The year 2025 began with a new series of security challenges for Europe: uncertainty over the future of the transatlantic relationship, hybrid attacks across the continent, and the question of how to approach a potential ceasefire in Ukraine. In the face of these converging issues, how can EU policymakers effectively identify and prioritise the most significant threats to European interests?
To answer this question, the EUISS partnered with the European University Institute (EUI), the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) and the European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS) to conduct a survey among European experts on the main risks to the Union in 2025. The surveyed experts are members of the EUISS, TEPSA, and EISS networks. 40% identified themselves as EU foreign policy experts, 98% hold at least a master's degree, and nearly 60% hold a PhD.
The Global Risks to the EU project, launched by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, represents the first comprehensive, continent-wide assessment of global risk perceptions among European experts.
At the end of 2024, the survey asked close to 400 unique respondents to rank the likelihood and expected impact of 30 predefined risks affecting EU interests – defined as coherence, unity, security and prosperity. The survey aims to generate strategic foresight for EU foreign policy, analyse foreign policy alignment within the EU, and facilitate transatlantic comparisons of strategic priorities.
The top risks identified by experts range from Russia’s continued aggression, to a potential US withdrawal from its security guarantees, to war in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Here, we review the main risks and suggest what the EU should do to address them in a proactive way.
Appeasing Russia – in Ukraine and beyond
Experts overwhelmingly view the defeat of Ukraine as a critical threat to EU interests, with a ceasefire favourable to Russia emerging as the top risk for 2025. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s efforts to rewrite the post-Cold War order in Europe have fundamentally disrupted the EU’s security. Today, through its actions against Ukraine, Russia continues to put pressure on EU unity and policy coherence. The concern that the Trump administration could push for negotiations with Russia while bypassing Ukraine and the EU’s interests likely contributed to the high importance that the experts attached to this risk. If Moscow were to secure a favourable ceasefire in Ukraine, leaving Kyiv defenceless and without a path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the Kremlin could rearm and launch another attack in the near future.
EU experts also identify a high risk of new Russian military action in non-NATO neighbouring states. They furthermore foresee the risks emerging from the formation of pro-Russian governments in Georgia, and potentially in Moldova. However, the experts consider the risk of a confrontation between NATO and Russia to be moderate, assessing this to be of relatively low likelihood, reflecting confidence in NATO’s capacity to deter direct Russian attacks.
US abandonment – in Europe and the Pacific
The withdrawal of American security guarantees to Europe also ranks among EU experts’ top concerns for 2025. Remarkably, in the view of these experts, US abandonment would have as high an impact on the EU as a Russian nuclear strike. This metric captures EU reliance on the United States for its security as perceived by the experts who clearly take President Donald Trump’s threat of not honouring US pledges towards NATO allies very seriously.
Moreover, experts view a direct US-China military confrontation as unlikely in the short term, despite rating the likelihood of a cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan as moderately high and the chances of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea as extremely high. This finding suggests that, in the event of Chinese aggression against US allies like Taiwan or the Philippines, the Trump administration would not act decisively to defend US interests in the region in 2025. However, EU experts acknowledge the significant impact that a potential US-China conflict would have on EU interests, reflecting the far-reaching influence of great power competition on global stability, EU security and economic prosperity.
Hybrid and cyber threats
Experts rank the risk of disruptive hybrid attacks on EU infrastructure among the top threats to EU interests in 2025. Their assessment aligns with reports pointing to a heightened cybersecurity threat, driven by increased activity from hacktivists, cybercriminals and state-sponsored groups, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Additionally, the response reflects the growing frequency of physical attacks on critical infrastructure such as sabotaging subsea cables or burning ammunition factories. While direct conflict between NATO and Russia remains a lower-likelihood risk, European experts see a large-scale hybrid attack as having a moderate likelihood of occurring and of constituting a high-impact threat.
No durable peace in the Middle East
Experts predict that a lasting ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is unlikely in 2025, ranking the ongoing conflict as one of the top risks to EU interests. Although a fragile ceasefire was brokered in January 2025, the absence of a long-term strategy to forge peace between the two sides will sustain high levels of tension. According to experts, this conflict will continue to strain the unity and coherence of EU policy in the Middle East. They also acknowledge the potential risk of a large-scale military confrontation between Iran and Israel, which they view as moderately likely to occur and believe would be highly impactful on EU interests.
In the Middle East geopolitical landscape, experts rank the collapse of the state of Lebanon as highly likely, though with moderate repercussions on EU interests. However, any of these conflicts could trigger large-scale migration towards the EU, which is seen as a high-risk scenario that would have a major impact on the continent.
Time to act: Suggestions for EU policymakers
Faced with this gloomy picture, the EU has two choices: to despair, or to act.
The Global Risks to the EU survey reveals overwhelming consensus among experts – across academia, think tanks, and policymaking circles – on the top issues affecting EU interests. On average, policymakers and think tankers express slightly more concern than academics.
The main risks are also recognised across the territory of the Union. Although there was once a divide between Eastern and Western Europe regarding the threat posed by Russia, Moscow’s belligerence has now unified expert opinion. The lack of significant differences between respondents from different regions suggests that Europeans might be overcoming long-term divergences in threat perception. This unity of views presents an opportunity that the EU should not waste.
Here are some ways in which the EU can start tackling the global risks with which it is confronted in 2025:
Prevent a bad deal
An unfavourable ceasefire imposed on Ukraine is the highest risk – but the range of potential negotiation outcomes could vary. The EU must be clear-eyed: if negotiations do begin, Kyiv’s battlefield strength and ability to deter future Russian attacks will determine its bargaining power. The EU must do everything in its power to ensure that Ukraine has the resources and support needed to sustain its defence at the required scale and strength. That will require working primarily at supranational level, but equally at the level of all 27 Member States, with key partners, and also in coalition-of-the-willing formats if there is no consensus.
A comprehensive Russia strategy
Developing a coherent strategy for the EU’s future dealings with Russia is crucial for European security. The EU must forge a coherent and unified political, economic and military posture towards an autocratic belligerent neighbour, one that will endure beyond any potential ceasefire in Ukraine. That strategy should emphasise the need to isolate Russia from the EU’s economy and deter the Kremlin from launching future attacks. The survey indicates that Russia is less likely to use nuclear weapons than the Kremlin’s red-line threats suggest. While the EU should not entirely dismiss these warnings, it must be prepared to take more decisive action against Moscow – especially since experts do not foresee a regime change in Russia anytime soon.
Spend big on defence
If US abandonment of Europe constitutes a threat of nuclear proportions, Europeans must allocate the appropriate resources to address it. A major increase in defence spending in the first half of 2025 – ahead of the NATO summit – will send a strong signal to the US that Europe is serious about defending itself, together with Washington, but alone if necessary. The EU should leverage the upcoming White Paper on the future of European defence to provide the right incentives to support Member States in this effort. The White Paper should focus on building an integrated European defence market with emphasis on joint procurement, proposing a coordinated rearmament strategy, and supporting defence purchases outside the EU to cover immediate shortfalls.
Go on the cyber-hybrid offensive
The growing number of attacks on European critical infrastructure shows that the current approach is not deterring the Kremlin and its allies – which makes this risk so particularly high. The EU should take a more offensive approach to impose costs on its adversaries, encompassing both deterrence by denial (better protection of infrastructure and early warning) and by punishment (going after the perpetrators).
Think across theatres and partners
The survey reveals that crises and risks can move across theatres. The EU’s geographically closest partners, such as the UK or countries in the Western Balkans, face a similar set of risks. US abandonment, experts say, would be felt in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific. Conflict in the latter region (South China Sea, Taiwan) would reverberate in Europe as well. Hence, this is not the time for parochial thinking. The EU should promote a common vision with both nearby and distant partners to deal with shared threats. Specifically, the EU must prioritise a clear and coherent vision regarding China’s role in its future economic and security strategies, making it a central focus of its agenda.
Don’t overlook other crises
Even as the EU zeroes in on its most critical threats, it cannot afford to retreat from the world. A recent survey reveals a tangled web of risks: a fragile Middle East ceasefire could collapse, potentially igniting a broader conflict with Iran. Meanwhile, while conflicts on the African continent – in Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, the DRC or Mozambique – may seem remote, they still rank high on the risk scale, and any escalation could spur significant migration flows into Europe. With its military and civilian missions already established across conflict zones, the EU is well-positioned to project force and tackle the root causes of instability. This presents it with an opportunity to strengthen its global engagement.
Can we maintain alignment with the US?
The Global Risks to the EU survey is inspired by the Preventive Priorities Survey which the Council of Foreign Affairs (CFR) has conducted among US experts since 2008. In 2025, the EUI and CFR coordinated their surveys to permit the comparison between the two groups of experts. This offers a rare glimpse into how American and European experts view the geopolitical threat landscape for the year ahead.
The results indicate a notable convergence of concerns on both sides of the Atlantic – ranging from the potential for renewed conflict with Russia, to the absence of peace in the Middle East, to escalating tensions with China.
A ceasefire favourable to Russia in Ukraine is a major risk for both sides of the Atlantic, questioning the rush to secure a peace deal from the Trump 2.0 administration. Neither American nor European experts foresee lasting peace in the Middle East, raising concerns over the fragility of the ceasefire brokered between Israel and Hamas in January 2025. Experts also agree on the high likelihood of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea (although US respondents tend to place East Asia contingency in a higher risk category than their EU counterparts).
The transatlantic relationship will appear fragile in the shadow of a confrontational Trump administration and a fragmented European leadership. There is little doubt that 2025 will be a turbulent year for Western cooperation. However, given the overlap in priorities across the Atlantic, there are clear opportunities for coordination. The key to unlocking this coordination will be political will.
