the work of the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) sent to troubled regions.

Although there is no EUSR for West Africa, Mr. Hans Dahlgren has been systematically invited, since 2001, by the EU Presidency to be its special representative to the Mano River countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). As such, he represents the EU in international forums such as the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin and travels at least twice a year to the region to meet state leaders and other representatives of the international community in order to try and find peaceful solutions to the crises in the region. Mr. Dahlgren works in close coordination with the joint Council and Commission Africa working group.

Two supplementary, more technical tools, complement this 'early warning and action' system. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) has been used since 2001 to quickly bring a host of measures to bear on a conflict situation. The RRM can only finance a non-humanitarian operation where other instruments cannot respond within the necessary time frame, and for no longer than 6 months. The RRM was mobilised in 2002, for example, to support ECOWAS mediation efforts in Côte d'Ivoire. €500,000 was granted to finance the establishment of an ECOWAS secretariat and mediation meetings in Abidjan, as well as a mediation conference in Abuja. Another €730,000 was given for the reestablishment of a radio station in Liberia that would provide balanced programming relevant for the transition process.<sup>63</sup>

The EU has also accumulated considerable experience in the field of election assistance and observation. This is consistent with the current emphasis on democratisation through transparent and free elections. Election assistance and observation missions are a response to those who criticised the international community's unconditional support for rapid elections, which can have a destabilising effect in fragile states. The EU began observing elections in 1993 and a Commission Communication on

63. See the Commission's website for detailed information on the RRM and the projects financed by this fund: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/pcm/rrm/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/pcm/rrm/index.htm) (accessed on 20 June 2006). The total budget for 2005 was €30 million.

Election Assistance and Observation, in 2001, set the legal and financial framework and the guidelines for such missions. A specific budget line, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), was created, that finances both election observation missions and thematic actions, such as training, media, civic and voter education, generally conducted by partner NGOs and international organisations.<sup>64</sup> Meanwhile, the traditional cooperation instrument – in the case of West Africa, the European Development Fund (EDF) – provides the authorities of the country with the financial support needed for the organisation of elections.<sup>65</sup>

The EU is a victim of its own success, however. It is faced with a growing number of requests to send election observation missions and finds it increasingly difficult to respond positively to all.<sup>66</sup> The current EUFOR mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, mentioned earlier in this paper, seems to indicate, however, that the Council is willing to complement its contribution to crisis prevention with targeted ESDP missions during electoral processes, so as to respond – militarily, if necessary – to destabilisation attempts.

### Structural stability

The Commission's Communication to the Council on conflicts in Africa in 1996 reflects the trend, described in the second chapter of this paper, which draws a link between development, security and democracy. In its 1996 Communication, the Commission uses the term 'structural stability', both to emphasise this link and to define the EU's role in dealing with conflicts in Africa:

'Structural stability is to be understood as a term denoting a dynamic situation, a situation of stability able to cope with the dynamics inherent in (emerging) democratic societies. Structural stability could thus be defined as a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without having to resort to violent conflict.'<sup>67</sup>

64. European Commission, 'Commission Communication on Election Assistance and Observation,' COM(2000) 191 final, 11 April 2000. On the RRM and EIDHR, as well as other Community instruments for civilian crisis management used both in Africa and other regions, see Catriona Gourlay, 'Community Instruments for Civilian Crisis Management', in Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), 'Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way', *Chaillot Paper* no. 90 (Paris: EUISS), pp. 49-67. As mentioned in Catriona Gourlay's chapter, a simplified set of financial instruments will be introduced in the next budgetary period in 2007-2013, and should contribute to greater flexibility in the instruments and a better linkage between short-term crisis response and long-term development instruments.

65. The EU Election Observation Mission sent to Guinea-Bissau for the presidential elections of 2005 provides an example of the way these funds are used: in addition to committing up to €3 million for the costs of the election observation mission from the EIDHR, a contribution of €1.5 million was provided by the EDF towards the cost of organising these elections.

66. Interview with a Commission (DG Development) official, September 2005.

67. European Commission, 'The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond', 6 March 1996, op. cit. (section I.2.).

The EU's policies dealing with development and security in Africa have since been consistent with this definition – even though the term 'structural stability' does not appear in most official documents – and emphasise a holistic approach that takes into account economic, security and political aspects.

The very first article of the Cotonou Agreement fully incorporates this comprehensive approach: The agreement was concluded 'with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment'. Article 9 of the agreement further reinforces this assertion and underlines another natural link between democratisation, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights, a link that had already been drawn in the previous Lomé conventions. As a natural consequence, the Cotonou Agreement defines human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law as essential elements. A violation of any of these elements may provide grounds for suspending EU assistance and trade cooperation with the ACP country concerned.

The Council wanted to add 'good governance' to this list of essential elements, but the ACP group's opposition to this addition – they felt that the concept was sufficiently covered by the existing essential elements and that its inclusion among essential elements could lead to arbitrary decisions – led to a compromise. 'Good governance' is a fundamental element in the Cotonou Agreement: with the exception of serious cases of corruption, a state facing governance problems will be provided with support and advice to improve its performance. Lengthy discussions also led to a more precise definition of good governance:

'Good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption.'<sup>68</sup>

68. Council of the European Union, Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community, of the Other Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), article 9(3).

These definitions of the essential and fundamental objectives of the EU-ACP partnership are accompanied by positive and negative incentives. Let us here consider the measures foreseen if a party fails to work towards the accomplishment of one of these elements. Positive incentives will be considered in the next section of this chapter.

Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement sets the rules of procedure in case of non-respect of one of the three essential elements – human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Following a Commission proposal,<sup>69</sup> the Council may open a consultation procedure focused on the measures to be taken to remedy the situation, once the political dialogue foreseen in article 8 has itself failed to solve the issue. The revision of the Cotonou Agreement also led to an extension of time frames. The consultation procedure may now last up to 120 days. If consultation is refused or does not lead to an acceptable solution, ‘appropriate measures’ that least disrupt the application of the agreement should be taken, suspension being a measure of last resort. ‘Appropriate measures’ have, in the past, ranged from no suspension at all but regular observation missions and assessments of progress – as was the case for the consultation procedure conducted with Guinea-Bissau in 2004 – to different forms of partial suspension, the redirection of former EDFs towards priorities defined during the consultations or the reduction of the current EDF. The two latter measures were taken during the consultation procedure with Guinea in 2004: cooperation financed from the unexpected balances of the 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> EDFs was to be continued and directed towards the implementation of undertakings within the context of the consultations, in particular decentralisation, liberalisation of the media and good economic governance. Meanwhile, the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was reduced.<sup>70</sup>

### Local ownership

The EU does not limit its relations with the ACP group to the use of ‘sticks’, however, and has developed a number of strategies and instruments meant to assist its partners in reaching the objectives set in the Cotonou Agreement. Articles 9 and 33 of the Agreement establish that the European Community will provide support for

69. The Commission issues this proposal either at its own initiative or on the Council’s request. The Troika represents the EU in the subsequent consultation procedure. For a detailed description of the practicalities of article 96 procedures, see James Mackie and Julia Zinke, *op. cit.*

70. Andrew Bradley, ‘An ACP Perspective and Overview of Article 96 Cases’, *Discussion Paper* no. 64D, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht 2005.

reforms and for building the capacity of public and private actors and civil society. This traditionally translated into the EU providing technical assistance to African governments and financial support to the national authorising officer who represents the country in all operations financed by the European Commission. The idea is to create and support 'local ownership'<sup>71</sup> and strengthen the partner-country's capacity to appropriate its own development and political strategy.

Article 33 of the Cotonou Agreement is however more specific and provides details of the institutional reforms which should be closely considered by the parties, i.e. supported and monitored by the EU and implemented by the ACP states. Reforms in the public sector, in particular, should range from modernisation of legal systems to decentralisation and capacity-building in the institutions needed to underpin a market economy.<sup>72</sup>

More recently, the Council also proved its determination to support security sector reform efforts more directly: two ESDP missions were thus launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). EUPOL Kinshasa, a police mission in the capital city, monitors, mentors, and advises the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and ensures that it acts according to international best practice. EUSEC DR Congo provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security. One of its major achievements has been to propose a more realistic figure for the number of Congolese troops and therefore to limit the scope for corruption through the wages of 'phantom soldiers'.

The EU is not only experimenting with these new approaches on the field, however. It has been conducting its own reflection on post-conflict strategies<sup>73</sup> and is in the process of developing frameworks meant to guide future policies and interventions. The Council thus published in October 2005 an *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform*, written in close coordination with the Commission. Local ownership is at the very basis of this concept, which specifies that 'EU action should be built on national ownership and partnership'.<sup>74</sup> The concept provides a clear Council definition of the security sector and of its SSR strategy, which should aim at preventing violent conflicts in fragile states. It adopts a holistic approach and advocates the full use of the EU's many instruments in the civilian and military fields. The Commission subsequently drafted a Community concept on SSR, and

71. The term 'ownership' effectively appears six times in the Cotonou Agreement.

72. Cotonou Agreement, op. cit., article 33.

73. Council of the European Union, 'Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa', 12 April 2005, see Annex 4. p. 69.

74. This emphasis in the introduction is a recurring element throughout the entire document: The term 'ownership' appears nine times.

both concepts were then presented under a single cover.<sup>75</sup> Council and Commission then worked jointly during the second semester of 2006 on an EU approach to DDR that aims at being consistent with the framework for SSR.<sup>76</sup>

### Mainstreaming conflict prevention

The realisation that some activities in international relations, which had until then mostly remained unsuspected, could in fact fuel violent conflicts led the international community to consider establishing restrictions on the free trade of particular goods through specific trade regimes. Of particular significance here are the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and similar international efforts to regulate the trade of timber, of small arms and light weapons or of landmines.

The EU has been a participant in the Kimberley Process since its inception. The scheme is implemented through a Council Regulation applicable in all member states. This regulation lays down the procedures and criteria to be followed in the import and export of rough diamonds into and from the EU and sets out provisions for self-regulation by the European diamond industry. The European Commission actively supported the setting-up of the monitoring system and will chair the Kimberley Process in 2007. The Kimberley Process has been the object of major international attention and promotion, but the EU also acknowledged that diamonds were not the unique natural resource known to fuel conflicts and launched its own EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT). The Action Plan places particular emphasis on forest governance reforms and capacity building in timber-producing countries. FLEGT actions should also aim at developing multilateral cooperation to reduce the consumption of illegally harvested timber in the EU.<sup>77</sup>

Both the Kimberley process and FLEGT are part of a wider reflection on ethics in trade and on the responsibility of conflict resource-importing countries. The EU's efforts do not stop with its import activities, however: Europe has also shown signs that it was ready to take responsibility as an exporting region, especially with regard to weapons. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement expresses the partners' willingness to address the issue of landmines and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons

75. Interview with a member of the EU Military Staff, June 2006.

76. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform, 12 June 2006; EU Concept of Support for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), 11 December 2006.

77. European Commission, 'Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT): Proposal for an EU Action Plan', Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 251 final, 21 May 2003.



(SALW). The EU, in effect, has adopted a multi-annual strategy for 2005-2007 that calls for a 'Zero Victim Target' to fight anti-personnel landmines worldwide. It also finances mine-clearing operations in post-conflict countries such as Guinea-Bissau, where it supports the operations led by Handicap International and a local NGO. Efforts to regulate the trade of arms, however, remain tentative. The Council adopted a code of conduct on arms exports in 1998, but this is not a legally binding instrument. European member states are among the world's largest arms suppliers, while West Africa remains one of the regions where the number of illegal light weapons in circulation is highest.



The description of the EU's instruments for peace-building and conflict prevention cannot fully conceal the inconsistencies and issues that are naturally linked to a holistic, ambitious and multi-faceted (linking developmental, political and security-related elements) approach. Interviews with Council and Commission staff show that most are aware of these inconsistencies and that efforts are regularly made to address and overcome them. Common work in the joint Commission and Council Africa group, in particular, is said to have considerably enhanced dialogue and cooperation between both institutions. The 2005 revision of the Cotonou Agreement also showed that the Council was both ready and able to respond to a number of its ACP-partners' critiques and suggestions. Some discrepancies between the above-described EU official objectives and strategies, the realities on the field and its institutional capacities however remain. Let us consider these here.

## **Dilemmas in the field<sup>78</sup>**

One recurring criticism when West African government and civil society representatives are asked about the EU's funding policies is that their application procedures and eligibility criteria are extremely complex and demanding. As a consequence, projects tend to be selected first and foremost for their compatibility with European bureaucratic requirements, sometimes to the detriment of their capacity to respond to local needs. Some NGOs even claim that they have simply given up applying for funds because they know their application has no chance of being successful and do not want to lose time filling in forms. The risk is that the EU essentially funds big NGOs or consortiums of NGOs whose efficacy lies more in their administrative capacities than in the originality of their projects.

78. Observations in this section and the following are essentially drawn from interviews with government officials and civil society representatives conducted in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in November-December 2005 and February-March 2006.

NGOs are not the only institutions that can suffer from a lack of capacity to win over the EU, however. West African governments themselves are often at a disadvantage when they negotiate with the EU. Their diplomatic teams in Brussels, in charge of the negotiations, are not always up to the mission and an influential but politically opposed diaspora can complicate matters further. The imbalance is even greater between those countries which are able to convince a European tutelary power to defend their case before the Council and those which are not. This issue has been underlined by numerous observers, as was the fact that article 96 consultations were more fruitful when a group of friendly countries took part in the consultations. The amendments made to the Cotonou Agreement in 2005 took this into account. In an additional annex to the agreement, the parties agree to strive to promote equality in the level of representation during the consultations.<sup>79</sup> Regional organisations also increasingly play the role of the ‘lawyer’, as is the case in Guinea-Bissau: ECOWAS and WAEMU actively take part in the transition process.

The partnership, however, remains unequal, as are all partnerships, and comes up against a recurring dilemma: the international community is caught between the proclaimed necessity to adopt a holistic and long-term approach and the need to foster local ownership. Recent cases of post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reforms show how much these two objectives can be contradictory. It is extremely difficult to reduce the aid and support given to a country where these have been exceptionally high, just as it is complicated to know when the time is ripe for this to happen. A successful international retreat will often depend on the coherence of the programmes led in the post-conflict transition and on the dialogue conducted with the local government.<sup>80</sup>

Success will also depend on the adequacy of the reforms advocated by the international community, i.e. on how much attention is given to local and historical realities. The international community – and the EU is not an exception here – tends to apply the ‘one size fits all’ rule to pre- and post-conflict situations. The very same package of reforms is now sold in all cases, irrespective of the particularities of the on-field situation.<sup>81</sup> It is telling that the major differences between the post-conflict programme carried out in Sierra Leone and the one under consideration in Guinea-Bissau are quantitative more than qualitative. The very same DDR, SSR and democratisation programmes are planned in Guinea-Bissau,

79. Cotonou Agreement (revised, 2005), Annex VII, article 3.

80. For a more complete overview of the ongoing debate on the notion of ‘local ownership’ in Africa, see Pierre-Antoine Braud, *Reviewing Conflict and Post-Conflict Management in Africa*, Seminar note, 7 April 2006, EUISS, Paris.

81. Again, a good overview of criticisms addressing this ‘one size fits all’ rule – or ‘standard packaging’ – is provided in the above-cited seminar notes, *ibid.*

although the amounts of money and political support devoted to the country will be much smaller.<sup>82</sup>

On-field practitioners also often regret the absence of adequate data before a new project is launched. There is much debate as to whether it makes any sense, for example, to launch a reconstruction programme in Eastern Guinea, where rebel attacks destroyed two major towns and led the Guinean army to arm young ‘volunteers’ in 2000-2001. Five years later, the number of young ‘volunteers’ who could benefit from a DDR programme is the object of an intensive debate among practitioners. For some, launching a DDR programme so long after the fighting took place makes no sense at all, as they expect the ex-volunteers will have reintegrated society by themselves. If they have not done so, they will probably be out of reach of a DDR programme anyhow. As was already underlined in chapter 2, practitioners in Guinea-Bissau denounce a similar lack of trustworthy figures concerning ex-combatants and soldiers who may need further support after the end of the DDR process.

The Kimberley Process offers another illustration of the need to adapt international solutions to local realities. Obviously, the certification process can only be successful if the mining areas are under government control, which is not the case in Côte d’Ivoire, for example, where diamonds provide the rebels with an important source of income. Moreover, the process presumes that governments can control their borders, which is often not the case in West Africa. NGOs have found evidence that Ivorian diamonds were exported through Guinea, a Kimberley Process member, where they enter the legitimate trade.<sup>83</sup> These first observations underline the limits of an international regime that is otherwise considered rather successful. It tends to be based, again, on a state-centric approach, when many member states of the process clearly do not have the necessary monitoring capacities.

National and local histories also play a role both in the emergence of a conflict and in its prevention. A unilateral and strong intervention by the former colonial power may send a disastrous message to a population who has already lost its sense of national unity and trust in its leadership. In such a case, the EU can play a significant role by intervening in a more – historically – neutral and legitimate manner than would one of its member states. It has, however, only rarely been able to play such a role in West Africa until now.

82. This difference can be explained by the violence, duration and geographic extent of the conflict in Sierra Leone, while the conflicts in Guinea-Bissau – triggered by two successive coups – were essentially confined to the capital city. These differences, in turn, partly explain the difference in terms of donor and media attention given to both countries.

83. The Fund for Peace, *The Effect of the Kimberley Process on Governance, Corruption and Internal Conflict*, Globalization and Human Rights Series, 1 March 2006.

A better understanding of local realities could also restore a balance between short and long-term visions. The EU, which was praised for its long term commitments, now tends to increasingly adopt short-term approaches: democratisation and institutional reforms are expected to be rapidly adopted and absorbed by the partner states. The focus is essentially on preventing the resurgence of any kind of violence, i.e. on establishing a security sector that can counter new rebel movements or prevent their formation. Long-term issues are neglected, and the root causes of the conflict only artificially addressed. This approach works on the assumption that violence can re-emerge at any time and insists on a state-centric logic. On-field observers however underline that the years following a conflict are often marked by a 'conflict fatigue' that precludes potential crises and could be used as an opportunity to concentrate on longer term issues. The very same 'conflict fatigue' can also be felt even before a conflict breaks out. This pre-conflict fatigue may partly explain Guinea's stability, when many observers predicted a domino-effect in the Mano River basin. Guineans were asked to take in refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone for years. They were thus soon made aware of the violence affecting Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire and the consequences, for the population, of these successive conflicts. Regional violence may therefore have acted as a strong disincentive in Guinea to this day.

A certain lack of inventiveness also often characterises democratisation programmes. The EU, in a way very similar to other international actors, relies essentially on technical elements to measure progress made in a democratisation process. In Guinea in 2005, the government was asked to implement three reforms that were meant to demonstrate its willingness to embark on the democratic path: freedom of expression and movement for opposition parties, liberalisation of the electronic media, and the creation of an independent electoral commission. All three conditions were fulfilled during the second half of 2005 and the Council, like the rest of the international community, expressed its satisfaction.<sup>84</sup>

Local NGOs were generally more critical. They noted, first, that the liberalisation of the radio and television could have no democratising effect in the absence of a real civil society that has the means to maintain programmes on or obtain access to a radio or television station. The electoral commission, moreover, was called 'autonomous' instead of 'independent'. Some members of civil

84. Relations between the EU and Guinea remain, however, constrained by the appropriate measures they agreed upon in the conclusions to article 96 consultations in April 2005.

society wondered about this change of term, not seeing the creation of the commission as a sign of progress and even less as a guarantee of transparency. Local elections however took place peacefully, with the participation of the opposition who had again threatened to boycott them. Turnout was very low – less than 30% – and the victory of President Conté’s *Parti de l’Unité et du Peuple* (PUP) was rather unsurprising although slightly suspect. The EU’s success at pushing for democratisation is thus questionable, while some observers underlined the destabilising effect these conditions and the continuous freezing of aid could have on the Guinean population. In the absence of a strong state and credible and unified opposition, this bargaining in the name of democratisation may be a dangerous game.<sup>85</sup>

As was underlined above, local NGOs often find it difficult to secure EU funds for their projects. Conflict prevention is however best done at the grass roots, at the community level. Local NGOs and dignitaries can act as preventive forces or mediators in community crises. A women’s NGO, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), which has sections in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively, emerged in an attempt to reconcile the three countries’ leaders. While cooperation between the three national sections seems to have come to a halt, the Guinean section is still eager to play a major role in preventing conflicts in the country. The preferred strategy is to maintain a dialogue among communities, especially those living at the border of the country, and to rely on traditional modes of expression and dialogue and on local messengers such as traditional leaders and storytellers. It is very difficult to measure the influence of such organisations and the results of their strategies, but there are signs that these conflict-prevention mechanisms exist, are used and maintain a peaceful dialogue between communities.

### **The institutional gap**

The EU also comes up against institutional constraints when it seeks to implement the strategies elaborated for West Africa. The first is in the European outposts in West Africa, the EC delegations. Although they are asked to implement programmes in an increasing number of fields, delegations lack the financial and material resources and the training that would enable them to move from an

85. The strikes and demonstrations that took place in June 2006 in the country’s major cities were greeted by state repression – eleven people were killed – and observers note that the steady increase in commodity prices and the growing scarcity of water and electricity can only make things worse.

essentially technical mission in development cooperation to a more diplomatic and political one. This expansion of delegations' capacities would however be essential if the EU intends to respond consistently to Africa's security needs. Currently, EC delegations find it difficult to go beyond the traditional developmental role they have played for several decades. Moreover, it is questionable whether one institution can be both a diplomatic and developmental actor when most Western states entrust two separate institutions with these duties.

For now, EC delegations' contribution to early action and preventive diplomacy very much depends on the determination of the chief of delegation to encourage his/her delegation to acquire capacities in political analysis. Several heads of delegations in West Africa have already created a new position for a *chargé d'affaires* who is often in charge of analysing the national political situation, picking up on early warning signs and reporting to Brussels. The sustainability of these positions is, however, anything but certain, as it often depends on the chief's understanding of the delegation's mission as well as on the staff allocated to the delegation. In the absence of a clear directive that would match their capacities with the ambitious objectives they are expected to achieve, the delegations' evolution towards a more diplomatic role therefore occurs in an *ad hoc* and fragile manner.

Another institutional constraint lies, as is the case for many other of the EU's activities, in its current structure and in the division of labour between the Council and the Commission. The trend, described at length in this paper, that gives the priority to political stability and security underlines how difficult it is to dissociate development – traditionally the Commission's field – and security – among the Council's attributes. SSR and DDR programmes obviously incorporate some purely developmental and some security elements which cannot be dissociated. This explains the double and parallel drafting, by both institutions, of SSR and DDR concepts. Both the Commission and the Council insist they will need to cooperate closely in the implementation of the civilian aspects of these programmes,<sup>86</sup> but the difficulty in drafting a unique and common document indicates the dilemmas the EU may come up against while implementing these concepts on the field.

86. See for example article 35 of the Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform, *op. cit.*



A recent case before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, that concerns the EU's relations with ECOWAS, actually underlines that the division of labour between Council and Commission is anything but clear and that the institutions do not easily agree on their respective roles. The Commission brought an action against the Council in February 2005, in which it accused the Council of assuming the right to contribute to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).<sup>87</sup> The Commission indeed considers that the Council decision affects Community powers in the field of development aid, since actions against the spread of SALW are already covered by the Cotonou Agreement and the regional indicative programme for West Africa. The Court's ruling may set a legal precedent for future cases, but as long as the EU division of labour in this delicate field that hesitates between security and development is not clearly defined, it is doubtful whether the EU can effectively contribute to increased stability and peace in West Africa.

The Commission vs. Council case also raises a more ethical question: can regulations on the trade of weapons – and other fields related to the military – be effectively ranked among development aid actions, as the Commission argues? Although the current assumption that development needs security tends to silence the debate, the question arises with a particular acuteness among EU institutions, as the EU is slowly evolving towards a more political and security-related role in the world. The EU will certainly need to reflect on how it can increase its presence on the African security scene without prejudice to its traditional development activities.

Unclear divisions of labour are also just as problematic inside the Commission, between its different branches and directorates-general (DGs). As has already been underlined in this paper, peace-building and conflict prevention mobilise various sectors, from security and defence, to trade, to external relations and development aid. This intermingling of fields requires close coordination between the different branches of the Commission. DG Trade and DG Development will need to carefully take into account the conflict-prevention precautions highlighted by DG External Relations (Relex). It is obvious, however, that these DGs often pursue different, or even contradictory, objectives.

87. Court of Justice of the European Communities, Action brought on 21 February 2005 by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union (Case C-91/05). See Annex 3, p. 68.

DG Trade will want to defend the EU's commercial rights, DG Relex will be careful to increase the EU's security, external relations and international visibility, while DG Development's prime objective is to contribute to increased prosperity in the ACP states. Reconciling these objectives is obviously a matter of tactical precision.

The EU's current commitment in favour of regional integration illustrates the difficulty of coordinating and reconciling these different objectives. The Cotonou Agreement foresees the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP regional organisations. The official rationale behind this new arrangement is to enhance regional integration in the ACP so as to integrate the economies of the ACP countries into the world economy. One of the principal aims of these EPAs, however, is also to submit EU-ACP trade relations to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, and to suppress the Lomé non-reciprocal trade arrangements. External observers and representatives of the ACP states have already, on numerous occasions, underlined the risks entailed by too hasty a liberalisation and regionalisation of trade in the ACP countries.<sup>88</sup> Even in a region like West Africa, which has reached one of the highest degrees of integration among the ACP, it is not at all certain that national economies are ready to face competition from neighbouring countries or reciprocal exchanges with the EU. The trade liberalisation entailed by the EPAs may create more ground for conflict than is openly admitted. Changes in commodity prices associated with trade liberalisation can intensify competition over scarce resources and exacerbate livelihood insecurity, while making it more difficult to control the flow of arms or conflict resources. The EU's willingness to pursue EPA negotiations in spite of these objections casts some doubt on the priority it gives to conflict prevention and on the effective mainstreaming of conflict prevention in all of its policies.

When the EU simply follows international developmental trends, finally, it runs the risk of losing part of its originality and inventiveness, as well as its comparative advantage. The above described problems of coordination between the Commission and Council and the problems related to the traditional and clear separation of civilian and military instruments – and therefore the need to reflect upon their combined use by one sole institution – underline the difficulties the EU may well come up against when it

88. See, for example, Richard Gibb, 'Post-Lomé: The European Union and the South', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 3, June 2000, pp. 457-81, and Yao Graham, '... Only if we stay in the market', *The Guardian*, 12 March 2005.

engages in security-related programmes. Other international actors – among which some EU member states – are very present in this field. EU institutions are aware of this and insist that international and multilateral cooperation must be an integral part of their peace-building policies.<sup>89</sup> The EU thus strongly supported the creation of the UN Peace-Building Commission. On this occasion, it expressed its willingness to coordinate its efforts with other international actors and to continue its reflection on international peace-building efforts inside this new advisory body.<sup>90</sup>

The temptation of having its own concepts and policies in the field of peace-building sometimes appears stronger, however. The EU's current wish to be more visible on the international scene leads it to engage in an increasing number of fields and to embrace ever-more comprehensive policies. The risk is that EU policies lose some of their consistency in the process and that efforts and monies be scattered rather than concentrated on a small number of priorities. The EU should bear in mind that a holistic understanding of development and security does not necessarily entail a holistic intervention for all actors. The EU is made up of two very complementary institutions – the Commission and the Council – and 25 member states and may therefore be best able to inspire European efforts towards the prevention of conflicts with some consistency and coordination. Both elements are vital if a holistic understanding of peace-building is to bear any fruit. For now, however, the EU institutions do not seem to have the political means – or vision – necessary for such a European coordination to take place in West Africa.

89. See, for example, article 14 of the *European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts* (2001): 'The EU must build and sustain mutually reinforcing and effective partnerships for prevention with the UN, the OSCE and other international and regional organisations as well as the civil society.'

90. Interview with a Commission (DG Relex) staff member, June 2006.



Conflict prevention is a rather unrewarding task. Its results are most often invisible and uncertain. It is difficult to prove that a conflict was prevented or for how long, while in contrast playing the firemen after the eruption of violence attracts media attention and public support. Conflict-prevention efforts are nonetheless costly: the current holistic approach entails the omnipresence of the international community which must intervene virtually simultaneously in all fields related to security and political stability. The EU, at times, seems to have committed itself to conflict prevention without taking the full measure of what this commitment exactly involved and without being aware of its own comparative advantages in the field.

There are indeed different types of contribution to conflict prevention. For historical and institutional reasons, some suit the EU better than others and would therefore deserve to be given more attention than has been the case lately. As has been highlighted in this paper, the mainstreaming of conflict prevention in other EU policies comes up against some institutional and political hurdles. Conflict prevention does not appear as a principal objective in the EU's trade policies, nor in its policies in support of regional integration in West Africa. Some trade arrangements such as the EPAs foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement or some democratisation programmes contain a crisis potential that should not be underestimated either. The EU would therefore need to conduct a comprehensive reflection on the policies it advocates and on their effective contribution to political stability.

This does not mean that the EU should renounce indirect conflict prevention efforts where it has a comparative advantage. The EU, as a major trade partner and provider of development aid, can make a real difference. To do so, however, it must not lose its traditional focus on long-term issues, rather than solely concentrate on more popular, short-term issues. While it cannot be said, as some EU documents suggest, that any development programme that

creates a degree of economic prosperity contributes to conflict prevention, sustainable and equally distributed development can certainly alleviate some crises.

The EU is, moreover, internationally recognised for its inventiveness and for the innovative and original way it has evolved in Europe. The type of regional integration it has created and its achievements in terms of political stability, peace and security and economic prosperity for itself and its neighbourhood are unprecedented. This inventiveness and originality need to inspire its external relations and development programmes as well. Drawing lessons from its own past and experiences, the EU should be more sensitive to local realities and locally inspired solutions and consequently support them.

This would imply, however, that EC delegation staffs, who are permanently on the field, are given adequate training in conflict prevention issues and political analysis. This is still not the case.<sup>91</sup> Delegation staff need to have sufficient means and time at their disposal to explore local realities and efforts at crisis prevention. The current *ad hoc* tendency to appoint a political analyst in EC delegations in West Africa could be institutionalised. Moreover, the work of this political analyst would need to be acknowledged, systematised and enriched through the observations of those members of the delegation who regularly travel around the country. More exchanges of information and communication between EC delegations in neighbouring countries could also provide a better understanding of border regions, sometimes distant from the capital cities. This enhanced coordination would also strengthen and improve the EU's focus on regional solutions, which are currently focused solely on ECOWAS.

The Council and Commission concentrated much of their effort, recently, on devising new security policies. The results of this policy focus are acknowledged by the international community and prove that the EU is both ready and able to adequately contribute to (especially short- and medium-term)<sup>92</sup> crisis management and post-conflict reforms. The EU's longer-term foreign policy and diplomatic capacities seem to have lagged behind, however. The balance between these two sides of the same coin – security and diplomacy – needs to be redressed, especially in a region like West Africa where there is still room for the EU to increase its political leverage. The problems entailed by the unclear division of labour between Council and Commission, linked to the fragile

91. This is acknowledged by Commission staff members themselves (interviews in Brussels in September 2005 and June 2006) and was confirmed by on-field observations in West Africa in November 2005 and March 2006.

92. Pedro Serrano, *op. cit.*

border that now separates civilian and military tasks, also need to be solved. In the absence of a deep reform that abolishes the current pillar structure and clarifies the EU's handling of its external relations, efforts need to be made by Council and Commission staff alike to agree on common definitions and concepts, and, more importantly, on who does what. An EU Special Representative (EUSR) – provided he/she is given the means and time to do so – could enhance and improve cooperation and coordination between Council and Commission staff in Brussels and EC delegations on the field, facilitate information exchanges and play the role of a coordinator and mediator in case of disagreement. The position of Presidency Special Representative currently occupied by Mr. Dahlgren would therefore need to be transformed into an acknowledged EUSR position. The EUSR would, moreover, take part in the political dialogue foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement and begin to provide the EU with the capacities in preventive diplomacy it currently lacks but very much needs if it is serious about engaging with conflict-prevention efforts.

West Africa is an ideal field where the EU can provide an illustration of its generosity, diplomatic effectiveness and political influence. Visibility and international as well as West African recognition may, however, be better and more easily earned through a cautious approach that takes local realities and needs into account. The EU, as a politically ill-known actor but highly regarded aid provider, has at its disposal a legitimacy it should be careful to use to its and its partners' best advantage.





## *European Commission Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict*

In relation to early warning and as foreseen in the EU programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, the European Commission works with the EU Secretary General/High Representative to prepare the broad consideration of potential conflict issues by the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council. This occurs at the start of each EU Presidency (i.e. six monthly).

The Commission has developed a **check list for root causes of conflict/early warning indicators**. In preparation for the January 2002 debate on potential conflict issues conflict assessments, based on these indicators, were carried out by Commission desk officers and EC delegations for more than 120 countries. The objective is:

- to increase awareness within the EU decision making forums of the problems of those countries/regions with the highest assessed risk of an outbreak, continuation or re-emergence of conflict.
- to heighten the effort to ensure that EU policies (and in particular those managed by the European Commission) contribute to conflict prevention/resolution.

Those countries receiving highest scores are drawn to the attention of the General Affairs and External Relations Council through a confidential 'watch list'. The watch list is a snapshot of one moment in time and is subject to constant revision.

The Commission remains alert to unanticipated and short term events and the root causes indicators are only one tool which the Commission is using for monitoring and early warning. Others include regular reporting from delegations on issues such as human rights, open source information monitoring via the Commission's new Crisis Room and ECHO's disaster monitoring system ICONS (Impending Crisis Online News System).

With the aim of enhancing capacity for early action, in Africa, the Commission also assists in conducting surveys on African countries. Those surveys examined (i) the root causes of conflict (ii), EU leverage and (iii) policy options.

The check list for root-causes of conflict **has been shared with counterparts in the UN system**, to other donors and those working in the field of conflict prevention and peace building.

### **European Commission Check list for root-causes of conflict**

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#### **1. LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE**

**Are there proper checks and balances in the political system?**

Respect of the Constitution, ability of the Parliament and the judiciary to check on the executive, devolution of powers and ability of regional authorities (if any) to counterbalance central power...

**How inclusive is the political/administrative power?**

Ethnic and religious representativeness of the government, equality of access to political activity, participative decision-making, fair recruitment in the administration and other public institutions...

**What is the overall level of respect for national authorities?**

Historical resentments against State authority, existence of independentist movements, parties advocating for extreme solutions (revolutionary or reactionary) to perceived shortcomings, perceived ability of the State to answer people's needs.

**Is corruption widespread?**

Overall level of corruption, existence of anti-corruption programmes, widespread bribery in bureaucracies, collusion between private sector and civil servants.

#### **2. RULE OF LAW**

**How strong is the judicial system?**

Independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, equality of all citizens before the law, effective possibility to undertake legal action against state decisions, enforcement of legal decisions.

**Does unlawful state violence exist?**

Participation of security forces in illegal activities (road blocks, extortion, others), effective prosecution of human rights abuses by security forces, existence of a minimal human rights framework for their operation, prison conditions.

**Does civilian power control security forces?**

Influence of security forces over political decision-making, role of the Parliament in debating/checking their use, existence of open debate and media/academic scrutiny on the security sector.

**Does organised crime undermine the country's stability?**

Control of a significant part of the country/economy by criminal networks (drugs, natural resources, human trafficking), existence of private armies or armed para-military groups acting with impunity, proper re-integration of former combatants into social life.

**3. RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS****Are civil and political freedoms respected?**

Respect of right to vote/eligibility, protection of civil liberties including freedom of speech & of assembly, free and fair elections respecting the rights of the opposition.

**Are religious and cultural rights respected?**

Punition by law of religious, ethnic or cultural discrimination, recognition of minority languages e.g. in education, definition of the state with no reference to a dominant religious/cultural identity.

**Are other basic human rights respected?**

Prosecution of human rights violations (torture, illegal detention), gender equality, freedom of private practices (dress codes, private life etc.), adherence to and implementation of commitments under international human rights treaties and conventions, effective operation of human rights monitoring by NGOs and/or international organisations.

#### 4. CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

**Can civil society operate freely and efficiently?**

Protection of NGOs and right of association by the state, liveliness of civil society, access to staff, training, resources and others, ability to influence policy processes and solve tensions between communities.

**How independent and professional are the media?**

Censorship by government, independence of the media from partisan agendas and political or private interests, ability to reflect the views of all social groups, access of journalists to professional training.

#### 5. RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND DISPUTE-SOLVING MECHANISMS

**How good are relations between identity groups?**

Ability of major identity groups to mix together, frequency of outbursts of racial/religious violence, perpetuation of negative stereotypes or mutual suspicions by collective memory and culture, existence and effectiveness of reconciliation mechanisms (e.g. justice commissions).

**Does the state arbitrate over tensions and disputes between communities?**

Existence and effectiveness of mechanisms arbitrating between conflicting parties (wisemen, elders, ombudsmen), political manipulation of ethnic/identity differences, existence of regional fora for conflict prevention/resolution.

**Are there uncontrolled flows of migrants/refugees?**

Social friction between migrant and host communities (e.g. adverse pressure on food, water etc.), respect for basic rights of migrants/refugees, impact of migration flows on ethnic/identity balance of host regions.

#### 6. SOUND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

**How robust is the economy?**

Income dependency on a limited number of sectors (e.g. one single agricultural product or industry or remittance), capacity to react

to natural disasters or international conditions (f.i. massive swings in commodity prices).

### **Is policy framework conducive to macro-economic stability?**

Stability of main macro-economic fundamentals (inflation, public deficit, current accounts), ability to attract investment (both domestic and FDI), implementation of policies negotiated with IFIs.

### **How sustainable is the state's environmental policy?**

Fairness of management of natural resources (e.g. water), anticipation of possible internal or external conflicts over natural resources, risk of serious environmental degradation (f.i. desertification) forcing people into exile or threatening traditional ways of life.

## **7. SOCIAL AND REGIONAL INEQUALITIES**

### **How are social welfare policies addressed?**

Overall level of literacy, health, sanitation, development of safety nets & income policies (or, by default, existence of alternative social mechanisms ensuring local or family solidarity), correct anticipation of massive demographic changes by public policies (especially urbanisation and youth unemployment).

### **How are social inequalities tackled?**

Trend for poverty and marginalisation (especially in absolute terms), vulnerability of least-favoured segments of society, fairness of access to education, health care, jobs, economic opportunities (including women and minorities), existence of public policies addressing inequalities among communities through land reform, quota systems, social programmes or others.

### **How are regional disparities tackled?**

Urban/rural gaps, existence of regions lagging behind in terms of economic development or particularly affected by lack of vital resources, redistributive policies between regions.

## 8. GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

### **How stable is the region's geopolitical situation?**

Relations with the country's neighbours, pending border issues, dependency of the country on unstable neighbours for vital assets (e.g. access to sea or water), effectiveness of regional conflict-resolution mechanisms.

### **Is the state affected by external threats?**

Destabilising policies of outside forces, existence of pro-active ethnic communities/diaspora abroad, ability to control arms trafficking.

### **Is the state affecting regional stability?**

Support to militias or rebel groups operating on neighbouring territories, protection of war criminals or rebel groups from neighbouring states, exploitation of the country's natural resources for foreign policy purposes, presence of illicit international activities on the country's territory.

## *The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership*

### COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 19 December 2005

The European Council, at its meeting on 15 and 16 December adopted the following text:

#### “Introduction: Our Vision

1. Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all their peoples.
2. This strategy sets out the steps the European Union will take with Africa between now and 2015 to support African efforts to build such a future. It is a strategy of the whole of the EU for the whole of Africa. It takes into account regional and country-specific needs and African countries’ national strategies. Its primary aims are the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance, in Africa.
3. The strategy builds on important progress made by the Africans themselves. Its core principles are partnership based on international law and human rights, equality and mutual accountability. Its underlying philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions.

#### Peace and security

4. Without peace there can be no lasting development. Without African leadership to end African conflicts there can be no lasting peace. So we will:

- a) Work with the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations and African countries to predict, prevent and mediate conflict, including by addressing its root causes, and to keep the peace in their own continent. In particular, we will strengthen the Africa Peace Facility with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding. We will help develop African capabilities, such as the AU's African Standby Force, and will build on existing activities by Member States to provide training and advisory, technical, planning and logistical support.
- b) Provide direct support to African Union, sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including potential deployment of EU battlegroups; continue implementation of the ESDP Africa Action Plan; and develop the dialogue with Euromed countries.
- c) Enhance our support for post conflict reconstruction in Africa, so that we secure lasting peace and development. We will support in particular the new UN Peacebuilding Commission; the strengthening of fragile states; and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and Security Sector Reform programmes in African states.
- d) Redouble our efforts to stem the illicit flow of weapons, including small arms. We will encourage others to adopt minimum common standards and associate themselves with the EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, discourage transfers which contribute to instability, develop ways to share and act on information on illegal trafficking and support border management controls and an international arms trade treaty.
- e) Join with African states to counter terrorism worldwide. We will provide technical assistance, enhanced information sharing and support to the AU Anti-Terrorism Centre in Algiers and continue to support the implementation of international counter-terrorism agreements.

### **Human Rights and Governance**

5. Successful development requires; adherence to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law; and effective, well-governed states, and strong and efficient institutions. We will:



- a) Promote and protect human rights, including the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups; help end impunity, including through the International Criminal Court; and promote fundamental freedoms and respect for the rule of law in Africa, including through capacity-building for judicial systems, national Human Rights Commissions and civil society organisations. The substantial funding under EC and member states' bilateral programmes will be maintained.
- b) Support good governance programmes at country level and help build the capacity of the African Union and Africa regional and national institutions, building on the €35 million already allocated for this purpose under the Africa Peace Facility and the €50 million under EDF 9.
- c) Support, through political dialogue and consultations with African partners, African efforts to monitor and improve governance, including through supporting the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD)'s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This should result in their goal of four completed reviews a year from 2006 being achieved and the development of a Governance Initiative to support national reforms triggered by the APRM process. Develop a governance facility in the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument.
- d) Support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and organised crime and promote transparency to meet the aspirations of African citizens and to ensure Africa's wealth benefits its people. This will include helping improve public accountability and financial management systems in Africa, early ratification by all EU member states and African partners of the UN Convention on Corruption, assisting proper management of conflict resources including timber as well as mineral resources, support to the Kimberly Process and to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) so that eleven African countries begin implementation of the EITI by July 2006.
- e) Support the growth of participatory democracy and accountability in Africa, including through support to African parliaments and civil society and an enhanced programme of election assistance and EU Electoral Observation Missions including a review of their remit in 2006.

## Development Assistance

6. If Africa is to meet the challenge of development, sound policies and good leadership must be backed by increased, sustainable and predictable financial flows at a level consistent with our ambitions. We will:

- a) Increase our aid, by delivering on our collective commitment to give as official development assistance 0.56% of EU GNI by 2010, with half of the additional €20 billion going to Africa, and 0.7% of GNI by 2015 in the case of 15 Member States, whilst other MS will strive to increase their ODA to 0.33% by 2015.<sup>1</sup>
- b) Secure more effective and predictable EU financial assistance for Africa, including by reaching early agreement on a successor to the 9th European Development Fund as soon as possible and ensuring adequate resources for North Africa in future EC budgets.
- c) In order to help to reach the 0.7% target for development assistance, implement on a voluntary basis, innovative financing mechanisms, such as a contribution on airline tickets or through financing the International Finance Facility for Immunisation.
- d) Support the proposal, agreed in principle with the International Financial Institutions, to cancel outstanding debts owed by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries that qualify by helping to meet the costs. This is expected to deliver in total further debt relief of up to €42 billion for African countries.
- e) Reinforce EU humanitarian and disaster response capability by strengthening the EC humanitarian aid department (ECHO) so that it maintains its strong role in under-funded emergencies, in support of the UN's lead.
- f) Make our aid more effective, by ensuring early implementation for Africa of our EU and international commitments, as agreed in Paris in March 2005.

## Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade

7. Rapid, sustained and broad-based growth is essential for ending poverty in Africa. We will:

1. The full text, accompanied by the relevant minutes statements, is set out in the Conclusions of the Council of 24 May 2005 (Ref 9266/05).

- a) Facilitate a better-connected Africa, to itself and the rest of the world; including by establishing an EU/Africa Infrastructure Partnership, which will be complementary to the new Infrastructure Consortium for Africa and include existing initiatives on transport and to facilitate peoples' access to water and sanitation, energy and information technology.
- b) Promote a stable, efficient and harmonized legal business framework in Africa, for example by convening a Euro-African Business Forum in 2006.
- c) Help to integrate Africa fully into the world trade system, by pressing for a successful outcome to the Doha Round of world trade talks that is ambitious, maximises development gains, ensures special differential treatment, addresses preference erosion and makes trade work for the poor, and extends duty and quota-free market access for Least Developed Countries to all industrialised country markets.
- d) Provide increased aid for trade, building on the Community's commitment of €1 billion per year by 2010.
- e) Agree Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Africa regional groupings by 2008 that are instruments of development, promote regional integration, improve African access to European and regional markets; support asymmetric and flexible implementation of EPAs; and reduce non-tariff barriers. We will closely monitor EPAs so that they help achieve development objectives; and also redouble efforts to complete by 2010 agreement on an EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.
- f) Help African countries comply with EU rules and standards, establish clear rules for services, simplify rules of origin and make them more development friendly.
- g) Support Africa in countering the effects of climate change in accordance with the EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development; and in protecting its environment, through a range of policies, by combating desertification and ensuring the sustainable management of its forests, land and biodiversity fisheries and water. Such support includes, for example, €500 million for the EU Water Facility and €220 million for the Energy Facility under EDF9.

## Investing in people

8. A successful Africa requires a well-educated, healthy population and the full empowerment of women. We will:

- a) Support African efforts to ensure that all children have free primary education of good quality by 2015, including through the implementation of Africa Education for All programme, with increased resources for the Fast Track Initiative, such as the €63 million agreed under EDF9; and through the plan agreed at the 2005 Barcelona Summit.
- b) Promote development of Euro-Africa networks of universities and centres of excellence, including through helping the AU establish a new exchange programme (the Nyerere Programme) for students in Africa.
- c) Provide predictable, multi-year financing for health systems in Africa so that all Africans have access to basic healthcare, free where governments choose to provide this and in support of African governments' goal of allocating 15% of their public budgets to Health.
- d) Enhance our support for the fight against infectious diseases, including by providing further EU contributions to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and malaria, thereby maintaining the EU share of global contributions (at least 50%). We will continue to support research and development of drugs for AIDS and other communicable diseases, and help countries deliver prevention strategies and universal access to HIV treatment and care for all who need it by 2010, through further support for the EU Programme for Action for AIDS, TB and malaria; and support fair access to drugs under WTO patent protection rules.
- e) Improve food security for the most vulnerable, by helping lift 8 million Africans out of hunger by 2009 through country-led safety-nets for chronically food insecure populations who rely on humanitarian programmes.
- f) Maximise the developmental benefits and minimize the negative aspects of migration and strengthen protection for refugees, through engaging in balanced dialogue and cooperation with the AU, other African organisations and states on a broad range of migration issues. In particular this means addressing the root causes of migration, fostering links with development and promoting co-development<sup>1</sup> and combating

1. Co-development involves migrant communities in the EU contributing to the development of their countries of origin.

illegal immigration. We will take this forward through a series of concrete priority actions as agreed by the European Council.

- g) Recognise the importance of women in all our policies towards Africa in view of their crucial role in economic growth, development, education and the disproportionate effects on women of conflict, poverty related diseases and lack of maternal health care; and give appropriate support to sexual and reproductive rights, in line with the International Conference on Population and Development Cairo agenda.

### **The future: an EU partnership with Africa**

9. Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa. Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this. We commit to:

- a) Deliver on this strategy. We will review progress on its implementation at the December 2006 European Council, and at least every two years thereafter. Our Ministers will discuss and oversee the development of detailed delivery and monitoring plans for this purpose, based on timelines and indicators proposed jointly by the Commission and Council Secretariat. In 2006, the Council will review implementation of the aid volume targets agreed in May 2005 and thereafter, on the basis of monitoring reports from the Commission.
- b) Develop this strategy, in partnership with the African Union, NEPAD and other African partners, respecting the principles of African ownership, the importance of working more closely with Africans in multilateral fora, and in coordination with multilateral partners.
- c) Building on the Cairo Summit, enhance the EU political dialogue and broader relationship with Africa and its institutions, and hold the second EU/Africa Summit in Lisbon as soon as possible.”

## *Action brought on 21 February 2005 by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union*

(Case C-91/05)

(2005/C 115/19)

(Language of the case: English)

An action against the Council of the European Union was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on 21 February 2005 by the European Commission, represented by Pieter Jan Kuijper and Johan Enegren acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg.

The applicant claims that the Court should:

1. annul Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP<sup>1</sup>
2. declare illegal and hence inapplicable Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP,<sup>2</sup> in particular Title II thereof.

### *Pleas in law and main arguments:*

The Commission is seeking the annulment for lack of competence under Article 230, second paragraph, of the EC Treaty of Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Council took this Decision under Title V of the Treaty on European Union, whereas Article 11(3) of the Cotonou agreement covers actions *inter alia* against the spread of small arms and light weapons. Moreover, the Commission had concluded pursuant to Article 10(2) of Annex 1V of the Cotonou agreement a Regional Indicative Programme for West Africa with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which gives support to a regional policy of conflict prevention and good governance, and announces support in particular for the moratorium on the import, export and production of light weapons in West Africa. Thus the impugned CFSP decision is in infringement of Article 47 TEU, since it affects Community powers in the field of development aid. In addition, the Commission is seeking a declaration of illegality under Article 241 EC Treaty of Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002, and in particular Title II thereof, on the same basis and for the same reasons. Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP is an act of a general legislative nature on which the CFSP Decision is based, of which the annulment for lack of competence is sought. Hence that Joint Action, and more specifically Title II thereof, should be declared inapplicable in the present case.

1. Council Decision 2004/833/CFSP of 2 December 2004 implementing Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP with a view to a European Union contribution to ECOWAS in the framework of the Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, OJ L 359, 04.12.2004, p. 65.

2. Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and repealing Joint Action 1999/34/CFSP, OJ L 191, 19.07.2002, p. 1.

*Council Common Position  
2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005  
concerning conflict prevention,  
management and resolution in Africa  
and repealing Common Position  
2004/85/CFSP*

Official Journal L 097 , 15/04/2005 P. 0057 - 0062

**THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,**

Having regard to the Treaty on the European Union and in particular, Article 15 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves.

(2) International law defines the framework for activities undertaken within the context of prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

(3) The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations.

(4) In the drawing up of UN Security Council decisions, the defence of European Union positions and interests is fully ensured by the application of Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union.

(5) On 26 January 2004, the Council adopted Common Position 2004/85/CFSP concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.<sup>1</sup>

(6) On 22 November 2004, the Council approved the Action Plan for ESDP support for Peace and Security in Africa and Conclusions on Peace and Security in Africa, and on 13 December 2004 the Council endorsed the Guidelines for implementing that Action

1. OJ L21, 28.1.2004, p. 25.

Plan. In this context, the Council stressed the complementary character of actions in the framework of CFSP (including through ESDP support), the Peace Facility for Africa, Community instruments and bilateral actions by Member States.

(7) The promotion of peace, security and stability in the continent is one of the objectives of the African Union (AU) and the peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States is one of the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. The prevention, management and resolution of conflicts have been the subject of dialogue with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the AU, and are included in the Cairo Declaration and Plan of Action. The AU and African sub regional organisations constitute the central actors in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa.

(8) Effective conflict prevention requires strategies to create enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international environment, and comprehensive and balanced aid and developmental assistance programmes to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent conflict; the importance of economic factors in conflicts in Africa, as well as the potential of diplomatic and economic measures for the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts also have to be taken into account.

(9) There is a link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, where development cooperation has a strategic role to play in strengthening capacities to manage conflicts in peaceful ways.

(10) The linkages between HIV/AIDS and conflict have to be addressed in all policies concerning peace and security. In all phases of conflict, from prevention to reconstruction, instability creates the conditions for an accelerated spread of the pandemic. The spread of HIV/AIDS itself has serious socioeconomic and political consequences in the short and the long term.

(11) The European Community and its Member States entered into a Partnership Agreement with the ACP States at Cotonou on 23 June 2000.

(12) The European Parliament adopted on 30 November 2000 a Resolution on Participation of Women in Peaceful Conflict Resolution; and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly adopted on 21 March 2002 a Resolution on Gender Issues.

(13) On 8 December 2003 the Council adopted Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict,



**HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION:***Article 1*

1. The EU shall contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field, in particular through enhanced dialogue with, and support for, the AU and sub-regional organisations and initiatives, and civil society organisations. In doing this, the EU shall take further steps to promote coordination between the many actors that may be involved, including a closer coordination of the measures taken by the Community and its Member States, notably in the frame of the Action Plan for ESDP Support for Peace and Security in Africa and the Guidelines for its implementation.

2. In particular, the EU shall implement the Action Plan for ESDP Support for Peace and Security in Africa, in accordance with the Guidelines endorsed by the Council. Coordination of Member States and Community contributions shall be improved and possibilities for a management mechanism in order to facilitate the pooling of voluntary contributions by Member States shall be explored.

3. The EU shall, as it strengthens its capacity in the areas of crisis management and conflict prevention, improve its close cooperation with the UN and relevant regional and sub-regional organisations in order to achieve the above objective. Cooperation with the UN on crisis management shall be taken forward in line with and as a part of the implementation of the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management of 24 September 2003. The EU, notwithstanding its commitment to African ownership, shall remain prepared to become involved, whenever necessary, in crisis management in Africa with its own capabilities.

4. The EU shall develop long-term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives, recognising that progress in these areas is a necessary precondition also for African States to build and sustain capacity to deal effectively with terrorism.

5. The EU shall develop a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach, which shall also serve as a common framework for actions of individual Member States. As a part of this, and to enhance capacity for early action, a yearly survey shall continue to be drawn up by the Presidency assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, so as to

identify and monitor potential violent conflicts and presenting the policy options necessary to prevent their outbreak or recurrence.

### *Article 2*

The EU's policy shall focus on preventing the outbreak and spreading of violent conflicts through early action, and on preventing the recurrence of violent conflicts. In this context, EU action shall cover:

- conflict prevention by seeking to address the more structural root causes while targeting the direct causes – trigger factors – of violent conflicts,
- crisis management by addressing acute phases of conflicts and supporting efforts to bring the violence to an end, using all possible measures including political and practical support to regional and sub-regional initiatives to achieve and support a ceasefire agreement between all parties involved and, when appropriate, deployment of a crisis management operation,
- peace-building by seeking to support initiatives for containing violent conflict and to prepare for, and sustain, peaceful solutions to such conflicts,
- reconstruction by supporting the economic, political and social rebuilding of post-conflict States and societies to prevent the re-escalation of violence and to promote sustainable peace.

### *Article 3*

In order to better contribute to conflict management as well as to respond to existing crises, the EU shall take into account:

- development of international legal systems, dispute resolution mechanisms, and cooperative arrangements at the regional level, in particular, the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in June 2004,
- institution building by increasing the effectiveness of African national security and judicial institutions including for counter-terrorism activities as well as by identifying specific action to assist African countries in implementing their commitments under the existing international instruments in all relevant fields, including the fight against terrorism and illicit trafficking,
- support for the ratification and full implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which can play an important role in shaping national institutions for the fight against impunity. This includes the reinforcement of judicial insti-

tutions which have an important complementary role in this context. Special attention will be paid to war-related crimes included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, like the conscription or enlistment of children, which has a serious impact on conflict-struck countries.

#### *Article 4*

1. The EU shall seek to increase its support to regional arrangements and efforts in conflict prevention by enhancing corporate responsibility, strengthening the rule of law, training in conflict prevention, building capacities for, *inter alia*, political and economic analyses, early warning systems, negotiation/mediation skills, improving international sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms, developing mechanisms that address economic factors that fuel conflicts, and strengthening linkages between regional organisations themselves as well as with local, national and regional non-State actors and other members of the international community. Efforts to support regional and sub-regional organisations in the area of conflict prevention shall be carefully coordinated by the Community and its Member States so as to develop joint initiatives and synergies, including through joint programming where appropriate.

2. The EU's support for, and cooperation with, the AU in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution shall be pursued with a view to developing a long-term partnership, particularly in the framework of the follow-up to the Cairo Summit.

#### *Article 5*

The EU shall seek:

- to support the mainstreaming of conflict prevention perspectives within the framework of Community development and trade policy and its associated country and regional strategies,
- to introduce, as appropriate, conflict indicators and peace and conflict impact assessment tools in development and trade cooperation so as to reduce the risk of aid and trade fuelling conflict, and to maximise its positive impact on peace-building,
- to ensure that tangible dividends reach swiftly the population as a whole,
- to improve the coordination between the efforts of the Community and those of its Member States in this field,
- to improve development and trade cooperation with regional,

subregional and local actors in order to ensure consistency between initiatives and to support African activities,

- to coordinate its efforts with the international financial institutions.

### *Article 6*

1. The EU shall support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peace support operations capabilities, at regional, subregional and bilateral levels as well as the capacity of the African States to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and development. Notwithstanding such capacity enhancement, the EU and its Member States shall continue, on a case-by-case basis, to consider deploying their own operational means for conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in close cooperation with UN activities in the region. Such considerations shall take into account the scope of capabilities developed under the EU crisis management capabilities, including the deployment of civilian personnel for longer-term responses to peace-building.

2. Member States and the Commission shall exchange information on all action taken to support African peace support operations capabilities with a view to improving coordination and developing synergies. This information shall be summarised in the annual review of this Common Position provided for in Article 14.

3. Member States and the Commission shall give higher priority to country and regional strategies and risk assessment. Country strategies can be developed with the use of standardised indicators and the assistance of expert groups. Risk assessment and country strategies would benefit from greater use of local knowledge, including information from local experts trained in early warning and risk assessment.

4. Member States and the Commission shall seek to achieve improved coordination of bilateral action in support of the AU and African subregional organisations, in particular the Economic Community of West African States, the South African Development Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, regarding African peace support operations capabilities.

5. Member States and the Commission shall systematically invite each other or the Presidency, as appropriate, to participate in exer-

cises and seminars they organise with a view to reinforcing African peacekeeping capabilities.

6. Coordination and exchanges on enhancement activities shall be sought with interested third parties, notably the United States, Canada, Norway and Japan in particular in the framework of the political dialogue with these countries.

7. The EU shall endeavour to improve further its coordination with the UN, and in particular with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, on all activities aiming at strengthening African peace support operations capabilities.

8. The EU shall analyse how best to coordinate efforts in areas of training and exercises.

9. On an *ad hoc* basis, the EU shall consider in due course initiating, where there is value added, capacity enhancement programmes in its own name, separately or in conjunction with programmes initiated by individual Member States. Such action might range from small-scale observer missions from African organisations during EU peacekeeping exercises to more comprehensive training programmes.

#### *Article 7*

Member States shall continue to conduct a restrictive policy with regard to arms exports, fully applying the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Recognising that the availability and accumulation of arms exceeding legitimate security needs may be a factor contributing to instability, and that the curbing of the illicit trafficking in arms is an important contribution to the easing of tension and the reconciliation processes, the Member States and the Commission shall:

- cooperate in promoting international respect for arms embargoes and other relevant decisions by the UN Security Council and support initiatives to implement such measures effectively,
- continue to support and actively respect regional initiatives contributing to the prevention and combating of illicit trafficking in arms,
- cooperate to encourage associated countries to align themselves with principles adopted and measures taken by the EU. The EU shall further consider support for African efforts to improve controls on arms manufacture, import and export, and support for controlling or eliminating surplus small arms, as well as support for African efforts to tackle problems relating to small arms

in accordance with Council Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002 on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons,<sup>2</sup>

- continue to support the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects as well as the negotiations of the Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 May 2001.

### *Article 8*

#### 1. The EU shall:

- seek to address economic factors that fuel conflicts,
- seek to promote the further integration of Africa into the world economy, and to support even access to the benefits and opportunities of this across societies,
- support economic and political cooperation, such as regional stabilisation arrangements, to strengthen relations between parties as a preventive and post-conflict peace-building measure,
- work to ensure that regional trade integration measures, within a policy context comprising safety nets for vulnerable groups, support conflict prevention and resolution.

#### 2. The EU shall also:

- cooperate in promoting universal respect for embargoes related to the illegal exploitation of, and trade in, high value commodities and for other relevant decisions by the UN Security Council and support initiatives to implement such measures effectively,
- actively work towards finding means to suppress illegal exploitation of natural resources which contributes to the eruption, escalation and continuation of violent conflicts,
- where appropriate, use restrictive measures, including economic and financial sanctions, targeted at actors who profit from and exacerbate violent conflicts. In this context, there is a need to further reflect on the (positive or negative) role to be played by the private sector in the area of conflict prevention and resolution.

2. OJ L 191, 19.7.2002, p. 1.

### *Article 9*

Throughout the different phases of the conflict cycle, the EU shall:

- evaluate the important role that “non State actors” can play either fuelling conflict or helping to resolve or prevent it. Either way, their role and the positive contribution they may make, needs to be accounted for,
- encourage the application of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, through ensuring that a gender perspective informs planning, implementing and evaluating the impact of conflict, the needs of the different actors in conflict and the level and nature of participation in decision-making in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, including peace processes and negotiations,
- address the short, medium and long-term impact of armed conflict on children in an effective and comprehensive manner, making use of the variety of tools at its disposal, and building on past and ongoing activities, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions 1460 and 1539 on Children and Armed Conflict and the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict. It shall also try to influence third country actors (governments as well as non-State actors including armed groups) to take effective measures to protect the rights of children affected by armed conflict.

### *Article 10*

To reflect the need to maintain focus on a conflict even after it has become less acute, and to contribute to a more coherent and systematic approach to post-war situations in Africa, the EU shall:

- develop and organise its own capacities in order to support security sector reform within the framework of democratic principles, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and good governance, in particular in countries in transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace,
- continue and consolidate its support for tackling the problems of the destabilising accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms,
- enhance its support for the disarmament and sustainable reintegration of demobilised ex-combatants with particular attention to gender-based needs and the needs of children recruited to take part in military activities,

- increase its assistance to the removal of existing landmines, as well as it shall promote mine awareness and encourage and support the development of African capacities in demining,
- continue to support actions aimed at facilitating the reintegration of uprooted populations in post conflict situations, taking into account the relevant Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, of the Representative of the UN Secretary General,
- encourage reconciliation and support reconstruction needed to allow countries emerging from conflict to relaunch policies for long term development,
- in accordance with the Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court,<sup>3</sup> reiterate in its political dialogue with its African counterparts its strong commitment to support the International Criminal Court and its position regarding the US proposed non surrender bilateral agreements.

#### *Article 11*

The EU shall evaluate possible cooperation at national and regional levels in this area suggesting avenues, utilising a range of instruments, to address the problem of the relationship between the radicalisation of religious groups and their vulnerability to terrorist recruitment, in a conflict prevention and peace building perspective. In this context, the EU shall take account of the Joint Declaration on Terrorism adopted by the EU Africa Ministerial Conference of Brussels ( 11 October 2001), as well as the Joint Declaration on Terrorism adopted by the EU Africa Ministerial Conference of Ouagadougou ( 28 November 2002).

#### *Article 12*

The EU shall ensure that tackling HIV/AIDS is an integral part of EU strategies to prevent and mitigate conflict. Dialogue with the AU on this matter, which shall be based on the principle of African ownership, should be intensified. In this context, assistance to peace support operations shall ensure elements on awareness and training for prevention of HIV/AIDS, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1308, on HIV/AIDS and International Peacekeeping Operations.

3. OJ/L 150, 18.6.2003, p. 67



*Article 13*

The Council notes that the Commission intends to direct its action towards achieving the objectives and priorities of this Common Position, where appropriate by pertinent Community measures.

*Article 14*

On the basis of a report by the Presidency, in association with the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, this Common Position and the implementation thereof shall be reviewed annually and amended as appropriate.

*Article 15*

Common Position 2004/85/CFSP is hereby repealed.

*Article 16*

This Common Position shall take effect on the day of its adoption.

*Article 17*

This Common Position shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Luxembourg, 12 April 2005

*For the Council*

*The President*

J.-C. Juncker

**Abbreviations**

ACP	Africa-Caribbean-Pacific states
AU	African Union
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DG	Directorate General
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2004)
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUSEC	EU Security Sector Reform mission
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
GEMAP	Governance Economic Management Assistance Programme (Liberia)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MARWOPNET	Mano River Women's Peace Network
MFDC	<i>Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance</i> (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance – Senegal)
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2004)
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo</i> (Mission of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MRU	Mano River Union
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ONUCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (2004 - ongoing)
PAIGC	<i>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</i> (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PDRRI	Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Former Combatants
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons


SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (2005 – ongoing)
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia (2003 – ongoing)
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (1993-1997)
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (1998- 1999)
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union

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## Books

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Friends again? EU-US relations after the crisis <i>Nicole Gnesotto, James Dobbins, Federico Romero, David Frum, William Wallace, Ronald D. Asmus, István Gyarmati, Walter B. Slocombe, Gilles Andréani, Philip H. Gordon, Werner Weidenfeld, Felix Neugart, Geoffrey Kemp, Dov Lynch, Fiona Hill, Baudoin Bollaert, Joseph Quinlan, Marcin Zaborowski; edited by Marcin Zaborowski</i>	2006
Defence procurement in the European Union – The current debate Report of an EUISS Task Force <i>Chairman and Rapporteur: Burkard Schmitt</i>	2005
EU Security and Defence Policy – the first five years (1999-2004) <i>Martti Ahtisaari, Michel Barnier, Carl Bildt, Elmar Brok &amp; Norbert Gresch, Robert Cooper, Judy Dempsey, Lamberto Dini, Jean-Louis Gergorin &amp; Jean Bétermier, Philip H. Gordon, Jean-Yves Haine, Gustav Lindstrom, Antonio Missirotti, Alberto Navarro, Martin Ortega, Ferdinando Riccardi, Alexander Rondos, Burkard Schmitt, Rainer Schuwirth, Theo Sommer and Laurent Zecchini; edited by Nicole Gnesotto; preface by Javier Solana</i>	2004



Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire ... For many, these names conjure up political crises and violent conflicts. The five West African countries that constitute the Mano River Basin have attracted significant international and regional attention and preoccupation over the last fifteen years.

Due to its history of colonial involvement in Africa, Europe shares a common past with these countries and has maintained a close partnership with them ever since their independence. Over the years, a series of agreements has established trade and development aid partnership links between the European Union and the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group of states. An increasing emphasis on political stability and on security was progressively introduced into the two last Lomé agreements and their successor, the Cotonou Agreement (2000). This peace and security dimension is also fully acknowledged in the EU's strategic partnership for Africa, which sets out the steps the EU will take by 2015 to support African efforts to build a peaceful future.

The Mano River conflicts justified and gave a new urgency to these new efforts and the region remains the focus of considerable European political analysis and attention. This *Chaillot Paper* focuses on the recent trend in the EU towards a holistic understanding of development in Africa, whereby security, political stability and democracy are now considered essential elements in the recipe for economic development. A range of specific EU instruments for dealing with Africa has gradually emerged in this context. Against this background, the paper suggests some approaches for the improvement of the EU's current responses to West Africa's fragile economic and political stability.

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