



ESDP newsletter

#6

European Security and Defence Policy

July 2008

- > Visit to operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA
 - > Kosovo – preparations for enhanced EU engagement
 - > Climate change and security



La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

en un coup d'œil



Camp Europa à N'Djaména, Tchad.

Dans le cadre de la PESC, l'Union élabore une politique de sécurité commune, qui couvre l'ensemble des questions relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d'une politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que premier "Haut Représentant pour la PESC", le Conseil européen réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement de la PESC les missions de gestion des crises.

Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d'évacuation, des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que "l'Union doit disposer d'une capacité d'action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d'y recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par l'OTAN".

C'est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la mise en place de structures politiques et militaires permanentes et à l'établissement de capacités civiles et militaires, y compris la formulation par l'UE d'un ensemble de concepts et de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L'Union a également conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en outre défini avec l'OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à l'Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l'OTAN.

Depuis janvier 2007, l'Union dispose d'un Centre d'opérations (OpsCentre) lui fournissant une nouvelle option pour la planification et la conduite d'opérations. Elle dispose également de forces de réaction rapide, les groupements tactiques ("EU Battlegroups").

L'Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003. À ce jour, elle a mené, mène ou s'apprête à mener une vingtaine d'opérations, dans les Balkans occidentaux, en Afrique, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie.

Pour un aperçu des missions et opérations de l'UE, voir page 30. Pour en savoir plus sur ces missions et opérations, consulter le site Internet du Conseil de l'UE: www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp – www.consilium.europa.eu/pesd

Editorial

The year 2008 marks a threefold anniversary. Fifteen years ago, the Treaty on European Union saw the launch of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); ten years ago, the French/British Saint-Malo summit paved the way for the European security and defence policy (ESDP) as we know it, and for the major decisions of the European Council in 1999; and five years ago, the first EU operations under the ESDP were launched.

This momentum is still very much alive today. A total of 19 ESDP operations and missions have been launched, 11 of which are ongoing.

Two major operations have been decided in recent months, both of them with ambitious objectives, and both challenging in their own ways.

As part of international efforts to respond to the Darfur crisis and its regional ramifications, the EU operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has now started to implement its mandate. To do so, it has had to overcome a series of hurdles related to the demanding geographic parameters, the resulting logistical challenge, and the security situation in the region. This issue of the ESDP newsletter will try to give you an insight into the first few months of this operation.

Closer to home, the EU rule of law mission EULEX Kosovo, which will be the Union's largest civilian mission, faces other challenges. Kosovo lies within Europe and is easy to reach. But the political context makes deployment and the assumption of responsibilities more complex.

This edition also looks at some of the issues facing Europe in the coming years, one of which is climate change. Last spring, High Representative Solana, together with the Commission, presented EU leaders and ministers with a report on the impact of climate change on international security. Climate change, the report tells us, is best viewed as a "threat multiplier" which exacerbates or magnifies existing trends, tensions and instabilities. For Europe and its partners, one aim is to develop proactive policies and mechanisms that can prevent global warming from overburdening states and regions which are already fragile and prone to conflict.

Another aim for the Union is the continued development of capabilities. Daniel Keohane, from the EU Institute for Security Studies, looks at the prospects and sees the twin pressures of static budgets and growing operational demands prodding EU governments to pool more of their military resources in the future, benefiting both their armed forces and European taxpayers.

Acting in the field, in theatres such as Africa and the Western Balkans, developing a common vision of threats and how to respond to them, and pooling resources: these are just three aspects of the EU's continued efforts to be active, informed and capable.



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> Nominations

Deux nominations récentes témoignent des renforcements du partenariat UE-Afrique.

Le Général Pierre-Michel Joana a été nommé à compter du 1er mars Conseiller spécial pour les capacités africaines de maintien de la paix auprès du Haut Représentant Javier Solana. L'Union attache une importance particulière au renforcement du partenariat avec l'Afrique dans le domaine des capacités africaines de prévention, de gestion et de résolution des conflits. Le Général Joana apporte à cette nouvelle fonction son expertise et sa connaissance du continent. Il a notamment dirigé de 2005 à 2008 la mission européenne de réforme des forces armées congolaises – la mission EUSEC RD Congo. Avant cela il avait occupé différents postes de commandement et de responsabilité au sein de l'Armée française dans plusieurs pays africains.



Le Général
Pierre-Michel Joana

Koen Vervaeke a été nommé le 6 décembre 2007 Représentant spécial de l'Union européenne (RSUE) et chef de la délégation de la Commission auprès de l'Union africaine à Addis-Abeba. Il y poursuivra les objectifs de l'Union dans le cadre du partenariat stratégique UE-Afrique. Sa nomination permet à l'Union d'avoir une présence permanente renforcée auprès de l'Union africaine. M. Vervaeke, diplomate belge qui a été en poste dans plusieurs pays africains, était depuis 2003 conseiller pour les questions africaines auprès du Haut Représentant Javier Solana.



Koen Vervaeke

Par ailleurs, Kees Klompenhouwer a été nommé directeur du CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) et Commandant des opérations civiles (voir p.24) à compter du 1er mai.

> Relations avec le Parlement européen et les parlements nationaux

Les activités sur la PESC et la PESD ont continué à se développer avec le Parlement européen, ainsi qu'avec les parlements nationaux des États membres.

Le Haut Représentant Javier Solana a effectué plusieurs interventions au Parlement européen, notamment aux sessions plénières des 30 janvier et 4 juin et à la commission des Affaires étrangères du 8 avril. Le HR a par ailleurs rencontré le président du PE, Hans-Gert Pöttering les 6 mars et 11 juin avant les réunions du Conseil européen. Des réunions ont eu lieu aussi avec le comité spécial sur les informations sensibles dans le domaine de la PESC en janvier, en février et en mai. M. Solana a également rencontré les dirigeants des principaux groupes politiques du PE.



Le HR Solana à Ljubljana le 17 mars à la Conférence des présidents des commissions des Affaires étrangères des États membres.

S'agissant des relations avec les parlements nationaux, le Haut Représentant Solana est intervenu devant la COFACC (Conférence des présidents de commissions des Affaires étrangères) le 17 mars à Ljubljana. Le Haut Représentant a également rencontré des parlementaires nationaux, notamment des membres des commissions Affaires étrangères de la chambre des communes du Royaume-Uni et du parlement danois et des commissions Défense des parlements suédois et néerlandais. Le 4 juin à Berlin il est intervenu devant les commissions Affaires étrangères et Affaires européennes du Bundestag.

D'autres acteurs de la PESC et de la PESD ont eu l'occasion de participer au développement des contacts avec les parlements, comme le président du Comité militaire, le Général Bentégeat, devant la commission Sécurité et Défense du PE (SEDE) en février. Les 2-3 mars à Ljubljana, le Représentant personnel du HR pour les affaires parlementaires dans le domaine de la PESC, Michael Matthiessen, ainsi que plusieurs responsables dans le domaine de la PESD sont intervenus à la Conférence des présidents des commissions Défense.

> Industrie et marchés: lancement des travaux sur un "paquet défense"

La Commission européenne a présenté le 5 décembre 2007 de nouvelles mesures en faveur de la compétitivité des industries et des marchés de défense.

Ce "paquet défense", en discussion actuellement au Conseil et au Parlement européen, comprend une communication exposant diverses recommandations en vue d'accroître la compétitivité du secteur, une directive relative aux marchés publics dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité pour une plus grande ouverture et une concurrence intra-européenne accrue dans ces marchés publics et, enfin, une directive relative aux transferts intracommunautaires de produits liés à la défense, dont le but est de réduire les obstacles aux échanges commerciaux de ces produits dans l'Union européenne.

Le "paquet défense" et les nouvelles initiatives prises depuis 2004 par l'Agence européenne de défense (AED), ont notamment pour objectif de contribuer à la création d'un marché européen des équipements de défense, facteur clé pour soutenir la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD).

> Stratégie européenne de sécurité

Au Conseil européen du 14 décembre 2007, les chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'UE se sont penchés sur la stratégie européenne de sécurité. Ils ont souligné l'utilité de cette stratégie adoptée en 2003 et jugé qu'elle fournissait à l'Union le cadre approprié pour sa politique extérieure. À la lumière de toutes les évolutions qui ont eu lieu depuis lors, notamment l'expérience acquise dans le cadre des missions PESD, ils ont invité le Haut Représentant, en pleine association avec la Commission et en étroite coopération avec les États membres, à examiner la mise en œuvre de cette stratégie en vue de proposer, pour que le Conseil européen les adopte en décembre 2008, des éléments qui permettront de l'améliorer et, au besoin, de la compléter.

> ESDP high level course 2007-2008 and alumni network seminar

In the year 2007-2008 the European Security and Defence College organised the third European Security and Defence Policy High Level Course (ESDP HLC).

The High Level Course 2007-2008 took place in the form of five one-week residential modules each taking place in a different member state. The aim of this course is to provide participants with an update on current policies and their implementation within the ESDP, and also to serve as a forum that helps in building up and developing a common European security culture.

Seventy people coming from EU member states and EU institutions attended this year's ESDP High Level Course. Modules took place in Brussels, Lisbon, Prague/Brno, Tartu and Ljubljana.

In the margins of the fifth and last module of the High Level Course 2007-2008, for the purpose of networking, the very first ESDC Alumni Network Seminar took place in Ljubljana from 10 to 12 April 2008.

This first seminar was organised by the Slovenian Ministry of Defence and supported by the Council Secretariat.



Head of Mission General Esteban Verástegui in Guinea-Bissau, April 2008

The alumni seminar gave the participants the opportunity to meet again with their colleagues and get to know participants of previous ESDP High Level Courses, to share experiences and to learn about new developments in the field of the ESDP (the new developments in civilian aspects of the ESDP for example).

> Lancement de la mission PESD en Guinée-Bissau

L'Union européenne lance une mission PESD de conseil et d'assistance à l'appui du processus national de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Guinée-Bissau. Cette mission – dénommée EU SSR Guinée-Bissau – vient compléter de façon cohérente les activités menées au titre du Fonds européen de développement et des initiatives communautaires. La mission s'inscrit dans le contexte du partenariat stratégique conjoint Afrique-UE adopté au sommet UE-Afrique de décembre 2007, qui identifie la paix et la sécurité comme domaine majeur de coopération.

La mission, dirigée par le général espagnol Juan Esteban Verástegui, sera composée de 21 experts internationaux et de 18 personnels locaux. Le Général Esteban Verástegui était jusqu'à sa nomination le 4 mars commandant des forces aéromobiles de l'Armée de terre espagnole. Les experts de cette mission visant de manière intégrée l'ensemble du secteur de la sécurité travailleront avec l'armée, l'armée de l'air, la police judiciaire, la police et le parquet.

Il s'agira notamment de rendre opérationnelle la stratégie nationale de réforme en contribuant à la mise en œuvre de plans détaillés de restructuration des forces armées et de sécurité.

Après le déploiement d'une première équipe à la mi-avril, le lancement officiel de la mission est prévu pour la mi-juin, pour une durée initiale de douze mois.



Alumni College

EU Chad/CAR force aims to enhance stability and protection

On the occasion of High Representative Javier Solana's visit to Chad in May, the *ESDP newsletter* reports on the deployment of operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the field.

> By Raymon Frenken



The European Union's involvement in the African desert in Chad and the Central African Republic takes on a unique logistical challenge and opens a new chapter in the history of European operations. The objective – to create security in one of the world's hot spots: eastern Chad and north-east CAR, near the border with war-torn Darfur.



> Unloading equipment at the port of Douala (Cameroon)

A demanding operation

Thousands of tonnes of military equipment, fuel and water are being shipped to the east of the country, by boat from Europe, with heavy-lift aircraft and by convoy overland via the Cameroon port of Douala. Camps are being built from scratch in the middle of the desert to house 3,700 European troops from several Member States, under Irish, Polish and French command.

All this is happening in a landlocked country with a chronic water shortage, where temperatures often reach well over 40 degrees Celsius.

The east of Chad is at the heart of an international humanitarian crisis with nearly half a million displaced people fleeing the fighting, killings and banditry in Darfur and eastern Chad. During the visit, there were unconfirmed reports coming in of continued fighting and pillaging.

Amid an international public outcry over the ongoing atrocities in Darfur, last September the United Nations authorised the EU to deploy a military force in Chad and the CAR. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1778, operation EUFOR Tchad/CAR complements the UN's MINURCAT police force in Chad and the CAR and a hybrid African Union-United Nations force deployed inside Darfur. The EU gave its final green light for the mission in January.

Besides Chad, EUFOR also includes a detachment of 200 troops, under French command, near Birao in the Central African Republic, helping to protect refugees there, too.

The EU operation reached Initial Operational Capability on 15 March, triggering the start of its one-year mandate which will end in March 2009.



> French C-160



Europe aims to contribute to the protection of refugees, civilians and aid workers in the east of Chad. This will involve a total of 3,700 European troops from 22 EU Member States (at OHQ level – 18 are present in theatre). By mid-June, 3,000 troops had been deployed. Full deployment is expected this summer, with more troops from Poland, the Netherlands, Ireland, and additional helicopters from Russia.

Irish Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash commands the mission from the EU's multinational operational headquarters in Mont-Valérien, near Paris. "It is the international community's ambition to create in Chad and CAR a safe and secure environment that is self-sustaining without the continued support of an international military presence," says General Nash.

"I hope very much that our presence here will solve some of the problems that are being so dramatically exposed in this region," said the EU's High Representative Javier Solana on completing his two-day visit.

At the end of his visit, Mr Solana himself experienced directly what it is like to work in the land-locked heart of Central Africa. His French Transall C-160 military transport plane was grounded only minutes before the scheduled take-off from the Goz Beida airstrip, close to the Irish camp, south of the operating area.

As Solana walked towards the plane, red hydraulic liquid began pouring forcefully from under a flap on the starboard wing. It instantly became evident that Solana's return would be delayed as the engines were shut down and darkness set in at the unlit airstrip.





> *EUFOR troops go out on patrol*

However, such incidents are not deterring the European forces there. The French dispatched a second Transall aircraft. When it showed up in the star-lit sky two hours later, Irish rangers lit up no more than five fuel barrels along the dusty airstrip, allowing the plane to make a “tactical landing”. At a barely lit airstrip in the dark heart of Africa, that is not without risk, so special forces were on hand with night-vision equipment.

Nine days earlier, the airstrip and a few huts for local tribesmen were the only features in the immediate Goz Beida area, about 70 kilometres from the border with war-torn Darfur. As the EU’s top diplomat arrived, Irish Army engineers, together with a handful of Dutch and French, had begun to construct the Goz Beida operating base in a six-week assignment. Since the end of May, Goz Beida has been home to a 230-strong Irish battalion and 60 Dutch Royal Marines, all under Irish command.

The logistical challenge

Logistics is a key element to what is probably Europe’s most demanding military mission to date.

The EUFOR operating area – approximately 280,000 square kilometres – is more than half the size of France. The long distances here create particular challenges for fuel and logistics.

Most of the heavy equipment and supplies are shipped by sea to Douala, Cameroon – a two-week journey from Europe. From there, the containers, trucks and other vehicles face a 1,700 kilometre overland journey, a distance similar to the Rome-Stockholm stretch, on roads far, far worse.

“The distance and road conditions between here and Abéché and indeed, more specifically Goz Beida, are probably the largest single





> *The forward base at Forchana*



> *Planning Goz Beida forward base*



> *EUFOR on patrol in the village of N'Jarouma*

difficulty we have,” explains lieutenant Enda de Bruin, who oversees Irish logistics at EUFOR from Camp Europa near N'Djamena.

By air, it takes between four and nine hours to reach Chad from Europe, depending on the type of aircraft. Having sufficient airlift capacity inside the country is seen as essential for this mission in the heart of Africa. France has offered 12 tonnes per day; the equivalent of about three C-160 flights. By air, the route between N'Djamena and Abéché is 760 kilometre long. By road, it would take five days in the dry season to travel the 1,380 kilometres.

The Goz Beida base houses generators, a field kitchen, dormitories, toilets and three large tents behind the levees, ditches and barbed wire. The quadrant base roughly covers the size of four football fields. Several dozen trucks, armoured vehicles and four-wheel drives are parked here.



> *Italian military hospital at Abéché*





> *Logistics convoy*

More Irish trucks, and also Viking traction vehicles for the Dutch Royal Marines, recently disembarked in the port of Douala, 2,300 kilometres to the west. It takes the convoy about two weeks to reach Camp Europa in Chad's capital N'Djamena. From there, it is another four or five days to Goz Beida – when the road stays dry, that is. The N'Djamena-Goz Beida journey may take as long as ten days during the rainy season.



> *Irish EUFOR troops at Goz Beida*

Enhancing security for refugees and IDPs

The Goz Beida area encompasses about a dozen camps for refugees from Darfur and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chad. The camps in this area house more than half of the 180,000 IDPs in Chad and a quarter of the 285,000 refugees from Darfur. To put these figures into perspective: eastern Chad's local population is estimated at about 700,000.

Eastern Chad is home to various local rebel groups. Ethnic militias and bandits are responsible for frequent attacks. In the last year, about a dozen off-road vehicles used by aid groups have been hijacked.

"The situation still is not stable, especially close to the border," insists an UNHCR official during a briefing for Solana at the EUFOR camp in Goz Beida. "Security is our major preoccupation, and we hope that EUFOR will give us a hand."

The killing less than a week earlier of French aid worker Pascal Marlinge, the country head for British aid group Save the Children, demonstrates that the risks remain real. Marlinge was killed by bandits nine kilometres from the EUFOR base in Forchana in the central part of eastern Chad. He is the third aid worker killed since January.

Humanitarian workers, wearing black, were still mourning their colleague's death as they received Solana at the UN's office in Abéché, the biggest town in eastern Chad. From this office, the work of 78 humanitarian agencies is coordinated by the UN's humanitarian office, OCHA.

Solana told humanitarian workers that "the idea is not to put a soldier in each convoy, but to create secure conditions. We're here to create a secure environment."

Abéché is also the location for EUFOR's main operational camp – or Force HQ – known as Stars Camp. It is still under construction but a modern Italian military hospital has already been set up.



The Italian hospital is a fully-fledged 'level-two' field hospital, composed of about 15 air-conditioned tents that are all linked to each other. The maze includes operating rooms, modern x-ray equipment, a pharmacy and even a dentistry unit.

The three 'forward' bases in Goz Beida, Forchana and Iriba are supported from Abéché. Iriba is the camp under Polish command in the north. In Abéché, during the build-up stage, the European Union is leaning on the spartan facilities at an existing French camp. That will change once construction of EUFOR's permanent Stars Camp has been completed on the other side of the airport. This camp will be able to house nearly 2,000 troops.

There is also a EUFOR special forces camp in Abéché town. This unit includes elite specialists from Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Belgium who carry out reconnaissance missions, among other things.



> Helicopters are a critical asset for the operation



Complex political context

Chad and Sudan accuse each other of helping rebels in the diffuse border area in the east. In February, pro-Sudan rebels reached the capital and attempted to oust Chad's president Idriss Déby during an offensive. In N'Djamena's government district, where much of the fighting took place, remnants of the February battle are clearly visible in the trash-ridden streets. Abandoned pieces of artillery are among the rubble.

The agreement reached in Dakar, Senegal, in March between Chad's president Déby with Sudan's president Omar Hassan al-Bashir was the topic of Solana's meeting with Déby the night before he travelled to the east. As Solana visited, fresh peace talks between Chad and Sudan were due to take place in Libya soon. "There will be a meeting in the coming days in Tripoli to check how that can be implemented," Solana said after the meeting, referring to the Dakar agreement.

But by the end of the week, diplomatic ties between Chad and Sudan had been cut. Sudan's capital Khartoum was attacked by rebels in an offensive strikingly similar to the one on N'Djamena in February. Sudan claimed the attack was inspired by the Chad government.

A new attempt at direct peace talks between Chad and Sudan will now be made during a meeting in Brazzaville, Congo, in June.



> Water - an all important commodity



The water factor

Even when standards are reduced to 60 litres of water per person per day – as is the case at EUFOR – supplying sufficient fresh water for 3,700 troops in the middle of the desert remains a serious challenge. Responsible consumption is actively encouraged.

“Imagine what would happen here if we were to drill wells and deplete all the water in this town in a few years,” says an Irish support engineer. “There would be nothing left. We can’t afford to create such a future problem, so we have to find other ways, like recycling waste water.”

Ditches have been dug at all the EUFOR camps which can handle substantial amounts of rain water. Camp Europa, near the capital N'Djamena, has already been nicknamed “little Venice”.

In Goz Beida, the first rains have come already. As Solana’s motorcade travelled towards the Gouroukoun IDP camp, it was soon evident that the rains would be a significant factor. The roads turn into rivers, and wadis – dry riverbeds – can no longer be crossed easily.

The Irish are eagerly awaiting the arrival of 60 Dutch Royal Marines with their Viking traction vehicles, which will allow the EUFOR troops in the southern part of the operating area to patrol even when the rains make local travel impossible for normal vehicles.

Although the prospect of the rainy season places extra pressure on the deployment, the rains themselves are not necessarily a disadvantage for EUFOR, explains Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Ganascia, Commander of EUFOR on the ground.

“This rain is a handicap for those we are trying to fight,” he continues. “The rainy season could be a handicap, but we are going to use it as best we can.”

At the Gouroukoun IDP camp, the elders used Solana’s visit to raise interest for their plight.

They would like to move back to their town on the border with Darfur, but want to do so only once a bridge has been built across a wadi at the west of their village. With such a bridge, they say they can escape faster when their village is attacked by the Janjaweed, the armed gunmen on horseback who cross the border from Sudan.

When the wadi is flooded, they simply cannot escape the violence, which is why they have stayed in this camp for two years already.

During the visit, aid agencies had already delivered sufficient food to last the people in Gouroukoun for six weeks to two months. But once these supplies run out, and if the rains have not disappeared by then, these displaced people will face new problems. Security is just one of them.

Europe’s operation has a mandate for one year, until March 2009. A mid-mandate review of the mission will take place in September, not least with a view to determining the arrangements for following up on the EU operation, including a possible UN operation. The aim is for the international community, building on the results that will have been achieved by EUFOR, to continue to support stability in this fragile part of the world.





> The forward base at Birao (CAR)


L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA

C'est le 28 janvier 2008 que l'Union européenne a décidé de lancer cette opération militaire de transition dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine, conformément au mandat figurant dans la Résolution 1778 (2007) du Conseil de sécurité.

Pleinement déployée, l'opération de l'UE comptera environ 3.700 hommes. A la mi-juin, quelque 3.000 personnels étaient déjà déployés sur le théâtre d'opérations.

Le déploiement comprend un quartier général de force arrière à N'Djaména, un quartier général de force à Abéché et trois bataillons multinationaux stationnés dans les régions de l'est tchadien respectivement à Iriba (nord), Forchana (centre) et Goz Beïda (sud), ainsi qu'un détachement à Birao (RCA).

Dans sa résolution 1778 du 25 septembre 2007, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a approuvé la mise en place d'une mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) et a autorisé l'Union européenne à déployer ses forces, pour une durée d'un an à partir du moment où celle-ci aura déclaré sa capacité opérationnelle initiale.



En menant une telle opération, l'UE renforce l'action qu'elle mène de longue date visant à faire face à la crise du Darfour, dans le cadre d'une approche régionale de cette crise. Cette opération est conduite en consultation avec les gouvernements tchadien et centrafricain.

Avec 14 États membres présents sur le terrain, 18 sur le théâtre et 22 au quartier général opérationnel (OHQ), situé au Mont Valérien (France), EUFOR TCHAD/RCA est l'opération la plus multinationale jamais envoyée en Afrique par l'UE.

Au regard de la situation sur le terrain, de l'immensité de la zone couverte et des difficultés logistiques, cette opération constitue un vrai défi pour l'UE.

Le commandement de l'opération est assuré par le Général de corps d'armée Patrick Nash (Irlandais), celui de la force par le Général de brigade Jean-Philippe Ganascia (Français).

EUFOR Tchad/RCA est une opération militaire de transition, étroitement coordonnée avec la présence multidimensionnelle des Nations Unies dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine, afin d'améliorer la sécurité dans ces régions. La mission de l'UE a plus particulièrement les objectifs suivants:

- contribuer à la protection des civils en danger, en particulier les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées;
- faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation du personnel humanitaire en contribuant à améliorer la sécurité dans la zone d'opérations;
- contribuer à la protection du personnel, des locaux, des installations et du matériel des Nations Unies et assurer la sécurité et la liberté de circulation de son propre personnel, du personnel des Nations Unies et du personnel associé.

L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA a atteint sa Capacité opérationnelle initiale (COI) le 15 mars 2008.

La déclaration de la COI a marqué le début effectif de cette opération. Elle signifie que la force européenne a les moyens de débiter ses missions, elle dispose notamment des outils de commandement (FHQ), de soutien logistique et de santé (hôpital de campagne italien à Abéché), d'ouverture de théâtre et de contrôle de zone (bataillon français à Forchana et Birao).

Parmi ses activités l'EUFOR effectue des patrouilles afin d'observer la situation sécuritaire dans sa zone d'opération et répondre au besoin de sécurité des populations.

• www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca

“Security is a precondition for development”

Interview

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash on the EUFOR operation to Chad/CAR

Pat Nash is the Operational Commander of the EU force in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). A native of Ireland, Nash has served overseas on six separate occasions, with experience in Cyprus, Lebanon and the Balkans and as commander of an Irish battalion in Lebanon in 1999.



General Nash

How does this EU operation relate to UN action?

■ This EUFOR military action is in line with the EU's policy of co-operation with the UN in the field of crisis management and is part of a package of EU initiatives. It is the EU contribution to a wider international and multi-dimensional presence under the auspices of the UN, and is part of a wider regional response to the Darfur crisis.

Why is Europe acting and why now? What are the EU's specific interests in this area?

■ Stabilisation of the Darfur region is an important objective for Europe. Security is a precondition for development, and the military operation will reinforce and complement other EU initiatives, political, economical and diplomatic, in the region.

How would you characterise the delay in getting the operation started?

■ The Force Generation process can only commence when the Council has validated the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), outlining the forces and capabilities required. Progress was slow and difficult to achieve, involving several meetings with long breaks in between. The delay in getting the operation started was then compounded in early February by the return of the rebels attempting to overthrow the Chadian government, who then had to be beaten back. The combined effect of these delays however has been positive because the newly deployed force will now have time to consolidate on the ground during the rainy season and have a clear period of some six months thereafter (instead of the previously scheduled one or two) to achieve its mission.

What is the goal of the military operation in Chad/CAR?

■ My task is to translate diplomatic policy into military action; the operation is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), and is aimed at contributing to a general improvement in security, creating a safe and secure environment in eastern Chad and in northeast CAR. This will allow for humanitarian aid to be delivered, and provide for the safety of the UN's MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) police mission and the return of internally displaced persons. Resolution 1778 was unanimously approved and authorises "all necessary measures" to achieve the mandated tasks.

The mission will take place in Chad/CAR. Why not in Darfur itself?

■ It is essential to remember that the situation to which we are responding is a regional problem – with EUFOR and MINURCAT achieving stability in the Chad and CAR regions neighbouring Darfur, it will be complementary to UNAMID (United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur) undertakings in Darfur itself.

“The EU operation in Chad/CAR is distinctly multinational in its mandate, in its chain of command and in its composition, being the EU's most multinational military operation yet to be conducted in Africa.”

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash

Can you describe the logistical challenges you are facing?

■ The area of operations is in the heart of Africa. It's remote, vast, and inhospitable. It was obvious from my reconnaissance and subsequent visits that the nature of the theatre is unforgiving. You don't speak of journey times in terms of distances but in terms of hours of flying and/or driving. Operations are based approximately 2,000 km from the nearest seaport (and 4,500 km from Brussels). Extreme climatic conditions and the inevitable arrival of the rainy season dictate that EUFOR camps and facilities be established as soon as possible. The putting in place of infrastructure is essential. EUFOR troops must be provided for with a minimum level of camp facilities in order to carry out their mission.



Gen Nash with Gen Ganascia, EUFOR Force Commander

It appears France is contributing the bulk of troops. Who else is participating?

■ As I speak we have just concluded the deployment of the Irish-led battalion into theatre to be followed shortly by the Polish-led battalion. 22 EU nations are represented in the Operational Headquarters and 18 are presently in theatre. The EU operation in Chad/CAR is distinctly multinational in its mandate, in its chain of command and in its composition, being the EU's most multinational military operation yet to be conducted in Africa.

"Stabilisation of the Darfur region is an important objective for Europe. Security is a precondition for development, and the military operation will reinforce and complement other EU initiatives..."

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash

What are the particular challenges involved in commanding a multinational force?

■ The challenge I face is to give purpose, direction and motivation to a multinational force seeking to be deployed into a remote inhospitable environment, in very poor countries in humanitarian crisis, and with a security dimension. It is a broad, deep, and multifaceted challenge.

Now that the operation is up and running, what specific challenges are you facing? Anything unexpected?

■ Getting a force was a problem, putting it on the ground was the next. For now the ongoing development of that deployment including the creation and improvement of infrastructure is concentrating our minds, as is the build-up of our sustainment capability in advance of the shortly arriving rainy season. The long lines of communication from Europe with limited airport capacity means we need considerable sea lift and port capabilities. The environment is very challenging, the heat, wet and rough terrain and very poor infrastructure place heavy demands on personnel, equipment and logistics. The security

Résumé

Pat Nash est le commandant de l'opération de l'UE au Tchad et en République centrafricaine (RCA). Originaire d'Irlande, Pat Nash a déjà servi à l'étranger, notamment à Chypre, au Liban et dans les Balkans. Voici quelques extraits de son entretien pour la *ESDP newsletter*:

"La stabilisation de la région du Darfour est un objectif important pour l'Europe. La sécurité est une condition préalable au développement, et cette opération militaire renforcera et complétera d'autres initiatives politiques, économiques et diplomatiques de l'Union européenne dans la région. [...]"

En service à l'étranger, j'ai appris que les forces multinationales sont en mesure de combiner leur rôle humanitaire et militaire sans perdre de vue leur objectif, en faisant toujours preuve de compassion et de compétence. [...]"

L'opération de l'UE au Tchad et en RCA est indéniablement multinationale par son mandat, sa chaîne de commandement et sa composition. À ce jour, il s'agit de l'opération militaire de l'UE la plus multinationale jamais menée en Afrique. [...]"

Le défi auquel je suis confronté consiste à donner un but, une orientation et une motivation à une force multinationale sur le point d'être déployée dans un environnement lointain et inhospitalier, dans des pays très pauvres qui sont victimes de crises humanitaires, sans oublier la dimension de sécurité. Il s'agit là d'un défi vaste et complexe, présentant de nombreux aspects. [...]"

L'obtention d'une force a été problématique et sa mise en place ne s'est guère avérée plus simple. Pour l'instant, c'est principalement le développement continu de ce déploiement qui nous occupe l'esprit, notamment la création et l'amélioration de l'infrastructure, tout comme le développement de notre capacité de résistance avant l'arrivée de la saison des pluies."

operational situation also poses difficulties. There is a blurring of the violence that is inspired by political motivation and bandit activities, a mosaic of associations that is constantly shifting.

What is the biggest difference between this operation and other operations you have been involved in?

■ Having served overseas, I've learned that multinational forces have the ability to combine humanitarian and military roles without losing focus, while still operating with compassion and competence. Undoubtedly however the big difference for me is to apply all this at the strategic military level while remaining conscious of parallel demands at the strategic political level.

What are your personal feelings about this operation?

■ I am optimistic and have good reason to be. The planning has gone well and with resolve and leadership the force has achieved a significant footprint in theatre. It will continue to increase gradually and incrementally, providing the necessary safe and secure environment whereby the humanitarian improvements can begin to take effect for the people.

Enhanced EU engagement in Kosovo



> Yves de Kermabon talks to the press


The European Union is about to enhance its presence in Kosovo. It will do this by a three-fold effort with the same overall objective: to support the Kosovo authorities at all levels to meet European standards. On 16 February 2008, the EU Council decided to launch 'EULEX KOSOVO' – an EU rule of law Mission in Kosovo. At the same time, the Council also appointed Pieter Feith as EU Special Representative in Kosovo. Alongside the Commission's decision to establish a permanent delegation in Pristina to drive the reform process forward, it is evident that Kosovo is a key priority for the EU.

Following the 78-day NATO intervention in 1999, that put an end to the armed conflict in Kosovo, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 which opened the way for a civilian and military presence in Kosovo under the authority of the UN. Kosovo came to be administered by the international community until a status settlement could be found. The UN administration, UNMIK, was organised in four pillars according to its main responsibilities: civil administration, reconstruction, humanitarian aid and institution building. The UN, EU, UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) were given responsibility of the pillars, respectively. In May 2001, the UNHCR pillar was replaced by a pillar for police and justice under UN management.

In March 2004, once again the world turned its attention to Kosovo. What started with a rumor that some Serbs had chased a few Albanian children into a river in North Kosovo and they had subsequently drowned ended with Kosovo-wide riots that resulted in 19 deaths and a around a thousand injured. Serb-Orthodox churches and Serb property were burned mainly by furious young Albanian men in retaliation for the alleged drownings. These serious incidents reopened the discussion about how the international community should handle the Kosovo issue.

Late in 2005, negotiations towards a final settlement started in Vienna, Austria. Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish President, led the UN team engaging in extensive talks with both main parties – negotiation teams from Belgrade and Pristina – and with international partners. More than 16 months later, on 26 March 2007, President Ahtisaari presented his comprehensive package to the UN Security Council in New York.

In light of the remaining differences in the UNSC on Kosovo and the ensuing agreement in the six-member contact group to drive the process forward, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, appointed Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger – a German diplomat – as EU representative in the European Union/Russia/United States Troika charged with facilitating a further period of engagement between Belgrade and Pristina on the future of Kosovo. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed this initiative stating that "the international community must find a solution that is timely, addresses the key concerns of all communities living in Kosovo and provides clarity for Kosovo's status. The status quo is not sustainable."



Pristina <

International support for a European perspective of Kosovo

Role of the European Special Representative (EUSR):

The objective of the EU in Kosovo is to support and assist the Kosovo authorities in developing a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours in the region. To promote these objectives, the Council of the European Union appointed Pieter Feith as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo on 4 February 2008.

His mandate is to:

- Offer the EU's advice and support to the Kosovo government in the political process of European integration
- Promote overall coordination of EU presences in Kosovo, e.g. European Commission liaison office and the EULEX rule of law mission
- Ensure consistency and coherence of EU action towards the public
- Provide local political guidance to the Head of the European Union rule of law Mission EULEX in Kosovo.
- Contribute to the development and consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo



> Pieter Feith

The European Special Representative holds a simultaneous mandate from the International Steering Group as International Civilian Representative (ICR).

Role of the International Civilian Representative (ICR):

The International Civilian Representative, Pieter Feith, supervises the implementation of the Comprehensive Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan) by the Kosovo government. He is the final authority in Kosovo regarding the interpretation of civilian aspects of the Comprehensive Status Settlement.

Pieter Feith is supported by the International Civilian Office (ICO) in exercising his mandate. The ICO consists of international experts from EU Member States and third countries in policy areas of the Comprehensive Settlement, such as decentralization, cultural and religious heritage and community affairs. In June 2008 the ICO consists of 96 local and international staff, this number will rise to over 300 when the office builds towards full capacity.

Even though the Troika did not leave any stone unturned, it concluded that the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This was regrettable, as a negotiated settlement would have been in the best interests of both parties. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence.

Faced with this new and complex reality in south-east Europe, the EU is now making preparations to take up its responsibilities. All Union Member States agree that in Kosovo the best way to move towards European integration is by creating a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo with full respect for the rule of law, co-operating peacefully with its neighbours and contributing to regional and European stability. This includes extensive measures to safeguard the future of all communities, thereby creating a basis for its sustainable economic and political development. It is precisely for this reason that the EULEX mission has been launched and an EU Special Representative appointed.

The EU's enhanced and renewed efforts in Kosovo will build on the significant support it has been providing since 1999. The Union is already the largest donor to Kosovo (nearly EUR 2 billion to date) and in the coming years (until 2010) it will allocate an additional EUR 330 million, making Kosovo a leading per capita recipient of EU assistance.

The EU is working in Kosovo on the understanding that there will be a major shift from international governance towards Kosovo governance. However, the international presence continues to provide strong guarantees and safeguards concerning community rights, cultural and religious heritage, and the principles of the rule of law.



> EU "roadshow" in Klina/Klinë



> Kosovo police service officers



Gros plan sur EULEX KOSOVO

Dans le cadre de son approche globale à l'égard du Kosovo, l'UE a décidé de lancer, le 16 février 2008, une mission "État de droit" au Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO).

Objectif: aider les autorités du Kosovo en les suivant, les encadrant et les conseillant dans tous les domaines liés à l'État de droit, en particulier dans les domaines de la police, de la justice, des douanes et des services pénitentiaires.

La mission aidera les institutions du Kosovo, les autorités judiciaires et les organismes chargés de l'application des lois à progresser sur la voie de la viabilité et de la responsabilisation et à poursuivre la mise sur pied et le renforcement d'un système judiciaire multi-ethnique indépendant, ainsi que de services de police et des douanes multi-ethniques. Les principales priorités de la mission consistent à répondre aux préoccupations immédiates en matière de protection des minorités et de lutte contre la corruption et la criminalité organisée.

La mission est conçue comme un effort mené conjointement avec les autorités locales, conformément au principe de la maîtrise locale du processus, en vue de faciliter la mise en place, au Kosovo, d'un système judiciaire et administratif viable de façon autonome et reposant sur l'État de droit et les normes européennes. Néanmoins, EULEX KOSOVO assumera certaines responsabilités exécutives, dans des cas définis.

EULEX KOSOVO n'assumera ses responsabilités qu'à l'issue d'une période de transition pendant laquelle la responsabilité continue à incomber entièrement à la mission des Nations unies pour le Kosovo (MINUK).

Une fois qu'elle aura atteint sa pleine capacité opérationnelle, la mission comptera quelque 1.900 officiers de police, juges, procureurs et agents des douanes internationaux et environ 1.100 agents locaux; elle sera établie au quartier général de Pristina ou intégrée dans les différents services judiciaire et de police au Kosovo. M. Yves de Kermabon (France) a été nommé chef de la mission EULEX KOSOVO.

Le représentant spécial de l'UE (RSUE) au Kosovo, Pieter Feith, fournira des orientations politiques au niveau local au chef de la mission EULEX KOSOVO, qui rendra compte au commandant d'opération civil à Bruxelles. Le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) de l'UE exercera, sous la responsabilité du Conseil de l'UE, le contrôle politique et la direction stratégique de la mission.

Le mandat initial de la mission est fixé à deux ans, mais il est prévu qu'elle s'achèvera lorsque les autorités du Kosovo auront acquis une expérience suffisante pour garantir l'État de droit à tous les membres de la société.

Le montant de référence financière destiné à couvrir les dépenses liées à une durée de seize mois sera de 205 millions EUR.

- www.consilium.europa.eu/kosovo
- www.consilium.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo



“Our mission will benefit all communities”

Interview

Yves de Kermabon on the EULEX KOSOVO rule of law mission

The EU is currently preparing for its biggest civilian crisis management operation under the ESDP umbrella to date. The mission that was agreed by the EU on 16 February 2008 aims to consolidate the rule of law in Kosovo. The build-up of the EULEX KOSOVO rule of law Mission has started and the recruitment of mission personnel is in its final stages. In charge of this important and sensitive mission in the Balkans is Yves de Kermabon, who was appointed Head of Mission by the Political and Security Committee on 7 February 2008.

What is your plan for the EULEX mission which is currently building up? How do you intend to establish this ESDP mission in this very sensitive environment?



The Head of the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo, Yves de Kermabon, during his visit to Kosovo on 14 and 15 March 2008

■ I am sure we can all agree that a solid rule of law is necessary for any society built on democratic principles and therefore we are convinced that this mission will be of benefit to all communities in Kosovo. EULEX is a mission composed of rule of law professionals supported by all EU member states and it is intended to be deployed Kosovo-wide.

Furthermore, we expect that the mission will have a very strong impact not only on Kosovo, but on the whole region, as organised crime,

inter-ethnic-, financial- and sensitive crimes still pose a threat on the societies' structures. By strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo we will be able to take a big step forward in the European integration process.

All member states have a clear view on this. The EU is committed to the region and the EULEX mission is a key instrument for enhancing stability in the region which is a key necessity for the social and economic development of Kosovo and of the whole Western Balkans. We all know about the impact that the current situation in Kosovo has on our member states.

How do you want to implement this philosophy in the field?

■ The mandate of the mission is to monitor, mentor and advise the local authorities in the broader field of rule of law, while retaining certain executive powers to be used in a corrective way. The EULEX experts will cover all aspects in police, justice and customs and our professionals will be co-located with their Kosovo counterparts. The key concept is local ownership and accountability: the Kosovo authorities will be in the driver's seat.

But, let me be very clear on one thing: If I need to use executive powers, be sure that I will. Should the Kosovo authorities fail to meet their responsibilities in the areas of organised crime, war crimes, inter ethnic

crimes, terrorism, corruption, financial crime or property issues, I will not hesitate to take the necessary action. Though I hope I can avoid the use of these powers as much as possible.

EULEX is facing major opposition from Serbia, supported by Russia. How will you meet this opposition and convince those countries that the EULEX mission will have a positive impact for everybody?

■ As I already mentioned you have to be aware that EULEX is a technical mission. I will not discuss the political process. However, if we want to help create a peaceful and democratic society, which is needed for the stability of the region, everybody, all the communities must be able to rely on a strong rule of law situation. This means freedom of movement, unrestricted access to justice, impartial trials and security for the whole population of Kosovo – security being the key to good living standards and economic development.

Let me give you one example of how the rule of law can bring benefits to the minorities in Kosovo; the prosecution and adjudication of serious crimes and the handling of conflict-related property claims is essential to the peaceful development of Kosovo's multi-ethnic society. It ensures equal treatment of all ethnic communities in Kosovo, establishes legal certainty with respect to property and housing and encourages the return of displaced persons.

What is the main challenge?

■ What we need to do is look to the future, not the past. It is time to develop a functional relationship between the different sections of the population in Kosovo, between Kosovo and its neighbours and between Kosovo and the EU. There are a lot of things to do in this area. We need to speak to everybody, to the Kosovo Serb community, to Belgrade, to the minority communities in Kosovo and last but not least to the Albanian majority as well. We need to be involved in the reconciliation process and to build trust. To do this, we need to have open communication channels. All people, regardless of their background, should be aware that the rule of law is of common interest, and maybe in particular for the Serbs, as they are part of the same geographical area. If we really want to fight organised crime and corruption we have to work together, we have to speak to one another.

Climate change

Creating a climate of security

Many think of climate change as a purely environmental issue, but it also poses significant global security challenges which are of major concern to the EU. Such concerns require concerted action, according to a report by Javier Solana, the Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the European Commission presented to the European Council in March 2008.

For humanity, climate change, and its social, political and economic repercussions could well be the defining challenge of the 21st century, potentially jeopardising the security of the world. In fact, global warming is already having a profound impact on international security, as individuals and states scramble for diminishing resources.

The potential implications relate to the lack of resources – crucially – water and the availability of land for food production and to food prices. We have already seen how skyrocketing food prices and shortages have triggered food riots and unrest across the developing world.

The United Nations estimated that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related. Last year, the UN Security Council also held its first debate on climate change and its implications for international security, while the 2003 European Security Strategy recognises the link between global warming and competition.

The report focuses on the impact of climate change on global security, how this could affect Europe's own security, and what the EU should do about it. "The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place," Solana wrote in an article published in several leading European newspapers. "Nor is it 'just' an environmental challenge, no matter how urgent and important. Climate change also causes serious political and security risks that directly affect European interests. That is why we need to address these together, as Europeans.

"Saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions," the EU's foreign policy chief went on to emphasise.

Magnifying threats

Climate change may create some new problems but it is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates or magnifies existing trends, tensions and instabilities. Without proactive policies and mechanisms, global warming threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and prone to conflict, potentially wiping out decades of development efforts.

The economic damage associated with climate change could carry a hefty price tag, potentially wiping 20% off global GDP each year, studies predict. However, the burden will not be evenly distributed, with coastal regions and the world's poorest suffering the most.

The report revealed a number of threat categories. Perhaps first and foremost among them will be the scramble for dwindling resources. Reductions in available arable land, widespread water shortages, diminishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already occurring, and this trend looks set to increase.

Shortage of water, the source of life, will prove the most problematic and could lead to civil unrest and significant economic losses, even in robust economies. The world's driest regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa, could witness the emergence of 'water wars'.

There is also the looming energy crunch and its possible ramifications for international security. As oil supplies dwindle and demand rises, the global competition for remaining energy resources will rise dramatically, potentially leading to greater conflict, particularly as previously inaccessible but resource-rich regions open up due to climate change. The Arctic could become such a flashpoint, mainly due to the emergence of new waterways and the increasing accessibility of its massive hydrocarbon reserves.

Nevertheless, handled pragmatically there is no reason why the world cannot weather these difficulties collectively.

Sea change for coastal areas

Coastal regions, home to about a fifth of the world's population, are likely to suffer severely. As the tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 foreshadowed, extreme climate events in the future are likely to have devastating local effects and strain global relief mechanisms.

Rising sea levels will most likely lead to territorial losses in many parts of the world, and some small island nations may disappear entirely. In addition to the devastation wrought on local populations, this could trigger disputes over land and maritime borders.



Environmental changes are already creating what have become known as 'environmental refugees'. Further loss of coastal areas, desertification and other climate-induced changes will accelerate this process, prompting large-scale, environmentally induced migration, both within and between countries. Although Europeans are unlikely to suffer this themselves, Europe will experience increased pressure from illegal migration. The extra strain placed by climate change, particularly on fragile and failing states, could lead to greater dissent, bring down governments, and provoke greater tensions between various ethnic and religious groups.

Hot spots

The report identified a number of developing regions which are most at risk from climate change: Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.

"Those most affected by climate change are not those most responsible for causing it," Solana pointed out.

Africa is perhaps most vulnerable to climate change because of the multiple stresses it will face and its low adaptive capacity born of poverty. North Africa and the Sahel could lose as much as 75% of their arable, rain-fed land, up to 15% of arable land in the Nile Delta could be lost this century owing to rising sea levels, and southern Africa is experiencing poor harvest due to droughts.

Water systems in the largely arid Middle East are already under intense water pressure, with roughly two-thirds of countries in the region depending on water sources outside their borders. This could lead to serious water-related conflicts. Two-fifths of Asia's population (around 2 billion people) live in coastal areas, which means that rising sea levels could displace millions of people.

In addition, changes in the monsoon patterns and reductions in the melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than a billion people.

Central Asia is similarly affected by diminishing water supplies. For instance, the glaciers in Tajikistan

lost a third of their area in the second half of the 20th century alone, while Kyrgyzstan has lost over a thousand glaciers in the last four decades.

All these challenges associated with climate change are likely to test the global governance system to the limit. That is why concerted effort is needed to strengthen the world's multilateral institutions.

Prevention, better than cure

The international scientific consensus is that a certain amount of climate change (perhaps a 2°C rise above pre-industrial levels) cannot be averted, even if we slash our greenhouse gas emissions to below half of 1990 levels by 2050. Of course, we should redouble efforts to reduce emissions because a failure to do so could take us beyond a natural ecological 'tipping point', with unknown consequences.

However, we also need to develop and implement robust strategies to deal with the socio-economic and security consequences of the inevitable changes that will occur to the global and local climates in the coming decades. In fact, it is imperative that Europe and the world adopt a preventive approach to the climate-related security challenge.

The report recommends a number of actions to boost the EU's capacity to deal with the security ramifications of climate change. One area of major attention is knowledge by intensifying the Union's research, monitoring and early-warning capabilities (particularly in areas of political instability). This would also include commissioning research to gauge the region-by-region implications of climate change. Another important focus is boosting Europe's civil protection, crisis-management and disaster-response capabilities, both civilian and military.


In addition, the EU should further develop a comprehensive European migration policy which takes into account the future growth in environmentally induced migration.

Leadership in co-operation

Climate change is a key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years. If recognised, it can even become a positive driver for improving and reforming global governance.

Europe cannot and should not attempt to handle the security aspect of climate change alone. Just as the EU is all about multilateral co-operation, the Union must lead the way in promoting global multilateralism in combating global warming.

Building on the successful Bali climate change conference in December 2007, the EU needs to continue strengthening its global leadership by directing attention to the security risks related to climate change in the different multilateral arenas. The Union also needs to spearhead efforts to enhance international co-operation in the detection and monitoring





of climate-related security threats, as well as boost regional prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. On the bilateral level, the security aspect of climate change should be woven into all the cooperation and political dialogue instruments the EU has with third-country partners.

"It is up to Europe to lead the international response," the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy concluded.



UN Climate change conference in Bali, December 2007

Résumé

En juin 2007, le Conseil européen a invité la Commission européenne et le Haut Représentant pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union, Javier Solana, à préparer un rapport conjoint sur l'incidence du réchauffement climatique sur la sécurité. Voici les principaux éléments de ce rapport:

Aggravation des menaces: Le changement climatique est peut-être à l'origine de nouveaux problèmes mais il convient plutôt de le considérer comme un multiplicateur de menaces qui exacerbe ou aggrave des tendances, des tensions et des instabilités existantes.

Régions côtières: Abrutant environ un cinquième de la population mondiale, les régions côtières risquent d'être gravement touchées. L'élévation du niveau de la mer entraînera très vraisemblablement des pertes territoriales dans de nombreuses régions du globe et certaines petites nations insulaires pourraient disparaître complètement.

Zones sensibles: Le rapport a identifié un certain nombre de régions en développement qui sont les plus menacées par le changement climatique: l'Afrique, le Moyen-Orient, l'Asie du Sud et centrale, ainsi que l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes. "Les pays les plus touchés par le changement climatique n'en sont pas les principaux responsables", souligne M. Solana.

Mieux vaut prévenir que guérir: Le rapport recommande un certain nombre d'actions pour renforcer la capacité de l'Union européenne à gérer l'incidence du changement climatique sur la sécurité. Il conviendrait notamment de commander des recherches destinées à évaluer la situation région par région, de renforcer la protection civile et les capacités européennes de gestion des crises et de réaction en cas de catastrophe (tant civiles que militaires), ou encore de développer une politique européenne globale en matière de migrations.

Chef de file de la coopération: L'Europe ne peut pas et ne devrait pas tenter de gérer seule les aspects de sécurité du changement climatique. L'UE doit promouvoir un multilatéralisme mondial dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique en s'appuyant sur la conférence sur le changement climatique organisée avec succès à Bali en décembre 2007.

Introducing CPCC

What lies behind the acronym chosen for the new member of the ESDP family, CPCC? At first glance, it is hard to tell. In English, CPCC translates as Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. In plainer English, CPCC is a new entity in charge of the planning, deployment, conduct and review of civilian ESDP crisis-management operations.



> EUPOL Afghanistan



> EU SSR Guinea-Bissau



> EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina)

Back in October 2005, at an informal meeting in Hampton Court, EU heads of state and government agreed to take forward proposals to strengthen Union crisis-management structures. Under the leadership of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, new measures were agreed, including the creation of the position of Civilian Operations Commander and the reorganisation of the internal EU crisis-management structures to establish CPCC.

These changes reflect developments in ESDP in recent years. In essence, wherever there is conflict, and wherever there is a peace deal, there is work to be done to stitch together security forces, police and/or the justice system and to help raise standards to a European level. Since 2005, the EU has been called in to manage political crises in many more places than before. Typically, missions are increasingly tailored to meet a demand for integrated action, whether between different sectors of civilian crisis management or as a combination of civilian and military assets. Also, the Union is deploying in more challenging security environments. The case for bringing these operations under a single chain of command had become compelling.

Established in August 2007, CPCC is located in Brussels and is part of the Council General Secretariat. It is responsible for eight missions in

the areas of police, border assistance management, rule of law and security sector reform: EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina); EUPT and EULEX KOSOVO (the former is supporting the build up of the latter); EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories); EUJUST LEX (for the Iraqi justice system); EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL RD Congo; and EU SSR Guinea-Bissau which is due to be deployed in June 2008.

CPCC totals approximately 60 staff in Brussels combining a unique blend of expertise: 50% Council officials, many with extensive international and ESDP experience, and 50% seconded national experts, largely senior police officers as well as rule of law, procurement, logistics and finance experts. In all, 17 different EU nationalities are represented. In a drive to assemble the best civilian crisis-management practices within the Council Secretariat and member states, CPCC has developed integrated working methods and procedures to link up its different units and sections. Based on their expertise, staff are assigned to informal project groups tasked with the development and implementation of various activities under CPCC's work plan.

In theatre, the statistics are impressive. This year, with the foreseen deployment of EULEX KOSOVO, some 3,000 men and women will be serving in three continents under civilian ESDP – Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Kosovo being areas of high-intensity EU foreign policy engagement. CPCC is responsible for their well-being and protection on a 24/7 basis and supports them in the day-to-day conduct of the missions, including through the help of the newly created Watchkeeping Capability. This support ranges from administration and finance to the



Kees Klompenhouwer <

Kees Klompenhouwer was appointed director of the CPCC and civilian operation commander as of 1 May.

He comes from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was director for Eastern and Southeast Europe.

Résumé

La Capacité civile de planification et de conduite (en anglais Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, CPCC) est une nouvelle structure de la PESD en charge de la planification, du déploiement, de la conduite et de l'évaluation des opérations de gestion civile des crises. Elle reflète les développements récents qu'a connus la PESD: pour chaque conflit ou accord de paix, un travail doit être mené à bien pour rapprocher les forces de sécurité, la police et/ou le système judiciaire, et pour contribuer à améliorer les pratiques jusqu'aux normes européennes.

Établie en août 2007, la CPCC se trouve à Bruxelles et relève du secrétariat général du Conseil. Elle est responsable de huit missions dans les domaines de la police, de l'aide à la gestion des frontières, de l'État de droit et de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité: MPUE (Bosnie-et-Herzégovine); EPUE et EULEX KOSOVO (deux missions à venir); EUPOL COPPS et EUBAM Rafah

(territoires palestiniens); EUJUST LEX (pour le système judiciaire irakien), EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL RD Congo et UE RSS Guinée-Bissau (qui devrait être déployée en juin 2008).

Dirigée par le diplomate néerlandais Kees Klompenhouwer, la CPCC emploie environ 60 personnes à Bruxelles et dispose d'un savoir-faire unique: 50% sont des fonctionnaires du Conseil, bénéficiant souvent d'une grande expérience dans le domaine de la PESD et des relations internationales, et 50% sont des experts nationaux détachés, en grande partie des officiers de police de haut rang ainsi que des experts en matière d'État de droit, de passation de marchés, de logistique et de finance. Sur le terrain, la CPCC est responsable du bien-être et de la protection de quelque 3.000 hommes et femmes qui participent ou participeront aux missions civiles de la PESD et ce, 24 heures sur 24 et 7 jours sur 7.

processing of mission-related planning documents and regular reports through the Council preparatory bodies. Most of the personnel on the ground or in Brussels-based support teams hail from the EU. An additional 15 other nationalities are also participating, either as secondees or contracted staff.

a challenge, in particular in a set-up such as ESDP which involves a variety of actors, i.e. civilian, military, policy and financial, in two theatres (Brussels and the area of operations concerned). Looking back over the past few months, much has been achieved, largely thanks to the dedication of staff, missions, Council Secretariat authorities and member states.

"CPCC now provides an upper command level to the Head of Mission on the ground; this enables us to finally have eye-to-eye contact with our military ESDP counterparts and facilitates situations where two missions are deployed in the same theatre or when planning or conducting integrated civilian/military missions. This is a real improvement and has long been needed."

Birgit, German Council official, with military and civilian ESDP experience.

For all personnel and CPCC partners, it has felt like constructing a fast car while driving it at the same time. Much of the intensity continues, especially in the wake of the appointment, on 1 May 2008, of its Civilian Operations Commander, Kees Klompenhouwer, a Dutch diplomat. CPCC is aiming to acquire full operational capability later this year and to bringing about quality improvements in the planning and conduct of all missions under its responsibility.

Over the last few months, CPCC has been busy building its internal capacity while fulfilling its 24/7 duties as of day 1. This involved nearly doubling its staff and securing the means and material resources to carry out its mandate. During the same period, two new missions in Guinea-Bissau and Kosovo were planned and launched, both presenting novelties of scale, design and purpose when compared with previous ESDP operations. CPCC has devoted time and energy to strengthening command and control over the missions under the responsibility of the Civilian Operations Commander, i.e. through output-oriented planning methodologies, more frequent visits and VTCs and a focus on quality reporting and information flows. Relations with other ESDP stakeholders have been developed on the basis of respective competences, and operational contacts with the UN, the OSCE and other international partners are being established.

CPCC's main deliverable by its first anniversary will be a unified and clear chain of command for civilian ESDP operations, as envisaged in the follow-up to Hampton Court. Managing change is always



> EUPOL RD Congo

European military capabilities

Sharing the burden



The 27 EU governments collectively spend EUR 200 billion per year on defence. This means that, together, EU governments are the world's second biggest defence spenders after the US. That amount of money should be enough to cover Europe's defence needs. But despite these hefty financial resources, Europeans do not have nearly enough soldiers whom they can use. The EU-27 governments have close to 2 million personnel in their armed forces, but they can barely deploy and sustain 100,000 soldiers around the globe. This amounts to a mere five per cent of the EU armed forces.

> **By Daniel Kehoane, Research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies.**

Some member state armed forces are already overstretched because of commitments in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Lebanon – and demand for European action is growing. Since its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the EU has initiated roughly 20 operations through its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). For instance, in February 2008, the EU started deploying a peacekeeping force to Eastern Chad and North-East CAR, which will comprise 3,700 soldiers.

Part of the reason for a lack of deployable soldiers is that there are roughly 220,000 conscript troops in the EU. Conscripts – a legacy of Cold War military planning – are largely redundant for foreign deployments. Another reason for Europe's lack of military muscle is a shortage of useful equipment, such as transport planes and communications technology.

The budgetary challenge faced by European defence ministries is great. The cost of defence equipment is rising by six to eight per cent a year, while current missions are consuming money that had been set aside for buying new equipment. This is putting EU military establishments under enormous stress; for example, the UK Ministry of Defence estimates that it is EUR 3 billion short of money needed to buy all equipment it plans to buy in the next decade.

In addition, inefficiency abounds in European spending on defence equipment, with too many small procurement programmes for essentially the same capability. For example: the EU-27 currently spends roughly EUR 30 billion a year on some 89 equipment programmes; the US spends much more (roughly EUR 83 billion annually) on just 27 projects. In other words, EU governments collectively spend just over a third of what the US spends on equipment procurement – on three times as many programmes.

The good news is that military reform is now widely recognised at the EU level as absolutely necessary if the Union is to fulfil its security aims. Member States have agreed to commit to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive capabilities covering the whole range of tasks defined in the Treaty of the European Union and in the European Security Strategy. Although the Union has not yet managed to convince European governments to rapidly improve their military capabilities, the process of military reform in Europe will continue. In addition, a number of major equipment investments started by EU defence ministries should enter into service in the coming years. These capabilities include A400M transport planes; A330 air tankers; Eurofighter, Rafale and Joint-Strike-Fighter jets; and Franco-British aircraft carriers.

Military reform does not mean that the EU will have its own army. But there should be much greater integration between European armed forces. In effect, Europe could have a collection of interlocking 'European armies' rather than a single force. Multinational military units make sound military as well as budgetary sense. They ensure that soldiers from different countries work well together on the ground, since they would train together and use the same equipment. Tentative efforts to encourage greater military co-operation have already started, such as the battle groups initiative, in which EU member states pool their troops to form a 1,500 strong, rapid-reaction force capable of long-distance deployment.

If successful, the battle groups might convince EU defence ministries to develop more ambitious joint units in the future. For example, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal could combine to form a Mediterranean fleet of frigates. France and Germany already train their Tiger helicopter pilots together, and could potentially use the same combat helicopter units. Another possibility would be for countries that are part of battle groups to think about forming multinational divisions (around 10,000 troops) together.



> Battlegroups exercise

A number of member states would also save money by pooling some of their military equipment, such as aircraft which are very expensive to maintain. For instance, the Union could set up a pool of transport aircraft, starting with the 180 A400M transport aircraft which will be owned by six EU countries. In order to achieve significant cost savings, some countries could operate their A400Ms from one main base, using a single planning, servicing and logistics organisation to support the force. The European Defence Agency is currently drafting proposals for pooling some A400Ms.

To sum up, the twin pressures of static budgets and growing operational demands mean that EU governments have little choice but to pool more of their military resources in the future. If EU defence ministries managed to share more resources, those benefiting would include not only their armed forces, who would get badly needed military equipment, but also European taxpayers, who would get better value for money.

Résumé

Les 27 gouvernements de l'UE consacrent collectivement chaque année 200 milliards d'euros à la défense et leurs forces armées comptent près de 2 millions de personnes. Pourtant, ils peuvent à peine déployer et entretenir 100.000 soldats dans le monde entier. Sont en cause le grand nombre d'appelés, difficilement déployables à l'étranger, et le manque d'équipement adéquat, notamment au niveau des avions de transport et des technologies de communication.

Une réforme militaire est désormais largement reconnue comme nécessaire pour que l'UE puisse atteindre ses objectifs en matière de sécurité. Les États membres ont convenu d'objectifs à atteindre dans le domaine des capacités militaires d'ici 2010 et ils ont décidé de lancer ensemble un certain nombre d'investissements d'envergure en matière d'équipement: des avions de transport A400M, des avions ravitailleurs A330, des jets Eurofighter, Rafale et Joint-Strike-Fighter, et des porte-avions franco-britanniques.

Une réforme militaire ne signifie pas que l'Union européenne disposera de sa propre armée, mais elle devrait permettre une intégration bien plus étroite entre les forces armées européennes. À titre d'exemple, l'initiative de groupements tactiques permet aux États membres de l'UE de réunir leurs troupes pour former une force de réaction rapide de 1.500 hommes. D'autres formations pourraient être envisagées, telles qu'une flotte méditerranéenne de frégates ou la formation de divisions multinationales (environ 10.000 hommes).

En bref, la double pression imposée par des budgets statiques et des demandes opérationnelles croissantes implique que les gouvernements européens n'ont guère d'autre choix que de mettre en commun une plus grande partie de leurs ressources militaires à l'avenir.

Clippings

Süddeutsche Zeitung

> "Wir werden im ganzen Kosovo tätig sein"

Enver Robelli.

Der EU-Sondergesandte Pieter Feith will auch in den serbischen Gebieten Sicherheit und Ordnung schaffen – auch wenn das lange dauern wird

Die EU will bis zum Sommer die größte zivile Mission in ihrer Geschichte im Kosovo stationieren; sie soll den Namen "EULEX" tragen. Etwa 2000 Beamte sollen helfen, dass die Justiz, die Verwaltung und die Zollbehörden den neuen Staates ein europäisches Niveau erreichen. Neben EULEX wird im Kosovo in Zukunft noch eine zweite Mission in mehreren Bereichen das Sagen haben: die internationale Verwaltungsbehörde (ICO), die von Pieter Feith geführt wird. Der 63-jährige niederländische Diplomat mit großer Balkan-Erfahrung ist gleichzeitig EU-Sondergesandter für den Kosovo. Seine Aufgabe ist es, die Umsetzung des Plans für die Unabhängigkeit der früheren serbischen Provinz zu überwachen.

SZ: Herr Feith, im serbisch dominierten Norden des Kosovo ist den vergangenen Tagen die Gewalt eskaliert. Die serbische Regierung lehnt die Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo kategorisch ab. Sehen Sie einen Ausweg aus dieser Sackgasse?

Feith: Es ist klar, dass durch die Gewalt im Norden die rote Linie der internationalen Gemeinschaft überschritten wurde. Ich fordere alle Seiten zum Dialog auf. Das gilt insbesondere für die Belgrader Regierung und für die Vertreter der serbischen Minderheit im Kosovo.

SZ: Kürzlich mussten Sie aus Angst vor serbischer Gewalt ein Vorbereitungs-team für die EU-Mission aus dem Norden der Stadt Mitrovica abziehen.

Feith: Wir sind erst daran, unsere Mission aufzubauen. Eins ist aber klar: Wir werden im ganzen Kosovo tätig sein.

SZ: Die serbische Regierung ist an der Kosovo-Frage gescheitert. Am 11. Mai finden dort Wahlen statt. Wie beeinflusst das Ihre Arbeit?

Feith: Das ist eine Angelegenheit für Serbien. Es stehen zwei Themen zur Diskussion: Eines ist die europäische Perspektive Serbiens, das Zweite ist der Konflikt über den Kosovo. Darüber haben sich die serbischen Wähler zu äußern.

SZ: Der Plan des UN-Vermittlers Martti Ahtisaari für die Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo gründet aber auf der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Serbien, der EU-Mission im Kosovo und der kosovarischen Regierung in Pristina.

Feith: Der Plan enthält klare Vorgaben für die kosovarische Regierung. Meine Aufgabe als internationaler Zivilvertreter ist es, zu assistieren und zu beraten. Die Entscheidungen werden von den lokalen Institutionen getroffen. Was Serbien betrifft: Der Ahtisaari-Plan ging von der Voraussetzung aus, dass es eine einvernehmliche Lösung über den Status des Kosovo gibt. Das trat nicht ein. Serbiens Kooperation ist jedoch wichtig für die Umsetzung einer Reihe von Vorlagen.

[...]

SZ: Es bleibt die Frage nach Rechts-Gleichheit. Im Norden und in den Enklaven bezahlt niemand Steuern, viele Autos fahren ohne Kennzeichen. Wer sollte da das Gesetz durchsetzen?

Feith: Ich werde die Einhaltung von Gesetzen nicht durchsetzen. Wir werden die Regierung des Kosovo unterstützen, die Ahtisaari-Vorgaben umzusetzen. Dazu gehören privilegierte Beziehungen zwischen Belgrad und den serbischen Gemeinden in den Bereichen Gesundheit und Bildung. Was die Nummernschilder betrifft: Das müssen wir in einem passenden Moment regeln.

SZ: In Serbien beginnt bald der Wahlkampf. Werden Sie diesen auch in serbischen Gebieten im Kosovo zulassen?

Feith: Es ist nicht an mir, solche Entscheidungen zu fällen, die UN-Mission (UNMIK) muss eine Antwort darauf finden. Es wird natürlich eine Kampagne geben, es werden wohl Minister aus Belgrade anreisen. Es ist aber unerwünscht, dass Leute kommen, um hier Gewalt zu provozieren oder die Lage zu destabilisieren.

SZ: Sie schieben die Verantwortung der UNMIK zu. Gemäß dem Ahtisaari-Plan muss die EU nach einer Übergangsphase von 120 Tagen das Zepter von den UN übernehmen.

Feith: Wir bauen unsere Präsenz auf im Einklang mit den Entscheidungen der EU und werden die EULEX-Mission einsetzen. Wie sich die Vereinten Nationen verhalten, ist offen.

SZ: Nochmals: Hat jemand die 120 Tage zu zählen begonnen?

Feith: Ich zähle immer. Doch ich zähle meistens mein Geld und meine Murmeln.

SZ: Wird UNMIK jemals den Kosovo vollständig verlassen?

Feith: Die Resolution 1244 bleibt gültig. Es liegt an den UN, darüber zu entscheiden, in welcher Form sie weitermachen: Vermutlich werden sie im Kosovo präsent bleiben.

[...]



> Au Tchad, les militaires de l'Ouest construisent des villes

Nicolas GROS-VERHEYDE.

Du sable, du soleil, du vent... Voici les principaux éléments dont disposent les militaires de l'Eufor, la force européenne au Tchad, pour relever un déficit logistique: monter quatre camps en un temps record.

Au départ, il n'y a "rien ou presque rien, explique le Lieutenant-Colonel Axelos de l'opération Eufor. Il faut faire des forages pour aller chercher l'eau, damer un camp et le stabiliser, installer un drainage, des fossés, en prévision des pluies, enterrer les conduites d'eau et de téléphone, construire des merlons pour protéger le camp"... voire même créer des routes comme à N'Djamena ou Abéché.

De vraies petites villes

Quand les Marsouins du Régiment d'infanterie de chars de marine (RICM), complétés d'éléments du 11^e régiment d'artillerie de marine (Lande d'Oué), sont ainsi arrivés à la mi-mars, sur place à Farchana, par la route, au terme d'une "croisière noire" de plusieurs jours, les premiers moments ont été rustiques. "La première nuit, on s'est réveillé avec plusieurs couches de poussière dans la bouche et sur le sol, raconte le lieutenant-colonel Faguet. Et même aujourd'hui, les conditions restent rudimentaires".

"C'est simple, explique le Colonel Serge Duval, un des responsables "soutien", c'est un bout de désert sur lequel on doit faire pousser trois petites villes de 600 habitants et une ville de 2000 habitants, à partir de rien. Et tout doit être terminé en un temps record, avant la saison des pluies en juin..."; dans des conditions climatiques (35° à 50° avec des vents de sable) et sécuritaires difficiles.

Dans cette opération, la logistique est donc fondamentale. Il faut, en effet, tout acheminer sur place: des douches au radar, en passant par les ambulances, les munitions, une partie de la nourriture et de l'eau, voire du ciment... Les militaires français de l'opération Épervier (bien implantés, sur des bases en "dur" près des aéroports de N'Djamena et Abéché) prêtent main-forte à leurs collègues "européens". "Chaque jour, explique le colonel Périé, commandant "Épervier", nous devons transporter 12 tonnes de fret entre N'Djamena et Abéché", sans compter les "missions de reconnaissance avec des Mirages F1".

Reste ensuite à organiser la vie du camp tous les jours, ce qui inclut aussi une compatibilité fine! Comme il n'y a pas d'armée européenne, chaque État doit contribuer pour ses propres troupes. Mais pour éviter les doublons, c'est la France, là encore, qui a été désignée comme chef de file logistique. "L'électricité, l'eau, la nourriture sont ainsi refacturées à chaque unité nationale, au prorata de l'utilisation" explique le lieutenant-colonel Villuendas, "maire" du camp "Europa", situé à N'Djamena, dans l'enceinte de ce qui était destiné à devenir... une prison.

> Chad.- Un avión español participa en el puente aéreo entre Yamena y Abeché para apoyar la misión de EUFOR en Chad

Un avión C-295 del Ejército del Aire comenzó a operar ayer entre los aeropuertos de Yamena, capital del Chad, y Abeché, en la frontera con Sudán, para proporcionar apoyo logístico a la misión que EUFOR desarrolla en la frontera con la región de Darfur (Sudán), en lo que supone el primer vuelo del contingente español desplegado en la Operación EUFOR Chad-RCA, informó hoy el Ministerio de Defensa en un comunicado.

Está previsto que este avión, junto con uno similar que llegará a la zona en los próximos días, realice misiones de apoyo al contingente multinacional de EUFOR, que proporciona seguridad al personal de Naciones Unidas y de ONG que trabajan en los campos de refugiados y desplazados por el conflicto de Darfur en el Chad y la República Centroafricana.

El avión ha transportado a 32 militares de diferentes nacionalidades (franceses, polacos, suecos, austriacos), entre Yamena y Abeché, y alrededor de mil kilos de carga. El C-295 es un avión que cuenta con gran capacidad para operar en todo tipo de campos con limitada estructura o medios de apoyo en tierra, como ocurre en el Chad.

Con el apoyo unánime del Congreso de los Diputados, España contribuye a la Operación EUFOR Chad-RCA con el envío de dos aviones C-295 y 100 efectivos del Ala 35 del Ejército del Aire.

Este contingente, que se contabiliza dentro del límite de 3.000 efectivos autorizados por acuerdo de Consejo de Ministros de 28 de diciembre de 2007 para participación en misiones internacionales de paz en el exterior, incluye personal de operaciones, seguridad e información, apoyo logístico y comunicaciones, así como personal destinado en los Cuarteles Generales en Francia y en Chad.



> La Belgique commandera un "groupement tactique" européen fin 2009

La Belgique prendra pour la première fois, au second semestre 2009, le commandement d'un "groupement tactique interarmées" (ou "Battle Group") européen d'intervention rapide et y contribuera à hauteur de 1.350 hommes, a-t-on appris dimanche auprès du ministère de la Défense.

La décision, qui marque une ambition accrue de la Belgique dans cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), a été prise vendredi par le Conseil des ministres, après des mois de tractations. Le gouvernement a également approuvé une participation importante – 1.100 hommes – à la force de réaction rapide de l'OTAN, la "NATO Response Force" (NRF), au second semestre 2008.

L'idée de prendre le commandement d'un groupement tactique (GT, en anglais EUBG) était déjà contenue dans l'accord de politique étrangère négocié l'été dernier par les partenaires de l'orange bleue. Elle a été reprise dans la déclaration gouvernementale du cabinet Leterme 1^{er}.

"Ce projet ambitieux, inscrit dans l'accord gouvernemental, nécessite la mise à disposition d'environ 1.350 personnes et d'un quartier général de force", a souligné le ministère dans un communiqué.

Concrètement, la Belgique fournira à l'Union européenne un état-major de brigade – celui de la 7^{ème} brigade de Marche-en-Famenne – et un contingent de plusieurs centaines d'hommes pour former l'ossature de l'un des deux EUBG de 1.500 hommes en "stand by" chaque semestre.

Le complément sera fourni par la France, a précisé un spécialiste du dossier à l'agence BELGA.

Un EUBG est constitué d'un bataillon renforcé par des éléments d'appui et de soutien logistique, soit environ 1.500 hommes. Il peut se déployer en cas d'urgence dans un délai de cinq à dix jours pour des missions d'une durée initiale de 30 jours, pouvant être portée à 120 jours, moyennant un réapprovisionnement approprié.

Deux groupements tactiques sont disponibles en permanence depuis le 1^{er} janvier 2007, ce qui permet à l'UE de mener deux opérations militaire d'une manière quasi simultanée. Ils sont soit nationaux, soit multinationaux, avec la participation de 26 des 27 pays membres de l'UE, le Danemark bénéficiant d'une exemption en matière de défense dans les traités européens.

Selon un système de rotation, les deux groupements tactiques en "stand-by" sont relevés chaque semestre par deux autres constitués d'unités d'autres pays européens.


Mais l'Union n'a encore jamais fait appel à ces unités, recourant par exemple à une force ad hoc (3.700 hommes, dont une majorité de Français) pour son opération EUFOR au Tchad et en République centrafricaine lancée au printemps.

Jusqu'à présent, la Belgique s'était pour sa part contentée de fournir une contribution parfois substantielle – jusqu'à 500 hommes – à certains EUBG, mais sans jamais en assurer le commandement..../...

www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp

www.consilium.europa.eu/pesd

ESDP homepage



Aperçu des missions et opérations de l'Union européenne

Jun 2008

- Missions civiles: **missions en cours** / missions achevées
- Opérations militaires: **opérations en cours** / opérations achevées

Autres missions :

EUSR border teams Moldavie/Ukraine et Géorgie/Caucase du Sud

Afrique

- **EU SSR Guinée-Bissau**
Depuis 2008
Effectif: 39
- **EUSEC RD Congo**
Depuis 2005
Effectif: 40
- **EUPOL RD Congo**
Depuis 2007
Effectif: 39
- **EUFOR Tchad/RCA**
2008-2009
Effectif: 3700
- **EUPOL Kinshasa**
RD Congo, 2005-2007
- **Soutien à AMIS II**
Soudan/Darfour, 2005-2006
Effectif: 31 civils et 20 militaires
- **ARTEMIS**
RD Congo, 2003
Effectif: 1800
- **EUFOR Congo**
RD Congo, 2006
Effectif: 2300

Caucase du Sud

- **EUJUST THEMIS**
Géorgie, 2004-2005

Asie

- **EUPOL AFGHANISTAN**
Mission de police, depuis 2007
Effectif: 230
- **AMM Monitoring Mission**
Aceh/Indonésie, 2005-2006

Balkans occidentaux

- **EULEX KOSOVO**
Phase pré-opérationnelle
Effectif: 1900
- **EUPM**
Bosnie-Herzégovine, depuis 2003
Effectif: 182
- **EUFOR ALTHEA**
Bosnie - Herzégovine, depuis 2004
Effectif: 2500
- **EUPOL PROXIMA**
Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2004-2005
- **EUPAT**
Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2006
- **CONCORDIA**
Ancienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2003

Moyen-Orient

- **EUJUST LEX**
Irak/Bruxelles, depuis 2005
Effectif: 25
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